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Abstract 
Milton's Paradise Lost and Ilnre Madach's Az ember tragediaja [The Tragedy of 
Man] were written in different centuries, in different languages. Yet as reworkings of the 
story of the Fall of Man both attempt to explicate the phenomenon of human self-
awareness. A comparison of their treatment of knowledge and its relationship to the Fall 
discloses this similarity of intent, as well as the fundamental difference that underlies the 
philosophical position of the two authors. 
The thesis is divided into chapters that examine prelapsarian knowledge, the Fall 
itself, and postlapsarian knowledge in Paradise Lost and The Tragedy of Man 
respectively, with occasional reference to the Biblical story and literary analogues in order 
to illustrate the development of central themes. As elements of the story are considered -
Adam's conversation with God in Eden, the injunction against the Tree of Knowledge, the 
role of Satan or Lucifer, Eve's otherness, the consequences of the Fall, expulsion from the 
garden, and Adam's postlapsarian [re]discovery of knowledge - it becomes clear that 
Milton and Madach deploy them differently to different ends: for Milton self-knowledge is 
only possible within the context of a relationship with God, while for Madach self-
knowledge begins when man has abandoned God and, although the final stage of self-
understanding can only be achieved by returning to a relationship with the divine, certain 
knowledge is never possible. 
The comparison of Paradise Lost and The Tragedy of Man illustrates the fact that 
the desire to know remains a constant through the vagaries of human development, but the 
approach to knowledge taken by different generations shifts, drawing the story of the Fall 
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Introduction 
Know thyself - Delphic Oracle 
In Genesis, the desirability of forbidden knowledge is the catalyst that precipitates 
the Fall of Man. The serpent's suggestion that whoever eats the fruit of the Tree of 
Knowledge will become "as gods, knowing good and evil" (Gen. 3.5) effects a change in 
Eve's perception: considering (or reconsidering) the Tree, she sees that it is "to be desired 
to make one wise" (Gen. 3.6). Whether or not Adam also finds the fruit and its properties 
desirable is left to the reader's imagination. That he succumbs to temptation is summarily 
expressed in the words "and he did eat," but the object and means of seduction are not 
identified, leaving subsequent tradition free to represent Eve as temptress and Adam's fall 
not as a thirst for forbidden knowledge but as a fatal lapse into uxorious weakness that 
overcomes his better judgement. Tradition generally represents Adam as impervious to the 
appeal of illicit knowledge. In the sixth century account of the Fall by Alcimus Ecdicius 
A vitus the serpent approaches Eve because he fears "he could not seduce the man I From 
the firm resolution of his mind" (10-11).1 Similarly, in Adamus Exul (1601) and Adamo 
Caduto (1647) Adam eats the fruit in full realisation of what he does, compelled not by a 
thirst for knowledge but rather by his love of Eve. 
Despite discriminating between these two sources of temptation, knowledge and 
love, as appropriate to Eve and Adam respectively, the literary tradition that preserves and 
develops the story of the Fall maintains the centrality of the symbol of the Tree of 
Knowledge. In the Biblical account, the Tree is situated in the midst of the garden, and 
knowledge is likewise centrally located in the story of the Fall. Understanding the 
relationship between knowledge and falling in any given version of the story is critical to 
an appreciation of its underlying philosophical intent, and a comparison between versions 
illustrates the way in which the story is utilised to explore the phenomenon of the human 
capacity for knowing. For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen to compare the 
relationship between knowledge and falling in Milton's Paradise Lost with a version of 
the Fall story comparatively unfamiliar to English readers, Imre Madach's 19th century 
Hungarian dramatic poem, Az ember tragediaja [The Tragedy of Man]. While Milton's 
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reinterpretation of the relationship between knowledge and the Fall as far as Adam is 
concerned has received significant critical attention, The Tragedy of Man has not, in 
general, been approached as a revision of the Fall story. Yet here the interconnection 
between knowledge and falling receives another twist, one that takes it further from the 
original Biblical source and aligns it with contemporary philosophical thought, 
challenging the assumption that underlies Milton's epistemology, that man can only know 
himself within the context of a relationship with God. 
The choice of Madach's The Tragedy of Man as a companion work and point of 
contrast to Paradise Lost may well give rise to questions among students of Hungarian 
literature as well as among Miltonists. The two works were written in different centuries 
and different languages, after all, and little scholarship has attempted to link them. In an 
article that explores literary precursors for Madach's Adam, Karoly Horvath enumerates 
those details of The Tragedy that suggest Madach's familiarity with Paradise Lost, but 
more frequently critics have identified the poem as an example of the Romantic poeme 
d'humanite, or analysed it in terms of its Faustian influences or the Hegelian dialectic 
evident the structure of the dream sequence. Others have approached it by means of 
discussing its broad philosophical message.2 Given that criticism has by and large avoided 
the comparison between Milton and Mada.ch, it is reasonable to ask, why examine that 
comparison now? Why read The Tragedy as a reworking of the story of the Fall of Man 
and in connection with Paradise Lost? 
I All references to versions of the Fall story antecedent to Paradise Lost are drawn from Watson 
Kirkconnell's The Celestial Cycle; reference is given by page number rather than line. 
2 Karoly Horvath. "Adam alakjanak vilagirodalmi elozmenyeihez." For the Faustian influence see 
Leser; Lotze also looks at parallels between The Tragedy and Lessing's fragments of a Faust drama. Soter 
points out that although Goethe's Faust and The Tragedy ask some similar questions, the answers they give 
are very different, and many of the similarities between the two works are merely external and incidental: 
"Helyesen akkor jarunk el, ha leszogezziik, hogy Madach nemcsak formailag, de eszmeileg is ugyanugy 
inditja a Tragediat, mint Goethe a Faustot, - majd pedig csupan formailag hasonl6, de lenyegileg nagyon is 
eltero vegkifejlettel zarja" (180) [We proceed correctly, ifwe posit that not merely in terms of form but also 
ideologically Madach opens The Tragedy as Goethe does Faust. He closes it, however, with a denouement 
that is merely formally similar but in terms of substance is very different.] The Hegelian dialectic is treated 
in depth by Lotze (74-104). Of those critics who deal with the underlying philosophical message of The 
Tragedy, Lengyel offers the most compelling analysis in his article "A filoz6fia alapproblemaja 'Az ember 
tragediaja'-ban." 
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The answer lies in Madach's choice of Adam as the protagonist for his dramatic 
poem. In 1852, in the wake of Hungary's failed revolution against the Hapsburg empire, 
Madach was imprisoned for sheltering a political fugitive. Detained for close to a year, he 
read and reread Goethe's Faust (Leser 44) and his familiarity with that work is evident in 
The Tragedy; at many levels implicitly and explicitly the text refers to Faust. That he 
subsequently chose not Faust but Adam as the hero through which to explore the 
individual's approach to the problems of existence suggests that his aims are consciously 
different to Goethe's. In Adam and the story of the Fall, Madach discovered an element of 
character and subject matter not available to him through the story of Faust. MacCallum, 
discussing Milton's choice of Adam as the hero of his epic, observes that "Adam's 
experience contains the experience of mankind" (Sons 165). Hubay, discussing Madach' s 
use of Adam, goes one step further: not only does Adam's experience encapsulate the 
experience of all mankind, but, as the first father of humanity, Adam contains in himself 
the entire human race. If the human race is able to produce autocracy and democracy, 
Epicureanism and Christianity, orthodoxy and revolution, then all this must have been 
present as potential in Adam (1176). Yet despite this - or perhaps, paradoxically, because 
of it - Adam remains an individual, the individual, in a way that Faust cannot. Faust is not 
Everyman, the representative of the human race, but is a-typical in his striving for 
knowledge of a kind that those around him cannot appreciate. This fundamental difference 
between Faust and Adam is made dramatically clear in the fluidity, or lack of fluidity, with 
which the two characters enter and inhabit the various worlds they encounter. Adam, 
flexible and multifaceted as the entire human race in nucleo, is transformed from Pharaoh 
to Miltiades, from Kepler to Danton, while remaining simultaneously himself. Passing 
from scene to scene, he does not lose himself; his identity as Adam is not fractured by his 
assuming the identity of Tancred or Sergiolus. Rather, these personalities seem to grow 
organically from his personality and quest for knowledge as Adam. He is able to enter the 
scenes of the dream-sequence without causing disruption or discontinuance, and his 
revision of the ideal affects not the society in which he finds himself but only his 
developing ego.3 Even in London, the Phalanstery, and the Ice World, where he appears 
3 Lotze, identifying in Adam Hegel's "World-Historical Individual" whose "effort and ... passion 
bring[s]about progress," implies that Adam's revision of the ideal does have an impact upon society: in the 
Paris scene "Adam is seen ... for the last time as actively determining human history" (82) While it is 
undeniable that Adam responds to the corruption of the ideal in its historical realisation, his revision of the 
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without the disguise of an assumed character, his actions do not cause change within 
society. Rather, he is assimilated by that society and its inhabitants interpret his presence 
according to their own rules. In contrast, Faust remains Faust and his intrusion into 
different locales and historical or dramatic moments is disruptive and destructive. Rather 
than being assimilated by the reality that he enters, his entry threatens that reality. 
In Adam, then, Madach found a character whom he could treat dramatically and 
symbolically as an individual, while representing in him mankind's response - and his 
own personal response - to issues of history and self-determination. Adam's integrity as a 
dramatic persona is not undermined by his function as a symbol of the developing 
individual. A second reason motivating his choice of Adam over Faust is that the story of 
the Fall is aetiological, attempting to explain the human condition by rationalising our 
ability to conceive of an ideal of perfection within ourselves and our simultaneous 
inability to achieve that ideal as the result of the loss of an original perfection. While 
Milton's use of the Fall story stemmed from a desire to compose a literary masterpiece 
based on history that would be "doctrinal and exemplary to a nation" and "to Gods glory, 
by the honour and instruction of my country" (Works I 810), Madach wrote his 
masterpiece during a period of withdrawal and intense reflection, with no avowed didactic 
aims. His interest in history had already been established in his earlier dramas; now, by 
returning to the beginning of human history, he attempts to put into perspective the 
political and personal inability to achieve ideals that had driven him into seclusion.4 The 
Faust story, with its impetus for dramatic action based on the Book of Job rather than 
ideal, if judged in terms of bringing about progress, is a signal failure. It could be argued that his rejection of 
the ideal catapults the drama forward to the next scene, but this would be to forget Lucifer's role as 
orchestrator of the entire dream sequence. It is not Adam but Lucifer who canies the dreamer to the next 
scene, and invariably Adam anives at an epoch where the revision of the ideal has already been conupted. 
4 Madach's interest in drama saw several plays completed before The Tragedy: Commodus (1839), 
Napolyi Endre [Andrew of Naples] (1840-41), Csakvegnapjai [Csak's Last Days] (1841-42), Ferfi es no 
[Man and Woman] (1842-43), Csak trefa [Just a joke] (1843-44), Maria kiralyno [Queen Mary] (1843, 
revised 1855), and A civilizator [The Civilisator] (1859). Many of these are of an overtly historical nature. 
Ferji es no, a reinterpretation of The Trachinian Women of Sophocles, illustrates Madach's interest in the 
relationship between man and woman, an interest also evident in his shorter poetry (Lotze 39-42). "Az elso 
halott" [The First Man Dead] and "A no teremtese" [The Creation of Woman] both deal with themes 
Madach comes back to in greater depth in The Tragedy of Man. 
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Genesis, could not have offered him this perspective nor the means to develop the 
philosophy of life that informs The Tragedy. 
These two facts, the flexibility of Adam as both individual and Everyman, and the 
Fall as a starting point from which to understand the human experience, offer strong 
inducement to explore The Tragedy as a late revision of the Fall story. Yet the initial 
question remains: why compare Mad:ich's work with Milton's, and, more specifically, 
why compare their treatment of self-knowledge and falling? That Mad:ich knew Paradise 
Lost is generally accepted; he had access to Milton's epic in German or French translation 
or in Sandor Bessenyei' s Hungarian prose editions of 1796 and 1817 (Horvath 52). But 
direct.influence is not necessarily a prerequisite for comparison. In his article, "Godgames 
in Paradise: Educational Strategies in Milton and Fowles," Martin Kuester discusses the 
phenomenon of intertextuality generated by the act of reading two literary works that 
might otherwise be unrelated. Such intertextuality can "result in a revaluation of literary 
tradition, in an interpretation seeing older texts in new perspectives and integrating them 
into new textual genealogies in which they had never been seen before" (31). While it is 
not my intention to argue such a radical retroactive intertextuality between The Tragedy of 
Man and Paradise Lost, the process of comparison, which approaches the earlier work 
through the later one as well as the other way around, may shed new light on textual intent 
or literary effect in Paradise Lost. For instance, the fact that Mad:ich's Adam does not and 
cannot speak with God until the final Scene of The Tragedy of Man throws into focus the 
significance of Adam's conversation with God in Book VIII of Paradise Lost and its 
centrality to his growth in self-knowledge. The silent presence of death throughout The 
Tragedy as a catalyst to Adam's desire for knowledge likewise serves to highlight the 
necessity of his understanding death after the Fall in Paradise Lost. 
A comparison of the two works discovers a wealth of such subtleties in the 
treatment of the theme of knowledge. The chapters that follow identify the most critical of 
these. Unfortunately, the scope of the thesis does not allow for a similarly detailed 
exploration of Eve's growing self-knowledge but only for a few comments on how her 
otherness affects Adam's understanding of himself. The difference in the structure of the 
two works - three quarters of Paradise Lost narrates events before the Fall, while in The 
Tragedy Adam has fallen already by the end of Scene 2 - necessitates a slight imbalance 
in the amount of space allocated to prelapsarian knowledge in Paradise Lost. There is not 
much to say about knowledge before the Fall in The Tragedy simply because in this 
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instinctual state Madach's Adam does not know. What becomes clear as the comparison 
proceeds is that one of the fundamental differences between the philosophical positions of 
Milton and Madach is that for the former the Fall represents a failure in self-knowledge, 
while for the latter, self-knowledge only becomes possible through the Fall. 
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Chapter 1 
Prelapsarian knowledge: the Education of Adam and the Delineation of Choice 
Narrating the story of creation in Paradise Lost, the archangel Raphael asserts that 
man was made "self-knowing" (VII 510). Certainly when Adam is first introduced to the 
reader in Book IV, he possesses a confident and well-reasoned knowledge of himself and 
of God. He understands the process of his own creation (God "made us ... raised us from 
the dust" IV 416) and can extrapolate the goodness of the creator from the physical 
conditions of his own existence. In this first speech to Eve, he identifies not only God's 
creative power and goodness ("needs must the Power I That made us, and for us this ample 
World I Be infinitely good" 412-14), but also man's dependency on that power and 
goodness that "plac't us here I In all this happiness, who at his hand I Have nothing 
merited" ( 416-18), as well as his inability to recompense his Creator by paying off his debt 
of gratitude ("nor can perform I Aught whereof hee hath need" 418-20). The Adam of 
Book IV is aware of God's injunction against eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge 
and of the reasoning behind that injunction: he understands that the Tree is "The only sign 
of our obedience left I Among so many signs of power and rule I Conferr' d upon us" ( 428-
30). He recognises the responsibility he and Eve bear within the context of the created 
world and expresses this in a summary that mirrors the Westminster Catechism's 
identification of the "chief end of man." Adam's "But let us ever praise him, and extol I 
His bounty, following our delightful task I To prune these growing Plants, and tend these 
Flow'rs" (436-38) offers a kind of Edenic parallel to the glorification and enjoyment of 
God enjoined in the fourth question and answer of the Catechism. Adam and Eve are to 
extol (glorify) God, following their delightful task of tending Eden (enjoying God 
forever). 
When we first meet him in Book IV, then, Adam is possessed of a significant 
knowledge of himself, of God, of the created world, and of the interrelation of these as 
expressed in and expressive of God's goodness and man's responsibility. Only as we 
continue to read Paradise Lost are the processes that have contributed to his apparently 
adequate knowledge umavelled and it becomes clear how he arrived at this state of 
knowledge. The angel Raphael was notably absent from creation and heard the story 
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second-hand from his celestial companions: the self-knowledge he finds in Adam, 
although present as potential in newly-created man, is in fact learnt rather than instinctive. 
Adam is in tutelage and has been since the moment of his creation; his tutor is a God who 
not only supplies necessary information about the world in which Adam finds himself but 
prompts him to explore the nature of his own existence. In this sense the structure of . 
Paradise Lost presents the undoing of knowledge, moving backwards through narrative 
time from an Adam whose understanding seems sufficient, to an Adam who, newly 
created, lacks all concrete knowledge of himself, the world and God. 
The possibility of knowledge in the prelapsarian state is of central importance to 
Milton's reworking of the Fall story. The Biblical account of the creation of man 
comprises only narrative: "And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and 
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. And the LORD 
God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed" 
(Gen 2.8-9). The basic elements of the creation as narrated in Books VII and VIII of 
Paradise Lost are derived from the Genesis text - the formation of Adam from the "dust 
of the ground" (VII 524-5), his inspiration with "the breath of life" (VII 525-26) through 
which he becomes a "living soul" (VII 528), and his placement in Eden (VIII 300-306) -
but the Biblical narrative does not explore the impact of creation upon the "living soul." 
Adam asks no questions about his own existence or that of the creator and consequently no 
growth in knowledge is explicit within the narrative. What knowledge he possesses is 
inherent, not learnt, and his education at the hands of God is conducted not as colloquy but 
as instruction and observation: God delivers the injunction against the Tree of Knowledge 
and, remarking that it is not good for Adam to be alone, announces that he will make "an 
help meet for him" (Gen. 2.18). Adam's naming of the animals almost has a ring of 
whimsy about it. God brings the animals "unto Adam to see what he would call them: and 
whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof," a process that 
seems at best serendipitous if not downright chancy. 
Several points of difference between Genesis and Paradise Lost are immediately 
noticeable and all relate to the importance Milton attaches to Adam's self-knowledge and 
his developing understanding of his Creator and the created world. When Adam wakes 
after his creation, he finds himself faced with problems arising from the fact of his 
existence. He has no knowledge of "who I was, or where, or from what cause" (VIII 270-
71) but within moments of articulating his bewilderment at finding himself alive he intuits 
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that his existence cannot be the result of itself, that life cannot be self-created, and must 
therefore be evidence of "some great Maker." His continued questioning reveals his 
recognition of his reciprocal duty to praise the one who permitted him this initial self- · 
awareness, "Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, I From whom I have that thus I 
move and live, I And feel that I am happier than I know" (280-82). Knowledge of the self 
can only be approached through knowledge of God and, conversely, knowledge of the self 
leads to a more perfect knowledge of God. 1 The two are inextricable. In the moment of his 
nativity, it is Adam's awareness of his self-existence, his sense that he is happy and that he 
moves and lives, that leads him to postulate the existence of a Creator. 
Having reached this first stage in knowledge, Adam is conveyed in a dream to the 
Garden of Eden. There the voice that addressed him in sleep takes shape as "Whom thou 
sought'st," the great Maker who will continue the process of "creation" as he engages in 
conversation with the man he has made. In Genesis the first words of God to man 
comprise the injunction: "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou 
eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" (Gen. 2.16-17). Significantly, Milton's God prefaces 
his first speech to Adam with words of self-identification and the gifting of Eden, spelling 
out in dialogue the narrative of Genesis 2.15. His opening words contain an affirmation of 
his being as "Author of all this thou seest" and continue with the presentation of Paradise 
to man and the invitation to "eat freely with glad heart; fear here no dearth" (VIII 317, 
322). The first concern of Milton's God is to assure Adam of the goodness of creation and 
the Creator. Further, when he forbids Adam to eat the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of 
Good and Evil, he explains that the tree stands as a "Pledge of thy Obedience," privileging 
Adam with information that the Biblical Jehovah did not feel obliged to disclose. The 
I Milton implies this interrelationship in Of Education: "The end then of learning is to repair the 
ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate 
him, to be like him, as we may the nearest by possessing our souls of true vertue, which being united to the 
heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection" (Works II 366-67). Imitation implies not only an 
understanding of the object to be imitated but the necessity of a self-knowledge that enables one to recognise 
when one's behaviour c01Tesponds to the desired model. Conversely, regaining to know God aright begins 
by a process of self-realisation and perfection, "possessing our souls of true virtue." Compare Calvin: "No 
· man can survey himself without forthwith turning his thoughts towards the God in whom he lives and 
moves; because it is perfectly obvious, that the endowments which we possess cannot possibly be from 
ourselves; nay that our very being is nothing else than subsistence in God alone" (Institutes I 37). 
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consequences of transgression are also more clearly delineated: Adam will die, becoming 
mortal, and will be expelled from "this happy State" into "a World I Of woe and sorrow" 
(VIII 331, 332-33). 
In the Genesis account the prohibition is followed immediately by God's 
observation that it is not good for man to be alone, and the naming of the animals follows 
as a logical consequence from this. There is no opportunity for Adam to respond to the 
prohibition. Milton's rearrangement allows Adam to reflect upon the "rigid interdiction" 
and assert his choice to remain obedient and not incur the consequences of sin. But the 
prohibition and the identification of a knowledge that is forbidden represent only one 
element in Adam's education. The focus of the text is the positive progression in 
knowledge, and God's reaffirmation of Adam's dominance over the created world offers 
reassurance of his "gracious purpose" after the severity of the prohibition and its 
consequences. 
In Adam's response to the created world, the concept of "calling" found in the 
Genesis text is replaced by the significantly different verb "to name," one that suggests not 
only the random attachment of appellation to object but the recognition of qualities already 
expressed in some [ as yet unuttered] nomination. Adam's naming of the animals as they 
present themselves to him in Eden involves an understanding of the intrinsic nature of the 
created object: "I nam'd them, as they pass'd, and understood I Their Nature, with such 
knowledge God endu'd I My sudden apprehension" (352-54). He has progressed from the 
instinctive grasp of creation that enabled him to postulate a "great Maker" to a deeper 
understanding of the reality that underlies the physical appearance of created things. His 
understanding touches now upon inner truth rather than external appearance: he 
understands "their Nature" rather than simply what he "saw." The verbs of perception that 
had characterised his discourse in the moments after his awakening before his 
transportation to Eden - "found," "gaz' d," "saw," "perus 'd," "survey' d," "beheld" - were 
all oriented towards the external. In the lacuna between his creation and his transpotiation 
to Eden, he could not perceive what lay beneath external reality and used the verb to know 
without exception as a negative measure of understanding, either as a simple expression of 
the absence of knowledge ("But who I was, or where, or from what cause, I Knew not" 
270-71; "stray'd I knew not wither" 283), as a desire to remedy the absence of knowledge 
("how may I know him" 280), or as an uneasy awareness of the inaccessibility of self-
knowledge ("feel that I am happier than I know" 282). It is not until God has instructed 
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him to "know" (328) and "understand" (345), that the verbs of external perception that 
characterised Adam's discourse outside Eden are replaced by verbs expressive of deeper 
perception. His "sudden apprehension" is enabled by God and he is endued with 
"knowledge" that has become a positive rather than a negative measure of understanding -
"I.. .understood I Their Nature" (353). Having moved from physical appearance to inner 
reality, Adam is now able to return to the deeper questions of existence equipped with 
knowledge and understanding: his next speech reveals his realisation that the nature of 
God is beyond his full comprehension and therefore he cannot "name" God, and that 
although God has no need for companionship, man does. 
Here, too, Milton's account diverges from the Biblical text. In Genesis it is not 
Adam (at this stage still relegated to the status of grammatical object) who recognises his 
need for a "help meet," but God. In Paradise Lost Adam's recognition of his need for 
companionship is indicative of his reaching a higher level of self-knowledge, a level at 
which he can revise previous conclusions: he is, he says, no longer "happier than I know" 
but has become aware of a lack within him that precludes happiness: "In solitude I What 
happiness, who can enjoy alone, I Or all enjoying, what contentment find?" (364-6).2 
Whereas Adam's initial postulation of a divine Creator was the result of intuition, now his 
recognition of a lack within himself and the need for companionship demonstrates a 
newly-discovered faculty of deductive logic. Having seen and named the birds and beasts 
as they approached him "two and two," Adam identifies a lack of "two-and-two-ness" 
within himself and realises that he is lonely.3 Again, this new pitch of self-knowledge is 
reached only under tutelage to the divine: the task of naming the animals provides him 
with the opportunity to discover and articulate his need for companionship. That God 
intends the exercise as a catalyst towards self-knowledge is evident in his response to 
Adam's expression of his need: "The vision bright, I As with a smile more bright'n'd" 
(368). 
God's tutelage of Adam through the ensuing discussion parallels the systematic 
education Milton sets forth in A Tractate of Education, a method designed to "trie all their 
2 Kietzman overlooks Adam's progress in knowledge through the colloquy with God when she 
writes, "God applauds Adam's desire for a partner in conversation as a sign that he intuitively knows himself 
and is able to express 'the spirit within (him) free" (55, my italics) 
3 In Giambattista Andreini's L'Adamo it is not until Act II Scene 2 and after the creation of Eve that 
Adam calls the animals to him and gives them names. 
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peculiar gifts of nature, and if there were any secret excellence among them, [to] fetch it 
out, and give it fair opportunities to advance it selfe by" (Works II 413). God's assertion 
that the earth is full of living creatures with which Adam can "fmd pastime" is designed as 
a "trial" to encourage Adam to formulate more exactly the need he feels within himself. In 
his response, Adam evinces further growth in knowledge, not only recognising in himself 
a need for more than simply "pastime" but identifying precisely what qualities define the 
fellowship he seeks; namely, equality and participation in "all rational delight" (VIII 391). 
Not only has he gleaned the necessity of partnership from naming the birds and beasts but 
now, prompted by God's apparent indifference to his plight, he articulates his realisation 
that their nature is other than his own, not participating in "rational delight" but fitting 
them only to live with partners of their own kind. His use of "rational" in itself illustrates 
his deepening understanding of his own nature, marking an advanced stage of a self-
awareness that began in "quick instinctive motion." Further, Adam's basing his argument 
upon the inferiority of the animals demonstrates his capacity to recollect and utilise for his 
own purpose information supplied by external sources: when God brought the animals for 
naming, he stressed their "low subjection" and now Adam relies on this to support his 
request for an equal. 
Again, the Almighty is "not displeas'd." Having prompted Adam to identify the 
critical difference between his own nature and that of the animals, he now prompts him to 
identify the difference between the nature of man and God. A solitary state, he suggests, 
does not necessarily preclude happiness. Again it is a "trial" and one that Adam meets 
successfully, expressing his appreciation of God's immeasurable majesty and the inability 
of man to comprehend him fully: 
To attain 
The heighth and depth of thy Eternal ways 
All human thoughts come short, Supreme of things; 
Thou in thyself art perfect, and in thee 
Is no deficience found ( 412-16). 
Having acknowledged God's otherness, Adam returns to his argument, recognising that it 
is not negated by <;rod's comparison with his own solitary happiness, for the nature of man 
is other than the nature of God and the two cannot be compared. Specifically, God has no 
need to propagate, being perfect in his singularity, while man, who lacks the creative 
powers that enable God to "raise thy Creature to what heighth thou wilt I Of Union or 
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Communion, deifi'd" (430-31), yet desires to "beget I like of his like" (423-24). Adam's 
identification of his inability by conversing similarly to "deify" the animals of Eden and 
"erect [them] I From prone" (432-33) contains within it a summary of the process by 
which God has, from the moment of Adam's creation and more particularly throughout the 
conversation, drawn him erect, as it were, from his original instinctive state to a fullness of 
knowledge that enables him to engage in rational discussion with the highest of all beings, 
God himself. 
At this point God expresses satisfaction with Adam's progress and with the pitch 
of self-knowledge reached: 
Thus far to try thee, Adam, I was pleas' d, 
And find thee knowing not of Beasts alone, 
Which thou hast rightly nam' d, but of thyself, 
Expressing well the spirit within thee free, 
My Image ... 
I, ere thou spak' st, 
Knew it not good for Man to be alone, 
And no such company as then thou saw'st, 
Intended thee, for trial only brought, 
To see how thou could'stjudge of fit and meet (VIII 437-48). 
Adam has reached that state of well-reasoned knowledge in which we find him at 
the beginning of Book IV, understanding himself and God, and able to explain the 
relationship between God's goodness and man's responsibility. It is knowledge he has 
reached through interaction with his divine tutor, but from this point in dramatic time God 
retires from direct involvement in Eden, leaving Adam to continue his discovery of self 
with the "fit help" of his "other self," Eve, who moves his education away from a reasoned 
appreciation of God's goodness and man's responsibility towards an understanding of the 
importance of human relationships. However, by presenting the creation and education of 
Adam as an event recollected at a later point in narrative time, the structure of Paradise 
Lost enables the juxtaposition of Adam's perfected understanding of himself and his 
st~ggles with the paradox of otherness. His progress in self-knowledge and God's 
satisfaction with his understanding of "the spirit within" him are followed within a 
16 
hundred lines by his bewilderment at the nature of Eve, a bewilderment that will 
ultimately constitute a failure in self-knowledge as he decides to fall. 
It is in the prelapsarian state that the first significant difference between Milton's 
account of the Fall and Madach's can be identified. In his treatment of Adam's awakening 
consciousness, his transportation to Eden, God's delivery of the injunction, Adam's 
naming of the animals, and his request for a companion, Milton's concern is to illustrate 
Adam's growth in knowledge through his tutelage at the hands of his Creator. But the 
visibility of the divine and the divine concern in Adam's education in Paradise Lost are 
superseded by the invisibility of the divine in The Tragedy of Man. Having created the 
world and seen the "great ideal" incarnate, Madach's God sits back and ostensibly leaves 
the machine of creation to itself.4 God no longer walks with man or visits him in "divine 
shape" in dreams. In Paradise Lost Adam asks questions arising from his own existence 
and God assists him to discover satisfactory answers. In The Tragedy of Man neither 
Adam nor God formulates the essential questions of being. God addresses Adam 
anonymously and at first glance it does not appear that his intention is to prompt Adam to 
question the mystery of existence or to stimulate his pursuit of knowledge. Rather, he 
speaks only in order to deliver the injunction against the Tree of Knowledge. 5 In doing so, 
4 It is worth observing that the lines "A gep forog, az alkot6 pihen. I Evmilli6kig eljar tengelyen I 
Mig egy kerekfogat ujitni kell" (13-16) [The engine turns, the maker rests. I For aeons it will turn about its 
axle I Before one cog will need to be replaced] is Janos Arany's alteration ofMadach's original "S ugy ossze 
vag minden, hogy azt hiszem I Evmilli6kig szepen el forog I Mig egy kerekfogat ujitni kell" [And all 
dovetails so neatly, I think that I it will tick along for aeons I before one cog will need to be replaced]. The 
original image suggests that God views creation as a clock, wound up and ticking- the verb "elforog" [az 
ido] implies the passage of time, an image that carries subtly different connotations to the more explicit "a 
gep forog" [the engine turns]. Similarly, only in Arany's alteration does God identifies himself as the alkot6 
[maker] and only in Arany's version does God, having completed the work of creation, sit back and take a 
break. 
5 Hubay speaks of The Tragedy's "mitoszi kezdet[ e] (a Bibliab61 j61 ismert esemenyekkel)" ( 1776) 
[mythological beginning (with events familiar from the Bible)] but fails to note that beneath the veneer of 
familiarity the traditional material used by Madach is put through significant revision ( cf Horvath 52). The 
response of the heavenly chorus to the completed work of creation is reminiscent of Paradise Lost VIII 602-
32 rather than the Genesis account, where no mention is made of angelic hymns. Lucifer's silence, causing 
an interruption in the songs of praise, and his indictment of Creation again lack Biblical sources, and in 
terms of the Fall, the tempter appears not as a serpent but as a man, and claims rightful ownership not only 
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he follows the traditional formula of the Biblical story, prefacing his command with a 
reminder that beyond this one prohibition he has generously set an entire world (or 
garden) at Adam's disposal. The details of the injunction, however, depart from tradition, 
and it is in these deviations that one can begin to identify the purpose of Madach's 
revision of the Fall story and, specifically, God's involvement in the education of Adam. 
In the first place, Madach' s God forbids Adam access not only to the Tree of 
Knowledge but also to the Tree of Life. Traditionally only the Tree of Knowledge is 
forbidden, while the Tree of Life is relegated to a position of uncertain significance. In 
Paradise Lost it provides a place for Satan to perch as a cormorant "devising Death" (IV 
194-98) but despite its centrality in the garden, Adam does not think to eat its fruit and so 
avert the unknown death whose nature and meaning he agonises over after the Fall. In 
Book XII, following the Genesis story, an angel with a flaming sword prevents access to 
the tree; his intention is not only to create a barrier between fallen humanity and the 
possibility of eternal life (XI 93-95) but also to prevent "foul spirits" stealing the fruit and 
practising further delusions upon man (XI 122-25). Among the notable antecedents to 
Milton, in La Seconde Semaine du Bartas ascribes to the Tree of Life a peaceable quality 
that would keep man from insurrections, civil strife, grief and "the passage of twice-
childish age" (64). The author of the Junius manuscript suggests that the two trees were 
planted to give man a choice; in choosing to eat of the Tree of Life he would have lived 
"in the world of life eternal," free from the irksome reality of age and illness (31 ). In 
Adamo Caduto God encourages Adam and Eve to eat the fruit of the Tree of Life and not 
only to eat it, but eat it on a regular basis: 
Yet wilt thou never die 
(Weary and bent with age, with ancient flanks 
Trembling, and every power failing quite) 
If of the Tree of Life thou still shalt eat (229). 
Traditionally, then, the Tree of Life is either implicitly beneficial to mankind or, as in 
Adamo Caduto, explicitly beneficial, with the eating of its fruit actually enjoined by the 
Creator. In The Tragedy of Man Adam is warned away from the Tree of Life. It is no 
of the Tree of Knowledge (an advance on the Genesis serpent) but also the Tree of Life. Eve is not tempted 
first, afterward to tempt her husband in tum, but both are tempted and fall together. 
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longer beneficial to mankind and, paradoxically, carries the same penalty of death as does 
the Tree of Knowledge. 
The second difference explains this inversion of the traditional role of the Tree of 
Life: together with the Tree of Knowledge, it has become the property of Lucifer, to whom 
God gives both trees, after cursing them, at the end of Scene 1. While Milton's Eden is 
fenced about and watched over by angelic troops whose task is to deny Satan access to 
Paradise, Madach's God, in a radical reworking of the story, not only allows Lucifer 
access to Paradise but places him in the midst of his created world, gifting him the two 
trees that stand in the centre of the garden and defining a sphere within Eden to which 
Lucifer now has legal claim. God's motivation for warning Adam away from the trees is 
thus very different from his motivation in Paradise Lost. The trees no longer constitute a 
"memorial of obedience" but Adam is to avoid them because a "mas szellem" is guarding 
their tempting fruits. Translated as "alien spirit" by Mark, Szirtes and McLeod, "mas 
szellem" simply means a different spirit, one who is "other." While "alien" carries this 
connotation of otherness, it also suggests a repugnant or even sinister nature that is not 
necessarily present in the Hungarian. 6 Despite Lucifer's intentions to ruin Adam and Eve 
and "subvert [the] whole created world" (150-51),7 God does not refer to him as a "rossz 
szellem," an "evil spirit," but only as a "mas szellem," a designation that is not burdened 
with the connotations carried by the English "alien," and does not in itself bode evil but 
rather identifies Lucifer as one who is different. The prohibition thus reads: 
Stop, stop! I gave you the whole world, Adam. 
Avoid only these two trees; 
A different spirit watches over their tempting fruit, 
And he who tastes it will surely die (162-65). 8 
6 The adjective "mas" can be applied to anything or anyone who is dissimilar to oneself or to the 
object of comparison. The colloquial "mas majom," used of someone one wishes to distance oneself from, 
means literally "a different [kind of] ape," while the equivalent of the English "that's a different kettle of 
fish" is found in the Hungarian phrase "mas kaposzta" - "different cabbage." 
7 All translations from Hungarian are my own. Passages from The Tragedy are identified by 
reference to line number in the 1998 Raabe Klett Kiad6 edition. 
8 Compare Mark's translation: 
Beware, Adam, beware. To you I gave 
the whole earth, but these two trees, these I ban. 
Over them an alien spirit sits watch, 
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In these lines, then, two striking revisions of the traditional Fall story are found: 
the Tree of Life no longer occupies a place of nebulous significance at the centre of the 
garden of Eden but is clearly associated with the Tree of Knowledge as a tree to avoid, and 
Lucifer, the guardian of these two trees, is identified by God as a different spirit and the 
reason why Adam should avoid them. Continuing, God offers Adam an alternative, 
drawing his attention away from the trees to the grapes that hang ripe in the shade: 
Over there clustered grapes glint red, 
There soft shadow offers tranquillity 
In the sultry heat of dazzling noon (166-68). 
Again, God's presentation of an alternative is without precedent in antecedent versions of 
the Fall. In Paradise Lost God concludes the "rigid interdiction" and pauses a while 
before, "his clear aspect I Return'd" (336~37), he reminds Adam of his dominion over the 
earth and brings the animals before him to be named. While this reminder provides 
reassurance of God's "gracious purpose," in no way does it mitigate the severity of the 
consequences of the injunction, and its function is not to offer an alternative but, as has 
And he that tastes their fruit swallows his death (2). 
Also Szirtes: 
Beware, beware! The whole wide world is yours 
But those two trees you must shun. 
An alien spirit guards their tender fruit, 
And those who taste it find their life undone (30). 
And McLeod: 
Adam, I've given all the world to you, 
but those accursed trees you must avoid. 
An alien spirit tends their fruit to tempt you: 
whoever tastes of them, shall taste death also (9). 
The original reads: 
Megallj, megallj, egesz foldet neked 
Adam, csak e ket fat kerilld, kerilld, 
Mas szellem 6vja csabgyi.imolcseit, 
S halallal hal meg, aki elvezi (162-65). 
It is surprising that only McLeod utilises the potential pun in "csabgyi.imolcs." The two parts of the 
compound word, csab andgyiimolcs, means respectively "allurement, enticement" and "fiuit." Perhaps the 
most literal translation would be "their come-hither fruit." 
20 
already been noted, to prompt the next stage of Adam's developing self-knowledge by 
illustrating the need of the creature for a mate. 
Taking all three differences into account, it becomes clear that the injunction in 
The Tragedy more properly constitutes the presentation of a choice than in any previous 
version of the Fall. God does not forbid Adam to eat the fruit but warns him away from it: 
"e ket fat keriild, keriild" is an imperative to shun or avoid the two trees, not a strict 
injunction against the eating of their fruits. Although he spells out the consequences of 
death that will result should Adam choose to enjoy the fruit, nowhere in Scene 2 does he 
actually forbid the eating but only warns man to beware: "Ember, vigyazz!" (271) [Man, 
beware!]. Rather, in this speech God is delineating for Adam the conditions of choice. He 
identifies what has been given to man (the whole world) and what has not (these two 
trees). He identifies the guardian of the two trees as "different" and offers Adam an 
alternative, the grapes that hang ripe in the shade, presenting him with a choice between 
the status quo and an alternative. In the first instance, Adam chooses the status quo, 
deciding to follow the bidding of the voice. Later, in eating, he chooses the alternative, 
rejecting the conditions of innocence and instinctive life in Eden. But in the absence of a 
specific command not to eat, his actions do not properly comprise sin. God does not damn 
him or drive him from Eden but only abandons him to himself with the words, "Adam, 
Adam! Elhagytal engemet, I Elhagylak en is, lasd, mit ersz magadban!" (334-35) [Adam, 
Adam, you have abandoned me I I abandon you too; see what you can achieve on your 
own], and Adam leaves Eden of his own accord. 
In his poem, "Hit es tudas" [Faith and Knowledge], Madach laments the 
disjunction between God and man in the postlapsarian state: 
Megszakadt a mindenseg gyiiriije, 
Melyben Isten, ember egyiitt eltek, 
s a nagy urt tan at sem tudja szallni 
Isten gondja es emberremenyek (Valogatott muvei 313) 
[The ring of nature's unity was riven I 
in which God and man lived together I 
·and perhaps not even God's care and human hopes I 
can reach and touch across the vast chasm.] 
In The Tragedy, he seems to question how effectively God and man communicated even in 
the prelapsarian state. There is no dialogue between the two in Eden. The divine 
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pronouncements are audible but Adam hears and obeys only a "voice" (173, 271). 
Endowed with an intuition that parallels that of Milton's Adam, however, he extrapolates 
from this the command of God (327). In the absence of the physical presence of the divine 
there can be no discussion between God and man and it is only intuition or instinct that 
supplies the nominative "God" in Adam's mind. The Edenic state is one of instinctual 
existence, and knowledge in this context is limited to what can be intuited from 
experience. Eve feels that they are watched over by unnamed benevolent spirits and that 
their only duty is to be grateful to the one "who lavishes these joys on us" but again, the 
benefactor remains unnamed. This lack of communication stands in striking contrast to 
the colloquy Adam enjoys with his Maker in Paradise Lost and reflects a return to the 
Genesis story in the impression of distance it creates between God and man. In Genesis a 
sense of distance obtains between an omniscient, omnipotent Creator and a creature not 
privileged with narrative voice. In The Tragedy Adam is privileged with voice but until the 
end of the poem his voice and the voice of God do not engage in conversation: it is not 
until Scene 15 that he addresses the Lord directly. 
The reason for the absence of dialogue between God and man in Scene 2 is that 
before the Fall Adam lacks the requisite self-knowledge and the concomitant 
understanding of the nature of God to engage in meaningful conversation. Not until Scene 
15 has he reached a sufficient level of self-knowledge to understand his need of the divine. 
This self-knowledge represents the cumulative effect of a series of choices through which 
he is encouraged to identify what constitutes the ideal, the eszme, and how this relates to 
the human condition as the "sarba gyurt kis szikra" (104), the "small spark kneaded into 
mud." God sets up the model for this educational strategy in Scene 2, identifying for 
Adam the presence of a different spirit in Paradise and setting out for him the conditions 
of choice. But it is not the Lord who interacts with Adam through the dream sequence. In 
The Tragedy God is no longer the immediate catalyst to Adam's self-realisation as he was 
in Paradise Lost. That role is played by Lucifer before, during, and after the Fall. 
Not until the conclusion of the poem is Lucifer's role as divine pawn - or divine 
proxy- in Adam's education referred to explicitly by God: 
And you, Lucifer, you too are a link 
in my universe. Work on! 
Your cold knowledge and foolish denial 
will be the leaven that brings the ferment on ( 4085-88). 
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Despite this, Lucifer's role is clear from the earliest lines of the work. In Scene 1 he 
characterises himself as the gap between God's ideas and their manifestation in physical 
form. As the ancient spirit of tagadas [denial or negation], he was the force of un-being 
against which all creation was formed - a claim that is not denied by the Lord - and yet he 
is aware of the ultimate futility of his opposition. His very negativity engenders positivity; 
the awareness of the gap between thought and realisation is what drives God to create. As 
Lucifer puts it: 
You conquered me, for it's my doom 
Continually to fall in all my battles 
but to rise again with new strength (124-6). 
Madach's radical revision of the Fall tradition should alert us to God's intentions to 
utilise Lucifer in the human sphere. It is God who introduces the concept of difference into 
Paradise by giving Lucifer the two trees and, symbolically, rightful claim to the spheres of 
knowledge and life. Adam and Eve's subsequent fall is no spanner in the works of 
creation but is as much a necessary part of their evolution as was Lucifer's un-being 
during the process of creation. The two trees represent choice rather than a "pledge of 
obedience" and Adam's decision to eat does not constitute sin as such. God's role in 
Adam's education, then, mirrors his role in creation. Having seen the "great ideal" 
incarnate, he steps back, confident in the knowledge that nothing will need adjusting for 
aeons to come. In terms of Adam's education, he creates the conditions of choice, presents 
these to Adam, and then withdraws, allowing Adam to find his own path to self-
knowledge and bidding him "lasd, mit ersz magadban" (335) [see what you can achieve on 
your own]. Renouncing providential control, he leaves Adam in Lucifer's world, where 
the self, by itself, can be great (302). 
Halfway between Paradise Lost and The Tragedy of Man, Mihaly Csokonai 
Vitez's poem "Az ember, a poezis elso targya" [Man, Poetry's First Subject] (1801) 
addresses the same problems of human existence as Milton's Adam does when he awakes 
after his creation: 
"Audacious mortal! Mud impassioned," 
so a voice of air addressed me, 
"With your unholy life do you not fear 
to tread in the halls of angels? 
Who are you, why are you, where do you dwell? And at 
whose bidding do you move? What will you become at last? 
Until you plumb these questions' depths you're dust 
and will continue to be dust." At these words, 
like an insubstantial nebula at night, 
under the aether's spacious ceiling, 
tumbling with swift fall to the earth 
I was left but dust, but ash. 9 
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The voice of Adam's dream in Paradise Lost revealed itself as the Creator; Csokonai does 
not specify whether his "voice of air" is divine or demonic, whether its intentions are 
kindly or malign. But to direct to Milton's Adam the questions that voice formulates, it is 
at God's bidding that he moves, both literally in his transportation to Eden during the 
dream and figuratively in his growing self-awareness stimulated by conversation with the 
Creator. Unlike the later poet, whose self is undone by the unanswerability of the 
questions of being, becoming dust and ash, Milton affirms the possibility of knowledge. 
Csokonai, and with him Madach' s Adam, must struggle with an anonymity that is resolved 
for Milton's Adam within moments of his awakening in Eden when God appears and 
assures him that "whom thou sought'st I am" (VIII 316). In Paradise Lost God never 
belittles man as a means to stimulate his pursuit of knowledge. Nor, in fact, does Satan; 
rather, he elaborates on Eve's beauty and high status and represents her to herself as 
"Angelic Eve" and "Empress of this fair world." A voice that compels a quest for self-
knowledge through ridicule and by articulating the difference between the angels and 
unholy man moves towards Madach's Lucifer, whose arguments for the necessity of self-
knowledge and autonomy are expressive of contempt and condescension. 
Unlike the "voice of air," the directors of knowledge in Paradise Lost (God, 
Raphael, Michael and, to a lesser extent, Eve) do not urge self-knowledge as a remedy to 
the narrowness of human existence. Rather, self-knowledge is desirable because it entails 
a more perfect knowledge of God. In understanding himself, Adam understands "the spirit 
within" him, a spirit formed in the image of the divine, and thus understanding and 
9 From the Hungarian original in Verstar '98: a magyar lfra klasszikusai. 
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expressing himself, he understands and expresses God. Csokonai's "voice of air" and 
Madach's Lucifer urge knowledge of the self primarily in relation to its own existence: the 
· clause "at whose bidding do you move" is swamped by a tide of self-oriented questions. 
The focus of the problems of existence has shifted away from knowledge of the Creator to 
an awareness that a self exists which can no longer fully understand itself simply by 
reference to its Creator. Self-knowledge and knowledge of God, inextricably linked in the 
work of Milton, are treated, if not as independent issues by Csokonai and Madach, at least 
as issues that are in the process of divorce. In The Tragedy of Man knowledge of the self 
can only occur in God's absence, while knowledge of God, and in particular of the 





Adam's Other Self 
In Genesis Eve takes the fruit, eats it and presents it to Adam because it is "good 
for food ... pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise" (Gen 3.6). The 
reader is left to presume that her character is such that she values the apparent virtues of 
the fruit more highly than God's continued favour. In fact, we know nothing of Eve's 
character; the Biblical account eschews any attempt at psychological motivation. The 
narrative and dramatic space afforded Eve by both Milton and Madach creates a character 
much larger than the functionality she brings from Genesis. When she awakes after her 
creation in Paradise Lost, like Adam she questions her existence. His "But who I was, or 
where, or from what cause, Knew not" is mirrored in her "much wond'ring where I And 
what 1 was, whence thither brought, and how" (IV 451-2). But beyond this similarity of 
uncertainty and questioning, the details of their nativities differ. Adam awakens in the sun 
and his first sight is of the sky; Eve awakens in the shade and seeks the placid water ''pure 
as th'expanse of Heav'n" (IV 456). Adam springs up with "quick instinctive motion"; Eve 
lies down with "unexperienc'd thought" (457). Whereas Adam intuits some "great 
Maker" from the fact of his own existence, Eve is drawn instead to contemplation of 
created things and, specifically, her own image in the pool. The overt parallelism between 
Eve's discovery of her image and the Narcissus story can obscure the more significant 
parallels between her awakening and Adam's, which, explored, reveal a fundamental 
difference between the instinctive orientation of the two characters. 
Like Adam, Eve does not employ verbs of knowing in her narration of her nativity, 
but substitutes verbs of external perception: "look," "seem'd," "appear'd," "fixt mine 
eyes," "espi' d." However, whereas Adam is aware of "to know" as a negative measure of 
his lack of knowledge and employs phrases that indicate a desire for certain knowledge, 
Eve uses positive verbs of contemplation, "much wondr'ing," "unexperienc'd thought" (it 
is "thought" even though "unexperienced"), "pin' d with vain desire" (it is "desire" even 
though "vain"), "methought" (IV 451, 457, 466, 478). Without certain knowledge, she 
substitutes a process of contemplation that is expressive of a degree of awareness of the 
I 
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self in relationship to the external. 1 On the basis of this awareness she even forms 
judgements - in her opinion Adam is "less fair" than the image in the water - and revises 
those judgements in her final yielding to Adam, a yielding that implies more than a 
physical submission to the seizure of his hand.2 
During Adam's conversation with God, the verb "to know" is introduced as an 
imperative, enabling him to include it in his own vocabulary and to feel its effects in his 
increasingly confident self-knowledge. The conversation encourages him to look beyond 
the external and understand the inner nature of created things, of himself and of the divine. 
Significantly, God does not exhort Eve "to know." Instead the voice bids her "follow me" 
and steers her from one external reality to another, from one surface (the mirror of the 
lake) to another (the mirror of Adam's physical form). It is not God who first points Eve to 
an inner reality that surpasses what is available to external perception, but Adam, when he 
outlines for her the process of her creation, "To give thee being I lent I Out of my side to 
thee, nearest my heart I Substantial Life" (IV 483-5). God referred Eve to Adam as to him 
"whose image thou art," but Adam identifies in her not "his image" but his "soul" and 
"other half," pointing out that the relationship between them is not simply one of exterior 
and physical correspondence as the image in the pool corresponds to the physical presence 
of Eve but is substantial and spiritual, involving the interrelation of two physical and 
spiritual beings: she is not simply "His flesh, his bone" but also "Part of his Soul" ( 483, 
487). 
Given the intimate tutorial role God plays in Adam's education, it is reasonable to 
ask why God did not explain to Eve the true essence of her existence as Adam's "image," 
why he did not direct her beyond the exterior to the interior reality. After all, the divine 
programme in Adam's education is precisely that direction from exterior to interior. The 
answer is twofold and is found in Eve's natural orientation and in God's intention, having 
1 Eve's different orientation and intimacy with the natural world has been the subject of much 
critical study. Gulden finds her "more immediate means of knowing" to be "achieved through the created 
things" (13 7). McColley identifies in Eve a "questing imagination" (102), Schullenberger her "humanizing 
sensitivity to the sweetness of Eden" (76). 
2 Jacobus's suggestion that reasoning is not enough and "Force, however gentle, and coercion, 
keeping her from her desired returning to the pool, are necessary for Eve to begin to come to awareness of 
herself' (110) cannot be absolutely sustained. Adam seizes Eve's hand immediately, without pause to see 
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withdrawn from active participation in Adam's education, to leave the first couple to 
promote and develop each other's knowledge of self and the world. 3 
Even in the first moments after her nativity, Eve is oriented towards and aware of 
the necessity for human relationships. She does not wake and postulate from her own 
existence the existence of a creator but discovers instead the existence of an image, an 
other, and realises that this other is necessary to complete her own existence, her sense of 
self. It is not simply the beauty of the image that appeals to her but its "answering looks" 
(IV 464), its "sympathy and love" ( 465). Her identification of this need for an other, a 
need so strong that without intervention she would have lain on the bank of the lake pining 
"with vain desire," expresses her innate recognition of what Adam required the prompting 
of God to recognise - the human need for "two-and-two-ness." In articulating his need for 
a mate, Adam mentions his need for "rational delight" and "collateral love." In her 
description of the "shape within the wat'ry gleam," Eve identifies other necessary 
ingredients of the intimacy implicit in the Renaissance understanding of the word 
"conversation" - mutual delight in the other ("pleas' d I soon return' d, I Pleas' d it 
returned"), responsiveness ("answering looks"), "sympathy" and "love."4 
It is important to note that this orientation of Eve's springs not from God's 
intervention but innately from her untutored and independent waking self. Desire to 
complete the self through the identification of the other is not something the voice imposes 
whether reasoning alone is sufficient to persuade her, and Eve's "from that time on" could refer as easily to 
the presentation of his reasoned argument as to the seizure of her hand. 
3 Identity "as Paradise Lost instructs us, can only be discovered in relationship" (Schullenberger 
76); or, as Roussetzki puts it, "Adam does not need Eve for convenience's sake, solace or pleasure but to 
realize who he is essentially" (85). 
4 Jacobus proposes a fascinating alternative to the reading of narcissism into Eve's discovery of her 
image in the water, by comparing her action with that of the disembodied soul contemplating itself in the 
river of Paradise in Peter Sterry's A Discourse on the Freedom of the Will (London, 1675). "If Eve in her 
quest for self-knowledge ... can be likened to the soul in its quest for self-knowledge as Sterry interprets it, 
then Eve, in paradise, even though she is not separate from her body, does just what might be expected of 
her. She enjoys the pleasure of seeing the river and of seeing herself. For Sterry, there is no reason to deny 
this pleasure to the soul - provided it is a pleasure enjoyed by the intellectual or angelic part of the soul" 
(115-16). Kietzman makes the sensible observation that "Eve's interest in the reflection does not have to be 
read simply as evidence of distorted desire that must be chastened; it could be read as a first step towards 
self-understanding that should be free to go further" (64). Beneath the overt narcissism of Eve's self-
contemplation is a valid means towards self-knowledge that contrasts with Adam's discovery of himself. 
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upon Eve when it directs her away from the lake and towards Adam. It already exists in 
her as strongly as the orientation towards knowledge exists in Adam and enables him to 
make the intuitive leap from existence of self to existence of a "great Maker." In her 
analysis of Eve's narrative, Froula seems to overlook this point. Her assertion (328) that as 
"the voice interprets her to herself, Eve is not a self, a subject at all; she is rather a 
substanceless image, a mere 'shadow' without object until the voice unites her to Adam" 
implies that the voice denies Eve the true essence of herself. But while the voice fails to 
direct Eve towards internal realities that are vital for her growth in understanding, it does 
not effect a radical revision of her orientation but actually identifies that unique orientation 
and directs her towards an other in whom she can find fulfilment of her desire. As 
McColgan observes, "The 'Heavenly Maker' offers the appropriate instruction to elicit 
from his newly created beings a proper understanding of their natures and their roles" (30). 
In acknowledgement of impulses expressed by Adam in the moments after his creation, 
God grants knowledge and responsibility; similarly, he acknowledges the impetus of Eve's 
nature and grants her relationship, fecundity, and motherhood. He gives Eden to Adam 
together with the responsibility it entails ("This Paradise I give thee, count it thine" VIII 
319); to E;ve he gifts Adam ("him thou shalt enjoy I Inseparably thine" IV 4 72-73) and 
blesses her with the promise that she will "bear I Multitudes like [her]self' (473-74). 
The fact that Adam and Eve are possessed of different instinctive orientations and 
are privileged with different educational experiences .does not mean that there is no 
appropriation of Eve by the patriarchal hierarchy of Eden. Most significantly, in her 
account of her nativity, she is permitted no opportunity to express herself. She does not 
vocalise her needs, queries, or concerns during the entire experience; it is not an 
educational exchange but the imposition of education. In Adam's account of his waking, 
he includes his own direct speech as well as that of God. "To speak I tri' d, and forthwith 
spake" (VIII 271), he tells Raphael and proceeds to narrate his address to the sun, the light, 
the earth and the living creatures he saw around him. His questions of being, first cast in 
indirect speech are then translated into direct speech: "Tell me, how may I know him, how 
adore, I From whom I have that thus I move and live" (VIII 280-81). But Eve's questions 
of being remain unarticulated, the subject of mute "wond'ring." Her image in the lake is 
silent: her communion with her reflection comprises only "looks." Kietzman's assertion 
that through language one can "author a self' is critical: Eve is allowed no opportunity for 
self-authorship in the moments after her nativity but is authored by others. The only direct 
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speech embedded in her narrative is that of the invisible voice and Adam (Froula 329). To 
both she replies in action, as if action constitutes the only possible reply. Her "what could 
I do, I But follow straight, invisibly thus led?" implies a perceived lack of choice. The 
lack of opportunity for the kind of verbal exchange that was offered to Adam and proved 
so critical in his developing understanding means that her educational experience denies 
her the possibility of full self-discovery. She is not allowed to proceed step by step 
towards conclusions about herself but is informed of her nature by others. To be the 
recipient of such an educational experience in which knowledge of self is imposed from 
external sources, supplanting self-discovery, implies that in the context of Eden and for 
Eve the journey towards self-knowledge is of no consequence. What she needs to know is 
supplied by the hierarchy, filtered from God through Adam. 
Yet Eve's otherness has an effect on Adam. Having prompted Adam to the 
expression of the "spirit within thee .. ./ My Image" (VIII 440-41), God withdraws, leaving 
the human couple together to continue the process of self-discovery in conversation with 
each other (McColgan 33). That Eve's orientation towards the external world and her 
"instinctive groping towards completion in another self' (MacCallum Sons 137) has an 
impact upon Adam's more rational approach to creation is clear from his admission to 
Raphael in Book VIII. "Authority and Reason" are the hallmarks of Adam's approach to 
creation and are attributes fostered by conversation with God in the moments after his 
creation. Now he feels that "Authority and Reason" are subservient to Eve, that what she 
"wills to do or say I Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best" (549-50). Implicit in the 
suggestion is the underlying realisation that her approach to the world is based on neither 
authority nor reason. Her unreasoned, instinctive appreciation of the value of the other in 
understanding the self has presented itself to Adam as an alternative way of knowing. 
It is significant that Eve's first "conversational act" with Adam is to yield to his 
hand and her final "conversational act" before the Fall is to withdraw her hand from his. In 
keeping with his authoritative and reasoned approach to created things, the impulse 
towards possession comes from Adam; paradoxically, the impetus towards withdrawal 
comes from Eve. The two actions frame their prelapsarian relationship, defining the 
beginning and the end of their recorded relationship before the Fall. "To love one 
another," Schullenberger observes, "is, in the terms of the poem, to become the image of 
the other" (80). Fascinatingly, their prelapsarian relationship and their exposure to the 
innate orientation of the other partner effects an inversion of the first couple's initial 
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orientation and their subsequent motivation in the Fall, an inversion that hinges upon 
opportunities for knowledge within Eden. Eve, who is initially oriented towards the 
necessity for human relationships and is deprived of the opportunity to learn through 
conversation with God, is attracted in the Fall by the possibility of higher knowledge. 
Adam, whose thirst for knowledge is sated by conversation with God and Raphael, falls 
because of his acute awareness of the necessity of human relationships. 
Eve's sensitivity to the created world in The Tragedy of Man forms a strong 
parallel with that of Milton's Eve. Her awareness of the angels watching over them, her 
receptivity to the heavenly music, and her understanding of the unity of the disparate 
voices of creation in the overriding harmony of love, are reminiscent of Book IV of 
Paradise Lost, where Milton's Eve catalogues the beauty of creation and creates harmony 
through ring composition and the subordination of the individual charms of creation to her 
love for Adam. Madach's Eve, like Milton's, is possessed of a wisdom specific to herself, 
an innate understanding of the natural sphere that is more intimate than Adam's and that at 
times shows up insufficiencies in Adam's understanding. 
But before exploring the nature and sphere of Eve's wisdom in The Tragedy, it is 
worth pointing to the significant difference between Milton's Eve and Madach's, namely, 
that in contrast to the Eve of Paradise Lost, the Eve of The Tragedy is not motivated by a 
desire for knowledge as a means to establish equality. Despite the fact that at first reading 
Madach' s heaven seems to be based on a similarly patriarchal system as Milton's and the 
angelic choir sing of the "incarnation" of the Great Ideal, Madach's creative God is a 
divine mechanic who views his creation as a well-constructed machine. Contemporary 
illustrator Mihaly Zichy represents Madach's God in traditional guise, bearded, 
grandfatherly yet imperious, but the structure of the Hungarian language itself, with its 
lack of a specifically masculine third person singular pronoun - 6 meaning he, she and it -
creates an absence of gender-specificity which represents a significant revision of the 
uncontrovertible gender dynamics of the Miltonic text.5 Madach's God is "Isten" or "az 
Ur" - "God" or "the Lord" - never "the Father." No dramatic time is allotted to the 
creation of man and woman and thus we learn of Eve's creation only in her own discourse, 
5 Szirtes's translation uses the original illustrations. The reader who is interested in Zichy's work 
will find God featured on pages 29 and 256. 
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not as a "help meet" or "last best gift" of Heaven but as the incarnation of Adam's desire, 
"kit letre is csak ho vagyad hozott" (183) [ whom your warm desire alone called forth to 
life]. After her nativity in Paradise Lost Eve discovers her image in the lake, an image 
equated by the voice with her "self' and which she is obliged to abandon, accepting the 
lack of true substance in the feminine isolated from the masculine whose image she is. 
Eve's narration of her nativity is reflected in The Tragedy but in reflection is turned inside-
out: 
Where else could I hope to find [that radiance] but in you? 
It was your warm desire that summoned me to life, 
Like when the regal sun in streams of light, 
Unwilling to be lonesome in the universe 
Paints itself upon the surface of the water 
and dallies with the image, glad to have a mate, 
indulgently forgetting that she is but 
the glimmered likeness of his own fire 
and will fade to nothing when he dims ( 182-190). 
The picture Eve paints in this speech reflects nothing but her own voice, her own values; 
no voice instructs her in the creation of imagery or the alignment of her loyalties. The 
narrative of Paradise Lost is liberated from the 'gentle seizure' of the patriarchal hand and 
Eve vocalises in imagery drawn from her observation of the natural world her own 
feelings of [inter]dependence upon Adam. While the image builds towards an expression 
of the reflection's reliance upon the sun to sustain it, the focus of the passage is not the 
existence of the reflection but the existence of the sun itself: five lines deal with the sun, 
compelled by loneliness to create and rejoicing in that creation, while only two lines are 
devoted to the reflection's dependency. Eve's complex word-picture suggests that any act 
of creation is effectively narcissistic: the sun creates a reflection on the water not 
incidentally (as does Eve in Paradise Lost) but with deliberate intent, attempting to 
resolve a lack within itself. The frailty of the reflection is reflected in the frailty of the sun, 
that loneliness that drives it to seek its image on the water. 
Madach' s Eve is not relegated to a subordinate status in the dissemination of 
received wisdom and experiences no sense of inferiority. The voice of God that delivers 
the initial warning the fruit Trees of Knowledge and Life and the dire consequences of 
tasting the fruit addresses itself to Adam but is heard equally by Eve. The second warning, 
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"Ember, vigyazz!" [Man (or, Human) beware!], while couched in the second person 
singular imperative, lacks any specific designation and can be read as equally applicable to 
Eve as to Adam. Unlike the Eve of Paradise Lost, who first initiates conversation with her 
husband only in the final quarter of the epic and whose initiation of conversation 
constitutes a subtle rebellion against the patriarchal and hierarchical order of creation, 
Madach's Eve opens the dialogue in Eden and Adam's response, "Es umak lenni 
mindennek felett" (155) [And to be lord over everything], is grammatically dependent 
upon her opening line, the infinitive lenni [ to be] referring back to her exclamation "Ah, 
elni, elni: milly edes, mi szep!" (154) [Ah, to live, to live-how sweet, how beautiful!]. 
The equality established in these opening lines continues throughout Scene II. 
Besides the quantitative parity of their dialogue (Adam is given 42 Yi lines of dialogue, 
Eve 38), their response to Lucifer's reasoning is presented in a series of complementary 
one-line utterances arranged in a way that grants primacy to neither but rather emphasises 
the differences between the two protagonists. 
Adam: You tell such tales ... they make my head reel. 
Eve: I'm enraptured; you say such beautiful, new things (258-9). 
Eve: How cruel our creator is after all. 
Adam: But what if you deceive us? (267-8) 
Adam: The Lord said that he will punish us if we choose 
Some other path than that he has appointed. 
Eve: Why would he punish us? (304-6) 
Eve: Then I shall pluck one of these fruits. 
Adam: The Lord has cursed them (327-8). 
This final exchange continues with two and a half more lines from Adam but is effectively 
punctuated at this point by Lucifer's laughter. Similarly, their responses after the Fall are 
antithetical. Eve's despairing "Vegiink van" (335) [This is the end of us] is countered by 
Adam's emphatic response to Lucifer's asking whether they are discouraged: "Korantse 
hidd" (336) [Not in the least]. 
Eve's one substantial speech in Scene 2, that beginning "Miert buntetne" [Why 
would he punish us], provides a point of departure for an examination of her discourse and 
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what it reveals about her character in relation to knowledge. These lines constitute her 
only attempt at abstract rationalisation in Scene 2 and for this reason throw into focus the 
underlying consistency in her various apparently fickle responses to argument and action. 
They also demonstrate how all her wisdom is grounded in observation of and experience 
of the world of the senses. Madach's Eve shares with Milton's an instinctive and 
integrated understanding of nature as perceptible to the human senses; Gulden's 
observation, "Eve's more immediate means of knowing is achieved through the created 
things" (137), is equally applicable to Madach's Eve. Her reply to Adam begins with a 
semblance of logic: 
Why should he punish us? Ifhe has marked out 
The path he wishes us to follow, surely 
He made us such that sinful impulses 
Will not lure us to another way (306-9). 
She justifies her reasoning not by further abstraction but by argument based on "created 
things." She likens their spiritual state to observed, physical realities, realising her 
metaphors with compelling detail. The precarious state of their innocence is compared to 
standing with a spinning head ["szedelg6 fejjel"] above an abyss, while she suggests that 
sin is as much a part of God's design as is a storm among bright, sunlit days and that 
temptation warms them ["melegft" - as might the sun]. Her argument can be reduced to a 
simple comparison of visible creation with invisible, the perceived world with the 
imperceptible. She resorts to parallels between the physical and spiritual spheres of 
creation and overlooks the logical counterargument to her initial surmise (307-9), namely, 
that they have been created with choice, with freewill. Standing in contrast to Eve's 
reliance upon the natural world to explain the spiritual, Adam's responses are based purely 
in idealism. He clings to the ideal of divine righteousness that will punish disobedience, 
arguing that "The Lord said that he will punish us if we choose I Some other path than that 
he has appointed." (304-5). 
Knowledge in the prelapsarian state is vital in Paradise Lost - to Adam because he 
has opportunity to pursue it, to Eve because she lacks that opportunity. In The Tragedy of 
Man, however, knowledge does not become an issue for either Adam or Eve until the 
arrival of Lucifer in Eden. In the final moment of decision, commanding Eve to pluck the 
fruit or at least colluding in her decision made a second ahead of his (another revision of 
the traditional story that eases the burden of responsibility from Eve to Adam), Adam 
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declares his intention to know: "legyiink tud6k mint Isten" (330) [let us be knowing ones 
like God]. Eve, on the other hand, avoids the verb to know throughout the entire scene and 
rather speaks of feeling ( erezni 155) and its correlative understanding ( erteni cf 201 ). For 
Eve the two are inseparable. Understanding is arrived at through her sensitive experience 
of the world. In Scene 4 she cries "hiaba kered azt, I Ki kinjainknak nem volt reszese, I 
Nern ert, nem ert! (601-3) [Don't waste your breath. I He who hasn't shared our agony I 
can't understand, can't understand!]. One understands because one has experienced. Thus 
understanding is a sensitive response to a system of stimuli rather than the result of an 
abstracted logical process. 
It is in this sense that Madach's Eve, while not vulnerable to the appeal of any 
equality knowledge would seem to proffer, is nevertheless vulnerable to the arguments 
presented by Lucifer in a way that Adam, with his idealism, is not. Lucifer, the "gap" who 
necessitated creation, whose first influence on the dramatic action of the poem is to 
interrupt the heavenly paeans with silence, now drives a wedge of ideological difference 
between Adam and Eve. Eve, with her acuity to the resonances of the perceptible world, 
responds immediately to the new stimulus Lucifer provides, not with the response of 
reasoned logic but with the logic of emotion. Her "en lelkesulok, szep s uj dolgokat 
mondsz" (250) [I'm enraptured; you say such beautiful, new things] with its emphatic use 
of the first person pronoun "en" articulates not just her fascination with what Lucifer says 
but presents her response as consciously different to that of Adam. 
This emotional response is not confined to her reaction to Lucifer but is present as 
her defining characteristic from the first lines of Scene 2. Her "Ah, to live, to live - how 
lovely, how sweet!" led Soter to identify Eve as the representative of the natural sphere 
(180), while Leser (astonishingly) finds Eve to be "limited to strictly sexual and maternal 
roles" ( 48). Lengyel, who recognises that at one level The Tragedy comprises "az emberi 
alkat. .. ellenmondasanak szimbolikus cselekmenybe vetitodese" [the projection of the 
contradictions of human nature into a symbolic plot] (149) and identifies in Eve "az ember 
szellemiseget rejto alkatanak a kivetftodese ... az osztoni elet megtestesitoje" [the 
projection of (one facet) of the individual's inner being ... the embodiment of instinctual 
life] (162), nevertheless effectively discredits her when, discussing the divine behest to 
strive on, he comments, "Eva is megerti, a sajatosan erzelmi leny, sot eppen o erti meg 
leghamarabb" [Eve, too, understands, that singularly sensitive creature; indeed, she even 
understands first] (155), as if understanding is not at all what one expects of Eve. Lotze 
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claims that Eve "is more inclined toward enjoyment of life than Adam" (67), a comment 
that fails to take into consideration the grammatical dependence of Adam's first line upon 
Eve's: Adam is also inclined towards enjoyment of life and does not negate Eve's 
expression of enjoyment but rather adds to it with his "es umak lenni mindenek felett" 
(155) [And to be lord over everything]. Lotze continues, "Her ties to nature are closer than 
his; she is emotional and is not given to abstract reflection .... She is less stable, can be 
tempted more easily, and tends to act without thinking" (67). With the exception of the 
final clause, we could as easily apply Lotze's analysis to Milton's Eve as a very crude 
appraisal of character but it is this final clause that proves the crucial one, for it is 
precisely Eve's apparent tendency to act without thought - a criticism that cannot be 
attached to Milton's Eve, who responds to Satan's temptation with a consideration and 
logic that more characteristically pertain to the masculine cast of mind 6 - that points to 
the significant difference in Madach's portrayal of Eve and, consequently, to his different 
intent and the underlying philosophical message of the The Tragedy. 
Eve acts "without thinking." It is easy to understand how Lotze arrives at this 
conclusion but an examination of the text demonstrates not that Eve acts without thinking 
but that the thought processes that inform her actions and words differ from those of Adam 
and expressive not of a rational but of an emotive logic. Eve does not "act without 
thinking" in the sense that her actions are unrelated to any cognitive-responsive process. 
Her actions are not ungoverned or haphazard but are the outcome of a thought-process so 
different, so divorced from the linear mode of reasoning associated with masculine 
response that Lotze fails to recognise it for what it is: an entirely feminine response, 
consistent and logical within its own framework as erzelem or sensibility, a 
complementary "other" to Adam, whose response is invariably idealistic. In this sense 
Madach's Eve is radically feminist. Lieb's study of Milton's understanding of the high 
status of the Biblical 'ezer keneghdo, the "help-meet," and McColley's examination of 
antecedent versions of the Fall story show to what extent Milton's text is revisionary, 
reworking traditions in a way that affords Eve a new dignity and virtue. But this 
rehabilitation occurs within a text dominated by the masculine: Milton's Eve is central to 
the action of the epic but in the final analysis it is Adam who is privileged by the angelic 
6 Stevenson notes that the basis on which Eve decides to eat the fruit is "on the Platonic scale of 
understanding, will, and appetite, higher than Adam's, and more typically or stereotypically masculine. She 
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visitors and, in terms of knowledge, Eve cannot "add to what wants in female sex" and 
assert her equality either through her difference or in spite of it. The subtext of Paradise 
Lost is rich with the "possibility of feminist thinking" (Schullenberger 70) but it is Madach 
who, whether with conscious intent or not, releases Eve from possibilities and endows her 
with actuality as an entirely feminine principle of knowledge not only within Eden but 
also within the individual. Madach's Eve does not argue against, challenge or assume the 
masculine role but, perfectly expressing and perfectly expressed by her feminine qualities, 
exerts an artless influence on action and actors with profound results. 
Eve's characterisation is subtler and more significant than a simple equation with 
the natural sphere. She embodies not the natural world but erzelem [ sensibility or 
responsive sensitivity] itself and while this pertains largely to the perceived world and 
draws its strength and wisdom from that perceived world, it is also responsive to other 
stimuli in a way that is consistent with the nature of erzelem, which is defined as 
Az ember tudatanak, lelkivilaganak az az allapota, tartalma, gyak. az 
ertelemmel es az akarattal szemben az a megnyilatkozasa, amelynek forrasa 
az emberekkel, targyakkal, a k:iilso vilag jelensegeivel szemben val6 nem 
tudatos, egyeni allasfoglalas (A magyar nyelv ertelmezo sz6tara). 
[That condition and content of a person's consciousness or state of mind, 
often its manifestation in opposition to intellect and volition, the source of 
which is a subconscious, subjective attitude with respect to people, objects 
and the manifestations of the external world]. 
The "inconsistencies" in Eve's character that Lotze complains of are no longer 
problematic when we remember that erzelem is by very definition the umeasoned and 
subjective response of the individual to the stimuli of the external world. What remains 
constant is the emotive basis of the response, its immediacy, and the evaluation of things 
as they are perceived. When the voice of the Lord forbids them to touch the Trees of 
Knowledge and Life, Adam's "why" queries the terms of the prohibition: "Csodas 
parancs, de ugy latszik, komoly" (169) [A strange behest, but it seems serious]. Eve's 
"why" reflects an evaluation based in the perceived reality of the object: "Miert szebb e 
ket fa, mint mas; vagy miert I Epp ez tilalmas? (170-71) [Why are these two trees lovelier 
than the rest; or why I Are only they forbidden?]. It is not the injunction that she cannot 
responds to temptation more rationally than Adam, Adam more emotionally than Eve" (127). 
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understand but the apparent discrepancy between the injunction and her own system of 
evaluation: the trees are beautiful and therefore should not harbour evil. When Lucifer 
suggests that faith and dependence deny the self full realisation, Eve's response is 
immediate and emotive: "I'm emaptured; you say such beautiful, new things." The 
suggestion that God has withheld knowledge and eternal life provokes her to re-evaluate 
what had previously been accepted as loving providence: "How cruel our creator is after 
all" (267). When the voice of God abandons Adam, Eve's response is again emotional and 
she reacts to conditions as they are immediately perceived: "This is the end of us" (336). 
Rather than taking these responses as evidence of the instability of her character or as lack 
of thought, they should be seen as the entirely consistent response of erzelem to situations 
as they arise. 
Although the scope of this thesis does not allow a detailed examination of Eve's 
characterisation, an examination of her role in the next few scenes will illustrate the 
consistency of her presentation and its significance in Madach's symbolic representation 
of the interdependent yet often conflicting facets of human nature. In Scene 3 Adam 
agonises over his mortality and the uncertainty of existence, and momentarily regrets 
discarding the ideal of divine righteousness: 
Oh, why 
Did I cast aside that providence 
My instincts dimly felt but did not treasure, 
For which my mind now yearns - oh, but in vain (450-53). 
Existence itself has been shown to be a process in a constant state of flux and not the solid 
fact on which Adam had based his claims of self-divinity. Eve's response appears to miss 
entirely the substance of his distress, focusing rather on the details of the altered physical 
world: 
Oh yes, yes, I feel the same way, too. 
When you are doing battle with wild beasts, 
Or I, with drooping strength, nurse our garden, 
I turn and look across this wide world 
But in earth or heaven find no kin, 
no friend, to comfort or to guard us. 
It was so different once in happier times ( 454-60). 
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Following Adam's agonising over the very nature of existence, Eve's words sound like 
little more than complaint, comprising nothing more than a quantitative sensitive response 
to experienced reality. But before dismissing them as shallow in comparison to Adam's 
grappling with the very substance of being itself, it is worth noting that she expresses the 
reality of "that providence" that Adam's "instincts dimly felt but did not treasure," 
identifying in response to his expression of loneliness those caring friends she first refers 
to in Scene 2 156. What Adam's instincts "dimly felt," Eve's acuity to the experienced 
world named as friends and kin. If she now expresses distress at the lack of these 
companions, it is because she was more acutely aware of their companionship in Eden. 
In Egypt, Eve links understanding to experience and claims that Pharaoh cannot 
understand because he has not experienced. In this scene her role as erzelem [sensibility] 
presents the most emphatic contrast to Adam's search for the ideal. Not only is she 
strongly characterised as possessing an acutely responsive sensitivity but she becomes, in 
a sense, erzelem itself. At the beginning of the scene Adam is devoid of any response to 
the external world. When Lucifer asks what he feels in his heart, he replies "Urt erzek, 
mondhatatlan iirt" (590) [I feel a void, an inexpressible void]. Eve's appearance as a slave-
woman falling with a cry of anguish beside her dying husband immediately negates the 
void in Adam's heart and replaces it with feeling, an experience to which he is 
unaccustomed: "mi ismeretlen erzes szall szivembe" ( 607) [ what unfamiliar feeling enters 
my heart?]. Through Eve, Adam begins to feel and understand his own emotions. Her 
presence allows him an awareness of the external, experiential world, not only by opening 
him to love but also by exposing him to the world beyond the self: "Szfveden keresztiil I A 
jajsz6, mint villam, fejembe csap" (672-3) [Through your heart I That wail of woe, like a 
bolt of lightning, strikes into my head]. Thus Eve functions as a conduit between the 
external world and the self, opening Adam to the possibility of emotion in himself and 
sensitive response to others, a function entirely parallel to that of erzelem. 
Eve's fluctuations between despair and hope in Athens are similarly expressive of 
erzelem. Her function vis-a-vis Adam here is different from that in Egypt but her role is 
still the expression of emotion: she prays not for civic crowns for Miltiades' brow, only 
"domestic peace for the champion's heart" (882), and her response to situations as they 
change is the consistently immediate, subjective response of erzelem. Lucifer's false 
account of Miltiades' return elicits despair rather than a reasoned response. Similarly, 
when Miltiades speaks of his sacrifices on behalf of his homeland, Eve's reply is couched 
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in emotive terms, "The fatherland and my heart bleed more than you" (974), and when she 
realises her fears are unfounded, her response is once again not logical but emotional: "hol 
van boldogabb no, I Mint a te nod, nemes nagy ferfiu" (986-87) [ where is a woman 
happier I than your wife, you great and noble man]. In Rome it is Eve who first feels and 
expresses the emptiness of the hedonistic life. Her rejection of the values of hedonism is 
not based in rational logic but is a purely emotional response or a "subconscious, 
subjective attitude." She is aware of the nature of her rejection and speaks of the emotive 
logic that underlies it as something experienced in a dream-state: "ugy erzem, mintha 
alomban feklidnem" (1236) [I feel as if I lay dreaming]. The auditory stimuli of this 
hedonistic existence, its laughter, music and song, stimulate her emotive response and 
waken memories of the distant music and song of Eden. The sensitivity Eve demonstrated 
in Scene 2 to the music of the heavens continues to characterise her responses to whatever 
world in which she finds herself. 
Before the entrance of Lucifer into Eden, Eve's responsive sensitivity is balanced 
and complemented by Adam's idealistic world-view. In reply to her query about the Trees 
of Knowledge and Life, Adam replies with an idealistic analysis in terms that Eve as 
erzelem can appreciate, "Hat mert kek az eg, I Miert zold a liget - eleg, hogy ugy van" 
(171-72) [Why is the sky blue, I Why is the woodland green? Enough that things are as 
they are]. His reply acknowledges Eve's evaluation of the perceptible quality of nature but 
continues to affirm his own idealistic stance - "things are as they are" is like saying "God 
is God," a position Adam agonises over in the moments before the Fall. In their unfallen 
state Adam and Eve complement each other as eszme and erzelem, as ideal and sensibility. 
It is only after Lucifer's incursion into Eden that their complementary approach to the 
world fragments into difference as he drives a wedge between them. 
In Paradise Lost Eve makes a conscious choice to remain with Adam: "So dear I 
love him, that with him all deaths I I could endure, without him live no life" (IX 832-3). 
Madach's Eve never stands on the horns of such a dilemma but, reflecting her word-
picture of the sup_ on the water, her interdependence on Adam throughout The Tragedy is 
such that her role gains significance and meaning only to the extent to which it effects his 
development and, conversely, his development, in which the development of the 
individual can be traced, would be impossible without constant interaction with the 
creative feminine. As the Fall effects separation, with Lucifer standing between Eve's 
responsive sensitivity and Adam's idealism, the subsequent action of The Tragedy 
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explores the interdependence of sensibility and idealism and the need for harmonious 
resolution to the disparate elements of human nature, a resolution that is finally achieved 
not only in the harmony imposed by God in Scene 15, in which the Lord affirms what has 
already been demonstrated by the action of the poem, but also through Eve's pregnancy, in 
which the disjunction effected by Lucifer in the Fall is healed in the engendering of new 
life. Dramatic irony is generated, however, by the fact that Adam fails to recognise Eve's 
true role. In Scene 4, having just renounced his throne in response to the awakening she 
has effected, he identifies not the enormous strength and dynamic influence of erzelem as 
evidenced by his own abdication, but only Eve's female weakness, that strength might 
love (756). Despite everything, he sees her as "csak virag .. ./ Haszontalan, de szep" (772-
3) - a flower, pretty but useless. 
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Chapter 3 
The Fall: Failure or Discovery 
In The Tragedy of Man Adam never arrives at a full appreciation of Eve's different 
wisdom and the critical role it plays both in his own developing knowledge and in the 
resolution of the harmony fragmented by the Fall. Yet he identifies and accepts her 
otherness. He recognises that she represents a different approach to life and values this 
difference: 
My own intellect is enough for me. I do not 
Lean upon your breast for strength or greatness's sake, 
Nor for the sake of knowledge; all this 
I can much better find within my books. But 
Speak, just speak, so I might hear your voice, 
So that its vibrations thrill my heart. 
It hardly matters what you say (762-8). 
For his counterpart in Paradise Lost, however, what Eve says does matter: "what she wills 
to do or say" (VIII 549) is singled out by Adam as one of the prime factors underlying his 
inability to accept the differences between himself and his "other self." While Eve's fall in 
Paradise Lost is motivated by a desire for higher knowledge, Adam's fall entails a serious 
failure in self-knowledge. 1 The decision to fall is consciously made and comprises a 
1 The Fall constitutes a failure in knowledge other than self-knowledge. After Raphael's narration 
of the War in Heaven, to which - we are told - Adam listened attentively, his recapitulation comprises an 
expression of wonder at the differences between the realms of heaven and earth (70-71) and an appreciation 
of the historical value of the narration (72-75), but includes only one brief acknowledgement of the primary 
lesson contained in the narration, namely, that he should learn from the terrible example of the fallen angels 
and beware of falling himself(77-79). His identification of Raphael as the "divine Historian" or "divine 
Interpreter" focuses on the narrative as narrative and fails to identify those lessons embedded within it that 
could have been of such assistance to him. His most critical omission is his failure to recognise in Abdiel an 
exemplar of obedience. Book Vends with Abdiel's continuing resistance in the face of Satan's subversion, 
while Book VI shows his triumph- albeit temporary- over his enemy. Raphael goes to some length to 
establish Abdiel as an example of faithfulness: 
So spake the Seraph Abdiel faithful found, 
Among the faithless, faithful only hee; 
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conscious rejection of the self-knowledge developed through conversation with God in 
Book VIII: he eats "Against his better knowledge, not deceived" (IX 998). Adam's 
account of his creation and the conversation that leads to his perfected understanding of 
himself and God, whose image he is, is presented in as close proximity as possible to his 
bewilderment over the nature of Eve. Barely one hundred lines after God's approving 
words, Adam expresses his perplexity over the woman created as his "image" and 
"likeness." He is able to identify the realities of Eve's nature but fails to assimilate these 
within their relationship in a way that does not threaten his self-knowledge. In the Fall his 
perplexity is resolved, but at the expense of self-knowledge and in a way that inverts the 
relationship between self and image. 
In his conversation with God, Adam is prompted to "know" and ''understand," to 
discover truths about himself and God, identifying those qualities that characterise his own 
human condition and differentiate it from the divine. The interrelationship between self 
and the source it mirrors is established, and the necessity of understanding the source of 
being in order to understand the self. Expressing the "spirit within" him, Adam is also 
expressing God's "Image." The conversation also leads towards Adam's awareness of his 
need for "collateral love." Man, unable to raise the animals around him "erect from prone" 
simply by conversing with them, as can God, yet desires creative opportunity to "beget 
Like of his like, his Image multipli'd" (423-4). The theme of mirroring in relation to 
creation and procreation is explored throughout Paradise Lost. Eve's picture in The 
Among innumerable false, unmov'd, 
Unshak'n unseduc'd, unterrifi'd 
His Loyalty he kept, his Love, his Zeal; 
Nor number, nor example with him wrought 
To swerve from truth, or change his constant mind 
Though single (V 896-903). 
The emphatic repetition of "faithful" juxtaposed with "faithless," together with the four negative adjectives 
with which Raphael chooses to describe Abdiel should be enough to catch Adam's attention. Abdiel's 
Loyalty, Love and Zeal are singled out for praise, and then - a telling point in hindsight when Adam, faced 
with a life of solitary obedience to God, feels he cannot bear to be alone - Raphael praises Abdiel' s 
perseverance even when outnumbered by thousands to one. Similarly, Abdiel's reply to Satan's specious 
logic (VI 172-88) provides Adam with an example of how to recognise and parry the falsity of Satan's 
arguments. Yet Adam fails to recall this angelic model of faithfulness for Eve's benefit when they discuss 
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Tragedy of Man of the sun compelled by loneliness to paint its reflection upon the surface 
of the water and then rejoicing in that reflection illustrates the essentially narcissistic 
nature of all creation. In Paradise Lost, too, creation is narcissistic, with the created or 
procreated being existing as a reflection of the creator or progenitor.2 Sin is the "perfect 
image" of Satan (II 763-65). The Son is the "Divine Similitude" (III 384) in whom "all his 
Father shone I Substantially express'd" (III 139-40). Adam is created "in the Image of 
God" and Adam and Eve bear "in their looks Divine I The Image of their glorious Maker" 
(IV 291-92). The created world itself is a mirror in which God is "dimly seen I In these 
thy lowest works" (V 157-58). The creation of Eve adds another dimension to self-
knowledge. God promises the desired partner with whom Adam can "beget I Like of his 
like, his Image multiplied," but Eve is herself Adam's image: God assures Adam that 
"What next I bring shall please thee ... I Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, I Thy 
wish, exactly to thy heart's desire" (VIII 449-51). As Adam and Eve resemble God in a 
physical and spiritual sense, so Eve is physically and spiritually a reflection of Adam. He 
can identify in her not only his "likeness" and "image," "Bone of my Bone, Flesh of my 
Flesh," but also "my Self I Before me" (VIII 495-96) and "Part of my Soul" (IV 487). 
While details of the relationship obviously differ- he is not her creator but only the means 
through which she is created - the relationship between Eve and Adam parallels the 
relationship between Adam and God in so far as in both instances the former is the image 
of the latter. To appropriate Raphael's phrase, Eve is "inward and outward both, [Adam's] 
image fair" (VIII 221). 
Initially, Adam's response to his image is expressive of his accurate knowledge of 
himself and of God. His "sudden apprehension" is still endued with knowledge, and he is 
able to recognise Eve's relationship with the divine (she is God's gift), her relationship 
with himself (she is bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh), and the process of assimilation 
whereby the self and its image can live in harmonious interrelationship (man and wife are 
to be "one Flesh, one Heart, one Soul"). He names her, an act that, like his naming of the 
separation at the beginning of Book X and fails again to recall it for his own benefit when faced with the 
choice between obedience to God and love for Eve. 
2 Kilgour discusses the narcissistic basis of creation: "If creativity is fundamentally divine, it is also 
essentially narcissistic, originating in God's self-love and the copying and multiplying of His own image. 
Appropriately, given his own interest in "self esteem" (Paradise Lost 8.572) and reputation as a sublime 
egotist, Milton draws on a tradition in which God and the Son are celestial narcissists" (1). 
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animals, demonstrates his understanding of her inner nature. He is able to identify an 
internal, spiritual reality in the details of her external appearance: "Grace was in all her 
steps, Heav'n in her Eye, I In every gesture dignity and love" ( 488-89). As he looks at 
her, he sees that her nature is perfectly expressed in her physical appearance. Her steps, 
her eye, her gestures betray the truths of an inner self which, as "Heav'n' s last, best gift," 
fills the external form with grace, dignity and love. The educational model established in 
the dialogue between God and Adam provides a means of establishing the interrelation 
between the self and its likeness or the self and its source. Adam and Eve also have 
opportunity to engage in mutually edifying conversation and her discourse influences his 
as much as his does hers.3 Both are provided with opportunity to identify the differences 
between the self and the other and to understand the interrelation between self and image. 
In Adam's narration of his nativity and in Eve's account of hers, it becomes evident that 
knowledge of the self cannot be divorced from knowledge of the other: only through 
understanding the nature of God can Adam understand himself, while Eve's fascination 
with the image in the water, which illustrates her innate understanding of the importance 
of the other in delineating the self, finds fulfilment when she yields to Adam whose image 
she is. 
But the fact that Adam's continuing response to Eve must take place outside the 
interaction with God that was so vital to his developing knowledge means that he cannot 
test his understanding of this "last, best gift" by discussing it with his Creator and, in the 
absence of a heavenly tutor, the understanding expressed in the moments after Eve's 
creation begins to be eroded by doubts. Having initially identified her as God's fairest 
gift, now he suggests that Nature "On her bestowed I Too much of Ornament, in outward 
show I Elaborate, of inward less exact" (VIII 537-39). Her physical loveliness, once 
properly identified as the material reflection and correlative of her internal, spiritual 
beauty, is now identified as "ornament" and "outward show," not only divorced from 
3 On the mutual influence their conversation, see McColgan: Adam and Eve "come to know, 
through divine instruction and human interaction, themselves, each other, and their relationship to God" 
(30). Kietzman finds "discursive complexity" to be "at the heart of human relationship ... the central 
challenge to realizing Eden in the making of conversation" (56). Compare McColley: "Adam learns that his 
image or other half is not just his image, has much to give, can enlarge and change him" ( 106); and 
Schullenberger: "if contemplation and valour are fundamentally masculine values, and if softness and grace 
are feminine values, either set is essentially inadequate in the absence of the other" (76). 
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internal truth but seen as incommensurate with internal truth, ironically devalued by 
exceeding the value of her "inward" beauty: her physical beauty is deemed "too much." 
As his ability to perceive internal reality in and through external form begins to 
falter, Adam's understanding of his "image" and of the relationship between that image 
and himself also falters. He admits that he struggles to implement a relationship with this 
image that does not impinge upon what he properly understands as his own attributes: 
authority, reason, and "higher knowledge." 
When I approach 
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems 
And in herself complete, so well to know 
Her own, that what she wills to do or say, 
Seems wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best; 
.-All higher knowledge in her presence falls 
Degraded, Wisdom in discourse with her 
Loses discount'nanc't, and like folly shows; 
Authority and Reason on her wait, 
As one intended first, not after made 
Occasionally (VIII 546-56). 
Authority and reason seem to desert him, for it is neither authoritative nor reasonable that 
they should "on her wait." He finds he cannot formulate an appropriate relationship 
between the image and a self that has already established a right relationship with the 
divine. Progress in knowledge depends on "the discrimination and right evaluation of 
three things: the 'I' or self as centre of impulse, feeling and thought; God, as the source of 
life and reason; and nature, or the 'other' (including other selves), that which is nether 
[sic] God nor self but contains notable expressions of both" (MacCallum Sons 111). With 
the creation of Eve, the linear relationship between man and God has become a triangular 
relationship, and Adam must understand his relationship to both God and his "image" in 
order to maintain a proper understanding of himself. His admission to Raphael 
acknowledges his failure to establish a reasonable relationship with his "image." His 
repeated use of "seems" indicates his awareness that his evaluation of Eve is problematic, 
not based on inner reality but only upon external seeming. 
The structure of the poem draws attention to these flaws in Adam's understanding, 
juxtaposing his perfected understanding of himself and God with his failure to understand 
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the relationship between himself and Eve. His growth in self-knowledge and knowledge of 
God is rewarded with a divine smile and "gracious voice." But by the time he comes to 
analyse the nature of his relationship with Eve, his understanding wins no angelic smile 
but only Raphael's "contracted brow." Raphael's reply, while often read as reproof or 
even censure, is designed to address the problems Adam has identified, clarifying the 
distinction betwee~ outward and inward reality.4 He reminds Adam of the role he is to 
play in the establishment of this one link in the triangular relationship between self, image, 
and God. Adam is not to be "diffident I Of Wisdom" (VIII 562-3), is not to value an 
"outside" or subject his soul to carnal pleasure, but is to "weigh with her thyself' and 
remember and value the spiritual dimension of love "by which to heav'nly Love thou 
may'st ascend" (592). This is not the first time in Book VIII that Raphael has corrected 
Adam's tendency to dwell upon external appearance. In response to Adam's query about 
the heavens, the angel reminded him that external appearance is not to be confused with 
internal reality, for "Great I Or Bright infers not Excellence" and what appears to be 
insignificant and glitters less may in fact contain more "solid good" (VIII 90-91, 93). As 
this earlier correction persuades Adam to put aside "perplexing thoughts," so now his 
reorientation towards inner reality and spiritual significance is successful. As the similarity 
between Adam and his Creator extends to a physical likeness but it is the inward, spiritual 
self, the "spirit within thee," that God specifically identifies as "My Image," now, 
encouraged by Raphael, Adam focuses not on the physical unity he experiences with Eve 
4 That Adam articulates his uncertainty over his relationship with Eve in Raphael's hearing implies 
that the admission is, at some level, a request for help or, as MacCallum puts it, "an attempt to clarify and 
master a complex psychic event by putting it into words .... Adam directs his words to a being of superior 
intelligence, whose advice is trusted" (Sons 149). Raphael's reply certainly suggests that he understands it in 
this light. Allen believes that Raphael overreacts and that while a mild rebuke might have been sufficient 
Raphael is "sharp, blunt, and severely corrective" (115). He even goes so far as to impute "injustice and 
spleen" to the archangel (16). To my mind, his observation that Adam is "hardly 'sunk in carnal pleasure' 
just because his language is a touch effusive" ( 116) misses the point: it is not the effusive nature of Adam's 
appreciation of Eve that is the problem so much as his focus upon external seeming at the cost of internal 
reality. 
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but upon their "Union of Mind ... in us both one Soul" (604). The crisis of self-knowledge 
precipitated by the image is averted - for the moment. 5 
While the conscious focus of Adam's admission to Raphael is his inability 
properly to relate his self to its "image," the admission reveals another flaw in his 
thinking, one that, like his focus upon the external rather than the internal mirror of the 
self, will play a role in the failure of his self-knowledge in the Fall. He ascribes his 
feelings of confusion - and, in fact, Eve's creation - to "Nature." In their morning prayer 
in Book V, Adam and Eve urge individual created things to praise God. The winds are to 
praise God by blowing gently or loudly, the pine trees by waving, and vapours by either 
evaporating or condensing. In other words, the created world praises God by the exercise 
of its multifarious natural functions. Nature exists as the expression of, and to express, 
God's goodness. The created world is a mirror in which God is "dimly seen" (V 157) and 
created things "declare I [His] goodness beyond thought, and Power Divine" (158-59). 
Eve, too, as a "created thing," should be valued as a manifestation of the creator's 
"goodness beyond thought" and in response to that goodness.6 Yet Adam, possessed by 
unresolved uncertainties, attempts to explain his response to her by dislocating "Nature" 
from God and ascribing her creation to ''Nature" rather than to God: 
Or Nature fail'd in me, and left some part 
Not proof enough such Object to sustain, 
Or from my side subducting, took perhaps 
More than enough; at least on her bestow' d 
Too much of Ornament (VIII 534-38). 7 
5 See Schullenberger: "Adam's forthright response, which honours Eve's 'thousand decencies that 
daily flow I From all her words and actions' (VIII. 601-02), indicates that Raphael's apparent demeaning of 
Eve has served to exalt Adam's understanding of her" (75). 
6 On creation as a glass in which one sees darkly, see MacCallum: "Adam's natural bias ... has been 
to see god present in his works as the maker in the thing made" (Sons 191); and Fish: "There is only one 
good reason for positively valuing created things: as either a manifestation of the creator's goodness and 
glory or as part of a response to the creator's goodness and glory. Any other reason is a bad reason" (55). 
7 Interestingly, as McColley observes ("Arts" 102), the passage reveals in Adam the fear of a sort of 
reverse inequality-while Eve is being made increasingly aware of her subordinate position, Adam fears that 
her otherness has been bought at the expense of his own selfhood. Froula suggests that "Adam's sense of 
inadequacy in face of what he sees as Eve's perfection" is a simple case of archetypal womb envy (331-32), 
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Not only is Adam failing properly to evaluate Eve as his "image" and God's, but he is also 
falsely discriminating between cause and effect in creation. God is the Creator; Nature is 
the resulting creature. While Nature as a creative divinity is a familiar figure in 
Renaissance literature (Spenser's "Dame Nature" in The Faerie Queene provides a prime 
example), Milton maintained that Nature is a created thing and not the Creator. In 
Christian Doctrine he asserts that "nature or natura implies by its very name that is was 
natam, born. Strictly speaking it means nothing except the specific character of a thing, or 
that general law in accordance with which everything comes into existence and behaves" 
(Works VI 131). Adam's previous usages of"Nature" certainly fall within the scope of this 
definition. In understanding the "Nature" of the animals, it is their essence that he grasps. 
When he recounts how sleep overtook him, "call'd I By Nature as in aid" (VIII 458-59), 
he refers to the general law under which everything acts. But neither an essence nor a 
general rule can account for the removal of a rib and its fashioning into Eve; that demands 
a specific act of creation. Raphael's response, "Accuse not Nature," suggests strongly that 
he, too, feels that Adam is stretching a point to lay the responsibility for the creation of 
Eve at Nature's feet. 
The juxtaposition of Adam's satisfactory understanding of himself and his 
relationship with the divine and his less than satisfactory understanding of his relationship 
with Eve is not coincidental. The structure of Books IV to VIII presents an ongoing 
revision of their relationship, framed by their accounts of their nativity. Eve is created last 
but narrates her creation in her first speech in Book IV; Adam is created first but recounts 
his creation in his penultimate speech in Book VIII. In Book IV Eve is shown to require 
the guidance of God and Adam in order to find meaningful fulfilment of her nature. Adam, 
on the other hand, is presented in Book IV as already possessing considerable knowledge 
of God, the created world and his own responsibility, knowledge gained (apparently) 
without assistance. Through this arrangement, the text creates the impression that it is only 
Eve who is in need of tutoring. In keeping with this, Adam's discourse is overtly didactic: 
he reiterates the conditions of the prohibition, explains what night is for, and dwells upon 
their responsibility to care for the garden. It is not until Book VIII that we learn that he, 
an interesting reading given the fact that at this stage Eve's womb has produced nothing worth envying, 
whereas the masculine Creator and Adam's own rib decidedly have. 
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too, required God's guidance to attain this pitch of knowledge. 8 In a sense the text 
subverts itself, revising and undermining the dynamics of the relationship as they appear 
to be established in Book IV. The arrangement also serves to place Adam's creation story 
as closely as possible to his decision to fall, his growing understanding of himself and his 
responsibility to God as closely as possible to his failure in responsibility and self-
knowledge. The negatively pivotal role to be played in the Fall by mirroring and the image 
is foreshadowed by the positively pivotal role played by mirroring during Creation as 
Adam is identified as God's "image" and expresses his need for an "image" of his own. 
In falling, Adam disregards the connection between himself and God, as well as 
that between Eve and God, and chooses to maintain that single "link of Nature" that exists 
between himself and his "other self." It is a choice informed by misunderstandings, one 
that could not have been made had he exercised proper self-knowledge, as the Son 
explains in Book X: 
Was shee thy God, that her thou didst obey 
Before his voice, or was shee made thy guide, 
Superior, or but equal, that to her 
Thou didst resign thy Manhood, and the Place 
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee, 
And for thee, whose perfection far ex cell' d 
Hers in all real dignity: Adom'd 
She was indeed, and lovely to attract 
Thy Love, not thy Subjection, and her Gifts 
Were such as under Government well seem' d, 
Unseemly to bear rule, which was thy part 
And person, hadst thou known thyself aright (X 145-56). 
The Son's assessment of Adam's fall as a failure in self-knowledge calls attention to the 
interdependence of knowledge of the self and knowledge of its "image." Adam's failure to 
8 McColgan notes that it is not only Eve who requires divine guidance to turn away from the pool 
and towards Adam, whose image she is. Adam admits that, having been transported to Eden, there too "had 
new begun I My wand'ring" had not God appeared and in so doing turned him towards the one whose image 
he is. McColgan asks, with justification, "could we not assume that, without guidance, Adam would still be 
wandering?" (32). 
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comprehend and correctly evaluate the nature or role of either God or Eve equates to a 
failure to comprehend and evaluate his own nature and role.9 In falling, he not only 
confuses Eve's place in their relationship but also his own. The Son's question, "Was shee 
... made thy guide, I Superior" (X 145-47), suggests both a false attribution of superiority 
to Eve and by implication the false subordination of that self that was "set above her." 
Besides this confusion of their roles in their relationship to each other, in eating the fruit in 
order to stay with Eve, Adam has incorrectly evaluated his relationship with her as more 
important than his relationship with God, in whom- as he recognised in the moments after 
his creation - "I move and live, I And feel that I am happier than I know" (VIII 280-81). 
His fall divorces the self from the relationship with God in which it had found true 
meaning and, having severed his own links with the divine, he can no longer understand 
Eve as an expression of God's goodness but sees her rather as a "fair defect of Nature." 
But at the moment of the Fall, deciding to remain with Eve, he declares that "to lose thee 
were to lose myself' (IX 959), overlooking or ignoring the truth that to maintain the "link 
of Nature" with his other self by sharing in her sin is to lose both himself and God. 
Adam's false attribution of superiority to Eve and the concomitant attribution of 
inferiority to himself points to an inversion of their relationship which, while only 
explicitly identified some time later by the Son, is nevertheless implicit in the Fall. The 
theme of narcissism is explored perhaps most overtly in Eve's account of her nativity 
9 Satan's fall centres upon a similar failure in self-knowledge. In his soliloquy in Book IV, in a 
moment oflucidity, he outlines his relationship with God as it should have been: 
He deserv'd no such return 
From me, whom he created what I was 
In that bright eminence, and with his good 
Upbraided none; nor was his service hard. 
What could be less than to afford him praise, 
The easiest recompense, and pay him thanks, 
How due! (42-48). 
Here he identifies, much as Adam does, his dependence upon God for existence and his duty to praise God 
for that existence, critical elements in self-knowledge. In falling, this self-knowledge fails. Satan sees this 
"easiest recompense" as a "Yoke" (V 786) and denies his dependence upon God by asserting that he is self-
generated: "We know no time when we were not as now; I Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais'd I By 
our own quick'ning power" (V 859-61). Satan's fall and dislocation from God in whose service he was 
properly fulfilled provides Adam with "a powerful demonstration of the tragedy of the self-enclosed 
individual" (MacCallum Sons 142-43). 
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when, waking after her creation, she discovers her image in the water as does Narcissus, a 
"Shape within the wat'ry gleam," and exchanges looks of "sympathy and love" with her 
own reflection. 10 But here the dangers of incipient narcissism are averted: she yields to 
Adam's hand and does not lie down on the bank to pine away "with vain desire." She is a 
Narcissus who recognises the difference between truth and shadow and, in turning away 
from her self-image to the other whose image she is, discovers a new, productive 
relationship that is oriented towards life rather than death and, paradoxically, will enable 
her own self-reflection in the medium of living beings: Eve will "bear multitudes like 
[her]self, and thence be call'd I Mother of human Race" (IV 474-75).11 Adam's fall, in 
which he expresses his thraldom to his "image," continues the Narcissus motif But 
whereas Eve avoided Narcissus' fate, Adam's decision to share her doom mirrors the 
Narcissus' story more closely: 
Certain my resolution is to Die; 
How can I live without thee, how forgo 
Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly join'd, 
To live again in these wild Woods forlorn? IX 907-910 
The passage is rich in allusion. Narcissus longed for physical death; Adam chooses 
spiritual death in order to remain with the beloved image. 12 In both instances death is 
precipitated by the inability of the self to sever itself from the image "so dearly join'd." 
And it is surely the intrusion of the Narcissus story into Paradise Lost that underlies 
Adam's substitution of "wild woods" for the Garden of Eden. The transformation of 
Paradise to "wild woods" is in itself surprising, but Milton's use of the Narcissus story 
evinces more surprising transformations. Narcissus dies, unable to divorce himself from 
10 "There was a clear pool. .. .Its peace was undisturbed by bird or beast or falling branches. Around 
it was a grassy sward, kept ever green by the nearby waters .... Narcissus ... lay down here: for he was 
attracted by the beauty of the place, and by the spring. While he sought to quench his thirst, another thirst 
grew in him, and as he drank, he was enchanted by the beautiful reflection that he saw" (Ovid 
Meta11101phoses III 408-18). Ovid's clear, tranquil pool and green bank find clear echoes in Milton's "liquid 
Plain" that "stood unmov'd" beside a "green bank." 
11 "The extension of the imagery of copying suggests the channeling of sterile Ovidian Narcissism 
into procreation which will miTI"or and extend God's originally Narcissistic creation" (Kilgour 13). 
12 "I have no quaTI"el with death, for in death I shall forget my pain" Metam01phoses III 472. 
Kilgour draws attention to Adam's narcissism in the Fall: "Realizing what Eve has done, Adam regresses 
into a Narcissus who cries that he will follow her example" (7). 
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his image; Adam dies spiritually for the same reason, but in falling he inverts the 
relationship between self and image and, subordinating himself to one who should 
properly be subordinate to him, becomes her image. By eating the fruit, Eve has become 
"to Death devote." In sharing her sin, Adam, too, becomes a devotee of Death, recreated, 
as it were, in the image of Eve. 
This inversion hinges upon those problems we identified in Adam's relationship 
with Eve in Book VIII. Now, in Book IX, his misapprehension of Nature and his tendency 
to forget that the physical is a reflection of the internal, both in terms of Eve's existence as 
an image of himself and in terms of the correlation between her physical and spiritual 
beauty, inform his decision to fall. Articulating his intention to imitate her sin, Adam twice 
refers to Nature as the force underpinning their union: 
I feel 
The Link of Nature draw me: Flesh of Flesh, 
Bone ofmy Bone thou art (IX 913-15). 
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The Bond of Nature draw me to my own, 
My own in thee: for what thou art is mine; 
Our State cannot be sever'd, we are one, 
One Flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself (955-59). 
Critically, in both instances Adam fails to identify their inner, spiritual interdependence. 
Forgetting that they are also "one Soul" (or were, for Eve is no longer his spiritual image), 
he focuses entirely upon their physical interdependence, mentioning only the substantial 
unity of flesh and bone and identifying this as the "bond of Nature." Whether he here 
understands Nature as "the essence of a thing" or as "the general law which is the origin of 
every thing and under which every thing acts," the "bond of Nature" should, as we have 
seen, also draw him to God. The essence of everything, and particularly the essence of 
Eve, derives from and draws the observer to God. Eve's nature as "Heav'n's last, best 
gift" informs her physical being, lending grace to her steps, Heaven to her eye, and dignity 
and love to every gesture. In Book VIII Adam was able to perceive this spiritual reality in 
the external form. Had Eve still been "Part of [his] Soul" he would not now be faced with 
the necessity of choice: the "bond of Nature" drawing him to Eve would draw him 
simultaneously to God, reaffirming the interrelationship of the self, the image and the 
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divine, for "God and Nature bid the same" (VI 176). Given that he is faced with choice, 
"sudden apprehension" should have come to his assistance, drawing him to God rather 
than to Eve by the "link of Nature" that in Book VIII led him to an instinctive 
understanding of the dependence of his own existence upon "some Great Maker." That he 
identifies the Nature as a force drawing him towards Eve and away from the Creator is 
only made possible by his failure to recall the critical spiritual mirroring that had been part 
of his relationship with Eve and his own reliance upon God as the source of his being. 
Of course, Adam does not identify Eve as the mirror of his soul because, fallen, 
she no longer is. In this interim where she is fallen and he is still innocent, it is impossible 
for him to identify in her his spiritual image, and so the image for which, Narcissus-like, 
he resolves to die is a physical mirror only, as ineffectual to offer true "Converse and 
Love" as the image in the pool is incapable of returning the "looks I Of sympathy and 
love" that could fulfil Eve's need for a respondent other. Eve no longer expresses "Grace 
in all her steps, Heav'n in her eye," and Adam, spiritually and physically God's image, 
cannot hope to find true correspondence in this shattered image of himself. When he looks 
for "my own in thee," all he can find is the physical: "we are one, I One flesh." But if Eve 
is no longer his true image, in resolving to become like her, Adam reverses their roles and 
recreates himself, or is recreated, in the image of Eve, becoming the mirror of her fallen 
self. 
This mirroring begins in verbal echoes. Resolving her internal debate whether to 
keep the fruit to herself or to share it with Adam, Eve decides that "Adam shall share with 
me in bliss or woe" (IX 831). Adam cannot have overheard and yet the decision itself 
affects his speech. He echoes her earlier words in his own resolution that "from thy State I 
Mine never shall be parted, bliss or woe" (915). Both consider the creation of another Eve 
and reject that alternative. Eve calls the possibility of life without Adam a "death to think" 
(830); Adam asks "How can I live without thee" (908). Both reach a "resolution." Both 
choose death with the other rather than life alone. Eve's "So dear I love him, that with him 
all deaths I I could endure, without him live no life" (832-33) finds correspondence in 
Adam's "if Death I Consort with thee, Death is to mee as Life" (953-54). It is as if, in the 
moments before the inversion of their relationship, Adam plays out the part of Echo in the 
Narcissus story, and through this verbal mimicry develops the dependence upon Eve that 
he then presents as the imperative to become her image, "submitting to what seem'd 
remediless" (919). Until the moment of his eating, he still has free choice to find an 
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alternative: the situation only seems remediless. But his words to Raphael in Book VIII 
have already betrayed his struggle to establish a relationship with this other that does not 
impinge upon the nature and responsibilities of his self. Now, in his decision, Adam yields 
primacy to Eve, becoming the echo that was prefigured in his admission that "Authority 
and Reason on her wait, I As one intended first, not after made I Occasionally" (VIII 554-
56). 
fu falling, Adam resigns to Eve the superior place reserved for the one of whom 
and for whom the "likeness" is made. The Son's repeated reference to Eve as "made" 
reaffirms her rightful place in the triangular relationship: she is a created thing, not the 
Creator; she is made inferior, not superior. But her response to Adam's decision to fall 
continues the theme of creation as a mirroring of the self in a parody of the Creator's 
response to Adam's perfected knowledge of himself and God in Book VIII. There God 
called his conversation with Adam a "trial," designed to elicit Adam's self-knowledge and 
his understanding of his spirit as God's "image." Eve represents her temptation of Adam 
as a "glorious trial" (IX 961) in which Adam, "engaging me to emulate" (963) speaks of 
their "Union" (964). Where Adam could only identify the material correspondence 
between himself and fallen Eve, Eve finds not only physical interdependence but also the 
mirroring of the internal, spiritual reality, addressing him as "Adam, from whose dear side 
I boast me sprung, I And gladly of our Union hear thee speak, I One Heart, one Soul" 
(965). Adam has not, in fact, spoken of their union of heart and soul. He cannot, for they 
are no longer spiritually united. Eve, still his image in an outward sense, no longer mirrors 
his soul. Nor is she any longer the image of her "glorious Maker." Inner grace no longer 
informs her steps, nor is heaven in her eyes, but as she meets Adam near the Tree of 
Knowledge "in her face excuse I Came Prologue" (853-54) and her cheeks are flushed 
with "distemper" (887). But Eve, determined that Adam shall eat and share her fate, 
projects the outcome of his fall back upon the present, identifying a unity that they will 
share once he has eaten the fruit. As God introduces concepts of "knowing" and 
"understanding" as imperatives in his conversation with Adam and thus enables Adam to 
assimilate and utilise these abilities, so Eve reintroduces the concept of spiritual unity, 
offering Adam a means of restoring the inner mirroring that he is temporarily unable to 
identify in their relationship. 
In Eve's fall two sides of the triangular relationship between the self, the image 
and the divine have been broken: the relationship between Eve and God and that between 
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Eve and Adam. All that remains is Adam's relationship with God. Upon awakening after 
his creation, it was an intuitive understanding of this relationship that motivated his search 
for answers to the question of his own being: "Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, I 
From whom I have that thus I move and live" (VIII 280-81). But in falling, the purpose of 
existence he instinctively grasped in the moments after his creation is superseded by his 
resolution to remain with Eve. His existence, once acknowledged to be dependent upon 
God, is now argued to be dependent upon Eve. He confuses Eve and God, image and 
source, death and life and, recreated in the image of Eve, "to Death devote," he loses 
himself. 
In Paradise Lost Adam's positive development in self-knowledge can be traced in 
his changing discourse as interaction with God enables him to move from verbs of 
external perception towards an understanding of internal truths; the Fall constitutes a 
failure in that self-knowledge. In The Tragedy of Man, however, the Fall marks the 
beginning of the possibility of self-knowledge and the ongoing development of knowledge 
is stimulated by Adam's interaction with Lucifer. His awareness of his instinctual 
existence and of the limitations of that existence - conditions identified by Adam himself 
in Paradise Lost, where he speaks of his "quick instinctual motion" and his uneasy 
awareness of his lack of concrete knowledge about the world - is prompted only in 
conversation with Lucifer. In fact, it is Lucifer who, paralleling the role of the "voice of 
air" in the Csokonai poem, brings the limitations of the instinctual existence to Adam's 
attention, and it is only after his fall into self-knowledge that he is able to recognise (and 
briefly regret) the instinctual state he has rejected. If God plays the pedagogue in Paradise 
Lost, Lucifer steps in as relieving teacher in The Tragedy of Man. 
We have already noted that until the incursion of Lucifer into the Garden, Adam 
does not identify God by name or refer to him conclusively as the Creator. In response to 
God's urging him away from the Trees of Knowledge and Life and delineating for him the 
conditions of choice that now exist because of the presence of the "mas szellem" [ different 
spirit], Adam observes that it is a "csodas parancs, de ugy latszik, komoly," that is, "a 
strange [or wondrous] behest but, apparently, serious." While Szirtes, Mark and McLeod 
all translate "csodas parancs" as "strange command," the Hungarian does not exclude the 
possibility that it is the delivery of the behest by some invisible and unidentified speaker 
that Adam finds wondrous, as much as its actual content. Be that as it may, he does not 
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identify God as the source of the wondrous behest; he decides on his behalf and Eve's that 
they will "obey the voice," not "obey the Lord." It is not until line 236 that he first 
identifies God by name and here he is prompted by Lucifer's suggestion that in his state of 
dependence upon divine providence, he has no need for conscious thought. His response 
illustrates the extent of his reliance upon instinctual awareness rather than on reasoned 
intellectualism: 
Of consciousness? Am I not conscious, then? 
Do I not feel the sunshine's blessing, 
The sweet bliss of existence, 
And my Lord's unending grace 
That made me this earth's lord? (233-37) 
Adam's definition of eszmelni [to be conscious] identifies a simple state of consciousness 
based on feeling - he feels the sun's kind rays, he feels the sweet bliss of living and the 
unending graciousness of his God. Interestingly, the correlation of feeling or experiencing 
and understanding will be made more strongly and consistently by Eve. At this stage, 
however, Lucifer has only just entered the Garden of Eden and the division between Adam 
and Eve that will become more pronounced through Scene 2 as they approach the moment 
of the Fall is as yet negligible. More important at this point is the fact that until this 
moment Adam has not referred to God by name. 
Equally important, if not of greater significance, is the corresponding fact that this 
reference to God is triggered by Lucifer's assertion that there is much Adam does not 
know. Unlike his counterpart in Paradise Lost, Madach's Adam exhibits no thirst for 
knowledge until he enters into conversation with Lucifer. In confessing to Lucifer that he 
"did not lmow" that other people existed, he demonstrates no dissatisfaction with this state 
of not knowing. At the beginning of Scene 2 Adam and Eve are aware of their privileged 
position within the created world - or rather, within the existent world, for they betray no 
realisation that their world is created or has not always been as it is now. In accepting the 
reality of their present situation, they identify specifically the pleasures of existence and of 
lordship of the world, and an awareness of benevolent guardians watching over them. 
Adam identifies lordship over the world, but even he is naively unaware of the workings 
of nature: "enough that things are as they are" (172) is both the sum of his knowledge and 
an expression of his lack of curiosity about the created world. Unlike Milton's Adam, 
who is aware of the quantitative difference between feeling and knowledge ("I feel that I 
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am happier than I know"), Madach' s Adam is content with an instinctual state in which 
feeling equates to conscious thought. He does not intuit the existence of some "great 
Maker" from his own existence, for the process of creation lies beyond the limits of 
human comprehension and, in the absence of an account of creation by a sociable 
archangel and the absence of a God who identifies himself as "Whom thou sought'st .. ./ 
... Author of all this thou seest," Adam has no access to information about creation, the 
Creator or himself until Lucifer supplies it. Knowledge and Life are the two trees given to 
Lucifer and it is the interrelationship of the two that he explores in the argument he 
presents to Adam. 
In Scene 1 Lucifer characterises himself as the gap between God's ideas and their 
manifestation in physical form, and as such is the force of un-being against which all 
creation was formed. In the human realm he continues to act as a catalyst by engendering 
in Adam an awareness of the absence of knowledge and, later, an awareness of the gap 
between desire and realisation. In the human domain, however, Lucifer's catalytic 
influence takes the form of ertelem - that activity of man's cognitive faculty that is 
capable of logical thought, critical analysis and evaluation. A fuller definition reads: 
Az ember megismero tevenkenysegenek legmagasabb foka, a logikus 
gondolkodas kepessege, amely feltarja a jelensegek mivoltat es 
ossze:fiiggeseit, a termeszet es a tarsadalom fejlodesenek torvenyeit, es 
ezeket tudatosan, celszeriien felhasznalja a termeszet es a tarsadalom 
atalak:itasara .... <Az osztonnel, erzelemmel szemben> tudatos gondolkodas, 
esz (A magyar nyelv ertelmezo sz6tara). 
[The highest degree of man's cognitive faculty, his ability for logical 
thought, that reveals the nature and interconnection of events, the laws of 
natural and social evolution, and deploys these consciously and effectively 
for the transformation of nature and society; conscious reflection (in 
contradistinction to instinct and sentience).] 
Ertelem, loosely used, can denote a static state or potentiality but Lucifer is never a static 
entity and in fact continually strives against stasis. It is important to note that while he 
characterises himself as both tagadas [negation or denial] and ertelem [intellect], he 
maintains a precise distinction between the two. In Scene 1 he explains to God that as "a 
tagadas osi szelleme" (123) [the ancient spirit of negation] he forced awareness of the 
disparity between the engendering of an idea and its realisation. He uses the term again at 
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line 150, claiming that "tagadas" needs only a foothold in order to subvert the world. In 
Scene 15 God refers to Lucifer's "dore tagadasod," his "foolish denial" (4087). Between 
these two scenes, there are only two references to Lucifer as tagadas, the first in Scene 2 
where the angelic chorus pities the world tempted by the "os tagadas" (269) [ ancient 
denial], the second in Scene 3 where Lucifer summons the Spirit of the Earth with the 
words "Az osi tagadas I hiv" (470) [ancient negation summons you]. In every instance the 
appellation is generated by spiritual beings - God, the angels, Lucifer himself - and 
nowhere in his transactions with Adam and Eve does Lucifer call himself "negation." 
Rather, he characterises himself as ertelem (199, 945, 4021), as "intellect," the capacity 
that differentiates man from animal, and it is by means of intellect that he intends to 
seduce and ruin mankind. 
In Scene 2 Lucifer criticises God's creation for its lack of osszhangz6 ertelem 
[harmonious meaning], a lack that is inevitable given the Creator's motives. God, Lucifer 
claims, made man only to glorify himself, and the imposition of this purpose upon created 
life robs it of true free will: 
You wrote a poem in your own praise, 
Installed it in this sorry mechanism, 
And it doesn't weary you to listen on and on 
As that ditty plays ad infinitum. 
Is this toy, over which a childish heart might swell, 
Worthy of one of such ancient days? 
Where a small spark kneaded into mud mimics 
Its lord, no true likeness but a freakish monstrosity, 
Fate and freewill hound one another, 
And harmonious meaning is absent (98-107). 
If man, the "small spark kneaded into mud," lacks choice, then his mechanical praise of 
God is meaningless. Once again, God does not directly rebut Lucifer's accusation: his 
"homage only, not censure, is my due" (108) only sidesteps it. The fact that he gives the 
trees of Life and Knowledge to Lucifer, placing him in the centre of the garden and 
creating the possibility for contact between the "different spirit" and Adam and Eve 
suggests that he, too, is aware of the need for choice and free will. Although Lucifer 
intends to utilise choice to subvert God's world, moments before his arrival in Eden, God 
has informed Adam of the existence of choice and delineated for him the attendant 
59 
conditions. It is as if God has vacated the classroom, leaving Lucifer to take the lesson, 
knowing that the lesson is one he can only endorse by his absence. 
Lucifer begins by seizing upon Adam's admission of a lack of specific knowledge. 
As with Milton's Adam, there are things that Madach's Adam does not know before his 
period of tutelage. The nature of the unknown, however, is significantly different. While 
Milton's Adam begins by posing questions about his own existence, Madach's Adam 
expresses the limitations of his knowledge about the existence of others: "I did not know 
there were others besides us" (224). Lucifer's response, "There are many things you do 
not know I and never will" (225-26), could not be more different to the subtle educational 
strategy of Milton's God conducted "as with a smile." Lucifer's educational tactics are 
entirely, and not surprisingly, negative. Adam is informed that there is much he does not 
know, God's providence is portrayed as an obstacle to the development of consciousness, 
and when Adam attempts to reply, formulating his own definition of consciousness, 
Lucifer refutes his argument with logic and sarcasm that leave Adam dazed. His Miltonic 
counterpart engages with God in a conversation where both partners share equally in the 
dialogue: Adam has 48 lines of dialogue to God's 63. In conversation with Lucifer, Adam 
is outtalked by 19 lines to 78, lines more consistently expressive of his bewilderment and 
his unwillingness to relinquish his idealism than indicative of his acceptance of Lucifer's 
arguments. Unlike his Miltonic counterpart, he is given little opportunity to apply the 
information presented him to his own situation, gradually developing an understanding of 
the "spirit within" by absorbing and appropriating aspects of the tutor's discourse. Rather, 
information is applied to his situation for him and conclusions drawn by Lucifer. 
Nevertheless, as Adam's development in understanding of his own nature and the 
nature of God in Paradise Lost can be traced in his discourse, so here too a developing 
knowledge and the particular slant of that knowledge towards realisation of the self can be 
identified in changes in discourse. In The Tragedy what Adam learns is learnt by falling. 
Before the Fall, his discourse is curiously lacking in grammatical markers of self-
promotion. He uses the first person possessive suffix -m only twice. The first instance is 
when he comments to Eve that his own existence (letem 195) finds fuller realisation in 
hers; the second is the reference to God mentioned above where he first refers to God as 
"Istenem" [my God]. In both instances the effect of the first person possessive suffix is 
subtly undermined by the context. In the former the focus is not upon his own existence 
[letem] but upon the fulfilment of that existence in another, while in the latter the 
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possessive suffix in "Istenem" seems to be similarly absorbed by the identify of the other 
and is an early indicator of the idealism that marks Adam's discourse. Similarly, when 
Adam expresses lordship over creation, the grammatical structure actually shifts emphasis 
away from the individuality of possession. In response to Eve's opening line, Adam does 
not respond with "And/or me to be lord over everything" [Es nekem urnak lenni mindenek 
felett] but with a simple repetition of the infinitive without identifying himself in the 
dative as that ruler: "And to be the master-ruler of the world" (155) [Es urnak lenni 
mindenek felett]. The implication, of course, is that it is he who is lord over everything but 
the fact that the text avoids the first person is interesting. When he returns to the theme of 
governance of the world at line 237 with "God's infinite grace that made me this earth's 
lord" [Es Istenemnek vegtelen kegyet, I Ki engemet ton e fold isteneve], the construction 
presents Adam as the object, not the subject of the sentence, and his godhood over creation 
as a divine appointment, an act of God, not something that stems from a sense of 
his individuality. The progression from the simple infinitive at line 155 to the 
identification of a God who has appointed him ruler of the world in itself comprises 
progression in knowledge, a knowledge supplied by God who, before warning Adam to 
avoid the Trees of Knowledge and Life, announces that he has given "the whole world" to 
Adam. But conversation with Lucifer elicits the recollection; only in response to Lucifer's 
challenging him to define conscious thought does Adam utilise this piece of information. 
Before the Fall, then, Adam's discourse is marked by a general absence of 
emphasis on the centrality of the self. Eating the Fruit of Knowledge brings about a 
fundamental shift in this pattern of discourse. The balance of the dialogue shifts in Adam's 
favour; no longer simply a respondent to Lucifer's sophistries, it is he who dominates the 
dialogue of Scene 3, with 96 lines to Lucifer's 89. More remarkably, although in Scene 2 
he has only three lines after the Fall, in these three lines he uses the possessive suffix -m 
twice and emphatically. The first, "ebredesem" [my awakening], is used to express his 
newly-discovered self-awareness: "Csak ebredesem borzongasa ez" (27) [this is only the 
first shudder of my awakening]. The second, "holgyem," literally "my lady," could be 
taken as formulaic rather than expressing a strong sense of the possessive, but it is surely 
significant that until this point Adam has addressed Eve only by her name (160, 173, 191) 
and as "no" (17 5) [woman]. The increase in the use of the possessive becomes more 
marked in the opening lines of Scene 3. Here Adam's dialogue is replete not only with 
possessives but with the repeated use of verbs in the first person singular - "enyem" 
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[mine], "otthonom" [my home], "birok" [I own it], "megvedem" [I will protect it], 
"kenyszeritem nekem" [I will oblige it (to bear fruit) for me] - illustrating the extent and 
aggressive nature of his newly discovered self-awareness. His very first words, the 
emphatic "Ez az enyem" (342) [this is mine], contrast sharply with his equivocal 
expressions of lordship in Scene 2. His next two speeches continue and clarify this 
development: he has become a god unto himself and desires greatness, a desire that echoes 
the goals Lucifer set up for his putative world in Scene 2: 
6nmagam levek 
Enistenemme, es amit kivf vok, 
Meltan enyem. Erom ez, s biiszkesegem (362-4). 
It is difficult to retain in translation the effect of the cumulative use of the first person 
possessive suffix and the emphatic personal prefix in the first clause. A word for word 
translation would read, "I myself have become I my very own god." Szirtes' "My God is 
me" (43), though perhaps less accurate than Mark's "I have become a god unto myself' 
(31) captures much of the emphatic spirit of the original. The rest of the quotation reads, 
"and what I conquer I is worthily mine. This is my strength and my pride." In abandoning 
God, Adam has discovered himself and an ability to convey in language concepts of 
selfhood and to project the self onto the external world. Unlike Milton's Adam who 
agonises over the consequences of the Fall and identifies his previous unfallen innocence 
as a good that can never be retrieved, this Adam revels in the consequences of falling and 
it is not until interaction with Lucifer demonstrates the flawed logic of his boasts that he 
regrets, even momentarily, the lost instinctual state. 
What follows in Scene 3 comprises a continuation of Adam's tutelage and 
establishes the necessity for the dream sequence. For, as in Paradise Lost, the dream 
sequence is imperative and it is only within its context that Adam can reach the "sum of 
wisdom," to borrow Michael's phrase: in The Tragedy before he can reach a knowledge of 
man's relationship to God he must arrive at a knowledge of the self. The self-awareness 
that Adam glories in during the first lines of Scene 3 is shown by Lucifer to be only the 
first step towards knowledge. The limitations of an individual's existence determine the 
extent of his ability to know and Adam quickly discovers the limitations of his self. The 
fine thread of physical existence binds the individual to his physical body, determining his 
horizons, and for the first time Adam becomes aware of the paradoxical nature of his 
being as divine ideal incarnate, the "small spark kneaded into mud." He cannot know 
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beyond the limitations of his being, cannot spy the secrets of the far-away (391). Like the 
grub, the eagle or the mole of Lucifer's similes in Scene 2, Adam's awareness of himself 
is circumscribed by his inability to gather knowledge of what lies beyond his own 
experience. "Grub equals god" is not an accurate equation but the grub has no means of 
reassessing its conclusion because the limitations of its physical existence deny it a wider 
frame of reference. Adam's sense of godhood, however, is shattered by the glimpse 
Lucifer gives him into the workings of nature. The instability of matter undermines his 
claims, founded as they were in his physical possession of the physical world. His 
awareness of his own mortality and of the existence of forces beyond his experience lead 
directly to his impatient desire to "know all" (506). Ultimately he is indeed constrained by 
his physical existence, a constraint that is underlined by God in Scene 15, but by 
presenting the existence of the individual as part of a continuum of the human essence, 
Lucifer offers him a different framework for existence - not matter, which is umeliable 
and transitory, but history. Adam's desire to see into his future is the only way he has of 
stepping beyond the limits of his individual perception and reaching a deeper 




The traditional association of death with knowledge as the penalty for eating the 
Fruit results in a surprising development in the Anglo-Saxon version of the Fall found in 
the Junius Manuscript. There the tree is referred to not as the Tree of Knowledge but 
consistently as the "Tree of Death." This is an extreme example of the erosion of the 
distinction between the forbidden object and the penalty for disobedience, a distinction 
that most versions of the Fall antecedent to Paradise Lost maintain. While in some the 
fruit itself is deadly, others follow the tradition, later upheld by Milton, that the Tree 
comprises a "Sacrament. .. of Good and Ill."1 However, while death is more properly the 
consequence of disobedience rather than an inherent property of the fruit, God's 
pronouncement that "in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" places knowledge 
and death in juxtaposition and in so doing establishes an interrelationship between them. 
Eating, Adam gains knowledge of death. While Paradise Lost and The Tragedy of Man 
explore the concept of death and Adam's knowledge of death in ostensibly different ways, 
beneath the obvious dissimilarities lies a surprising correspondence: in both accounts 
Adam's understanding of death is not an end in itself but is necessary to his continuing 
growth in knowledge, and it is only through exposure to death that he realises the "sum of 
wisdom." 
1 Du Bartas La Seconde Semaine 65. Du Bartas consistently represents the tree as "a sure pledge, a 
sacred signe, and seal" (64). The virtue of the fruit, when eaten, is divisive; much as in Paradise Lost it 
imparts a knowledge of"good lost and evil got" (XI 87). Du Bartas' Tree of Knowledge would reveal 
What ods there is between still peace, and strife; 
God's wrath, and love; drad death, and dearest life; 
Solace, and sorrow; guile, and innocence; 
Rebellious pride, humble obedience (64). 
For an example of the fruit as deadly, see Avitus, where the fruit possesses deadly virtue or represents death 
and is referred to as "the dish of conquering death," "a poisonous dower," (14) "sweet poison .. .I And grim 
death" (13). In Christian Doctrine Milton insists that "it was necessary that one thing at least should be 
either forbidden or commanded, and above all something which was in itself neither good nor evil, that 
man's obedience might in this way be made evident" (Works VI 352). 
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Logically, death should be incomprehensible in the prelapsarian world. Existing 
only as the penalty for disobedience, it must lie beyond the experiential knowledge of 
beings who have not yet disobeyed, a point that is overlooked by some of Milton's 
antecedents. In Adamus Exul, for instance, Adam announces to Satan that "Between us 
there shall be the sort I Of sympathetic pact that links the lamb and wolf' (151), an 
assertion that implies an anachronistic understanding not only of death but of the existence 
of an enmity between predator and prey that is completely out of place in innocent Eden. 
Milton, re-establishing the impossibility of death in Paradise before the Fall, has his 
carnivores "gambol" before Adam and Eve, while "Sporting the Lion ramp'd, and in his 
paw I Dandl' d the Kid" (IV 343-4). While death is present in imagery - Satan, for 
instance, approaches Adam and Eve in the guise of a stalking tiger "who chose his ground 
I Whence rushing he might surest seize them both I Gript in each paw" (IV 406-8) - such 
imagery is confined to the narrative and does not intrude into Adam and Eve's dialogue 
nor into the reality of Eden as they perceive it. Understanding of death is required only of 
the reader, not ofunfallen man. From Adam's perspective, tigers in Eden do not stalk their 
prey but only "gambol," and presumably he does not see Satan's approach as the 
crouching tiger. In this way, the imagery becomes a device for underlining the difference 
between the unfallen and the fallen world, imposing the conditions of the fallen world 
upon the text and surrounding innocence with danger. The gambolling tiger is supplanted 
by the stalking tiger, which intrudes into the narrative, entering not only the text but Eden 
itself, although in a way that is only appreciable from the external point of view of the 
fallen reader. Represented by the stalking predator, the conditions of the fallen world 
impinge upon the unfallen world: death has not yet entered Eden as the consequence of sin 
but nevertheless is present. 
Adam's inability to recognise the crouching tiger underlines the impossibility of 
his understanding death in the prelapsarian state. In relating the injunction against the Tree 
of Knowledge to Eve, he expresses a lack of certainty about the nature of death, qualifying 
his explanation of God's command with the words "whate'er Death is, I Some dreadful 
thing no doubt" (IV 425-6). Not until after the Fall does experiential knowledge of death 
become possible. Then his knowledge of death - or, ironically, his lack of knowledge -
becomes the focal point of the narrative, generating psychological conflict and, eventually, 
repentance. In earlier Renaissance versions of the Fall story, Death is treated by and large 
as an allegorical figure. While in Adamus Exul Death and its hellish attendants are visible 
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to Adam only as "phantoms of delirium," in L 'Adamo and Adamo Caduto Death features 
among the dramatis personae and participates in the dialogue and dramatic action. In 
Paradise Lost Death makes a cameo appearance as the son of Sin and Satan and actually 
enters Paradise after the Fall, but as an allegorical figure it has no contact with Adam, and 
Milton's concern in relation to Adam's understanding of death is to investigate the 
psychological and spiritual consequences of sin. 
Physical death in terms of the dissolution of the body does not follow immediately 
upon eating the fruit but as a loss of physical perfection it is instantly apparent. As noted 
in the chapter on Eve, when she approaches Adam after eating the fruit, internal, spiritual 
beauty no longer irradiates her physical form but rather "in her face excuse I Came 
Prologue" (IX 853-54) and her cheeks were flushed with "distemper" (887). Adam 
recognises this loss of purity not only in Eve but also in himself when he identifies "in our 
Faces evident the signs I Of foul concupiscence" (IX 1077-78). Visible already in the 
moments after the Fall, the alteration of their "looks Divine" in which "The image of their 
glorious Maker shone" (IV 290-91) continues, until when they present themselves before 
the Son what is evident in their faces is guilt, shame, perturbation, despair, anger, 
obstinacy, hate, and guile (X 112-14). Outer form still reflects inner reality, but the inner 
reality that is now projected into their faces is that of death. 
In Christian Doctrine Milton defines four degrees of death, the first of which, 
guiltiness, includes "all evils which tend to death and which, it is agreed, came into the 
world as soon as man fell," as well as this "lessening of majesty of the human 
countenance" (Works VI 393). It involves terrors of conscience, the loss of divine 
protection and favour, and degradation of the mind. Fallen Adam and Eve become subject 
to anger, hate, mistrust, suspicion, and discord (IX 1123-24). Such physical symptoms of 
death and degradation are the results of what Milton identifies as the second degree of 
death: spiritual death through the loss of their "innate righteousness," which again took 
place "at the same moment as the fall of man, not merely on the same day" (Works VI 
394). Adam's acquaintance with death begins with this spiritual death and its 
manifestation both in the physical changes evident in their faces and in their psychological 
perturbation. Love, forwarded as a reason to join Eve in sin, is one of the first fatalities of 
death. Having fallen, Adam discovers that the "link of Nature" he fell to maintain is also 
shattered. Love is perverted to carnal desire and lust, conjugal unity is replaced by mutual 
recriminations, and, "estrang' d in look and alter' d style" (IX 1132), he and Eve are no 
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longer "imparadis't in one another's arms" (IV 506). But Adam fails to identify these 
changes as symptomatic of death. In Book XI he asks why God delays 
His hand to execute what his Decree 
Fix'd on this day? Why do I overlive, 
Why am I mock't with death, and length'n'd out 
To deathless pain? (771-75) 
As yet he conceives of death as a single act, the extermination of existence. But the decree 
has already been executed in his loss of "innate righteousness" and in the psychological 
torments he suffers as a result of sin. 
Although at the moment of the Fall "Earth trembl' d from her entrails" (IX 1000), 
not until after Death and Sin arrived in Paradise do the effects of the Fall become evident 
in the natural world. Those created things that had once praised God simply by being are 
now altered at God's command "as best sorted with present things" (X 651). The earth is 
tipped on its axis and Discord, first manifest in the cold and heat, winds and thunder that 
result from this disturbance of natural equilibrium, also introduces to the animate creation 
"Death through fierce antipathy" (709). Carnivores no longer dandle the young of prey 
species in their paws but devour them instead. 
This narrative progression from the psychological and physiognomic effects of 
death to its visible effects in creation is reflected in and actually enables Adam's growing 
understanding of what death is. In resolving to fall with Eve, he claims that "if Death I 
Consort with thee, Death is to mee as Life" (IX 953-54). Although aware of the spiritual 
and physical changes he has undergone as a result of sin, changes that have stripped him 
of innocence, faith and purity, and leave him unable to bear to look on God or angels 
"with their blaze I Insufferably bright" (1083-84), he has not identified these changes as 
constituting death. Before the incursion of Death into Eden as a dramatis persona, he 
mentions it only once and not to acknowledge his condition as "to Death devote" but in 
reference to his choice to fall when he reminds Eve that he "willingly chose rather Death 
with thee" (IX 1167). At this stage he expresses no true comprehension of what death 
entails. It exists as a fact; it is the penalty of disobedience. But Adam has not experienced 
it and it is not until he sees its physical manifestation as discord among the elements and 
"fierce antipathy" between the animals, that he identifies his own fallen state as one that is 
subject to physical death. He has seen the dissolution of the physical body as animals prey 
on one another and now understands what death of the body means: as "earth insensible" 
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he would "lay me down I As in my Mother's lap" (X 777-78), decomposing to the dust of 
which he was originally created. This understanding of the nature of physical death 
actually enters his discourse as a point of reference. Remembering God's command to 
increase and multiply, he now calls it "death to hear" (731 ), an evaluation that would have 
been impossible in his unfallen state when he had no experiential knowledge of death; 
impossible, too, in the interim between the Fall and the arrival of Death in Eden, when he 
experienced the "evils which tend to death" without making a connection between those 
evils and death itself. 
Adam's understanding of death, however, is not yet complete and will not be until 
Michael's visions and narrative reveal the ways in which a being who is both spiritual and 
physical can die, and enable him to identify death as his "final remedy" (XI 62). In the 
meantime, having seen the dissolution of the physical body, he struggles to make sense of 
the physical death of a being into whom God has breathed spirit. He recognises that it was 
the spirit of man that sinned (X 782-92) and as such must bear the punishment of death, 
but supposes this to entail an end much like the demise of the physical body: "All of me 
then shall die" (792). The result of this debate over the nature of death is his realisation 
that death is not confined to the immediate demise of the physical body but is an ongoing 
process, "a slow-pac't evil, I A long day's dying" (X 963-64). But without Michael's 
tutelage he is unable to identify the spiritual consequences of death and, tellingly, when he 
proposes that they should return to the place of judgement and confess their faults, it is in 
the hope that God will ameliorate the physical effects of death in the material world: 
How much more, if we pray him, will his ear 
Be open, and his heart to pity incline 
And teach us further by what means to shun 
Th'inclement Seasons, Rain, Ice, Hail and Snow (X 1060-63). 
God, seeing them "soft'n'd and with tears I Bewailing their excess" (XI 110-11) does 
respond. His ear is "open" and his heart inclined to teach Adam further. But the instruction 
he imparts through Michael is designed to address not the symptoms of sin in the material 
world but rather the spiritual implications of the Fall. It is only through understanding 
spiritual death that Adam can eventually gain the "sum of wisdom," identifying death as 
the "Gate of Life" and be dismissed from Eden "sorrowing, yet in peace." 
The centrality of death to the ultimate solution in which the consequences of 
falling are remedied or at least ameliorated finds an unexpected echo in The Tragedy of 
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Man. While Madach does not explore the spiritual consequences of a severance of man 
from his Creator, death plays a pivotal role in Adam's developing self-knowledge. In The 
Tragedy death is relegated to the background during the temptation and Fall. Adam does 
not query its nature and although God explains the consequences of eating the fruit of the 
Trees of Life and Knowledge at line 165, the penalty of death is nowhere reiterated in 
Scene 2. It is implicit in Eve's "Vegilnk van" [This is the end of us] but God, responding 
to their eating of the fruit, pronounces abandonment rather than death. The degrees of 
death identified by Milton in Christian Doctrine, which "came into the world as soon as 
man fell," are nowhere evident in The Tragedy: conjugal disharmony, carnal desire, guilt, 
shame, perturbation, despair, anger, obstinacy, hate, and guile, do not mark the fallen state 
of Madach's Adam and Eve. Rather than falling to mutual recriminations, outside Eden 
they reconstruct their former state as best they can, taking pride respectively in their 
mastery of creation and potential for motherhood. Nor, again, does discord wreak havoc 
in the animate and inanimate world. Instead, it is in himself that Adam first discovers 
death. 
In eating the fruit and in God's abandonment of him Adam feels the "first shudder 
of [his] awakening" and subsequently bases his self-godhood upon the fact of his 
existence, identifying in himself "an independent, self-sufficient whole" (412-13). Only 
when Lucifer permits him to see the world with spirit-vision and he experiences the 
instability of matter, including the matter of his own physical being, does he becomes 
aware of his mortality: 
Oh, amidst this whirl of confusion 
what will become of my accomplished selfhood, 
what will become of you, my body, 
in whom, in my grand designs and great desires, 
I placed such foolish trust as a sturdy tool? (431-35) 
Paradoxically, this realisation of the potential for dissolution of his own body acts as a 
stimulant in the pursuit of knowledge rather than a deterrent. He understands that the 
process of living cannot delay death but rather precipitates it: "My every word, each 
thought that passes through my mind, expends a fraction of my being" ( 442-43). Death is 
inseparable from life and his awareness of his mortality drives him to "know everything": 
For you to speak of patience is easy: 
Life unending lies spread out before you. 
But I have not eaten of the Tree of Life. 
Existence is brief. It bids me haste (513-6). 
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The allocation of the Trees of Knowledge and Life to Lucifer means that life, death and 
knowledge are interrelated in The Tragedy in a way unparalleled in previous versions of 
the Fall story. Both knowledge and life will lead to death ("avoid these two trees .. ./ ... he 
who tastes it will surely die" 163-65). Now, through interaction with Lucifer, Adam 
discovers that knowledge is located between, and determined by, life and death. If the 
possibility of knowledge is limited by the barriers of the individual existence, as Lucifer 
argues in Scene 2 with reference to "eagle," "mole" and "grub," and if the boundaries of 
the physical prevent the individual from spying the "secrets of the far-away," the pursuit 
of knowledge is necessitated by the inevitability of death. The urgency of Adam's demand 
to know increases throughout Scene 3 as his experience of death becomes more 
immediate. It is the irreconcilability of the divine kneaded into mud, the paradox of 
immortality bounded by mortality, that drives the imperative to know. 
Milton's Adam agonises over the nature of death after the Fall and his growing 
understanding of what death constitutes spiritually as well as physically is - or will be -
essential to his attainment of "the sum of wisdom." While the interrelationship of death 
and knowledge are of equal importance in The Tragedy, rather than exploring the impact 
of this interrelationship on Adam through dialogue, Mada.ch chooses to explore it through 
the dramatic structure of his poem. Most obviously, Adam ages as he journeys through the 
dream sequence from youth to old age, from instinctual innocence to maturity in self-
knowledge. But more interesting is the dramatic presence of death in each scene. Death 
not only provides the impetus towards the search for knowledge in Scene 3, where Adam 
becomes aware of the precarious nature of matter itself, but is present in each scene as a 
pivot around which ideals are espoused and discarded, propelling him forward through the 
dream sequence. In Egypt the dying slave brings him face to face with Eve, in Greece 
demagogues are baying for Adam's blood, in Rome Hippia dies from the plague, and in 
Constantinople heretics are burning. In each instance the intrusion of death marks the 
moment of the redefinition of the ideal. Although it is through Eve that Adam as Pharaoh 
is enabled to feel and experience the world beyond the self, the words of the dying slave 
prompt him to begin questioning the ideal of eternal glory, while the slave's death creates 
the opportunity for him to elevate Eve to the throne and for the process of disillusionment 
and redefinition to continue. In Greece the death-sentence pronounced by the city he has 
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given his life to protect makes him realise "mi <lore a szabadsag I Melyert egy elten 
kiiszkodem keresztiil" (1028-29) [how foolish is that liberty I to which I gave a whole 
lifetime of struggle]. Hippia's death, coinciding with the· arrival of the Apostle Peter and 
his offer of salvation through baptism and the holy love of God, prompts Adam to 
renounce the life of pleasure and adopt a new ideal. As a knight of the Holy Sepulchre in 
Constantinople, Adam's idealism is evident in his discourse: he uses the word "szent" 
[holy] ten times during Scene 7, six times in quick succession between lines 1390 and 
1462, and again at 1516 and at 1549. But the "holy love" that Adam had hoped would 
bring "a new people and a new ideal to the world" (1341) has been perverted in the debate 
between the Church and the Heretics, and is offered as a pretext for the murder of women 
and children: 
My son, 
he who pampers the body does not show love, 
but he who leads the soul back, across the 
sword's edge or through flames, if need be, 
to Him who said, "I bring not peace unto the earth 
but war" (1536--40). 
After the Patriarch's words and the perversion of the ideal, Adam uses "szent" only twice 
more, once as the attribute of the Virgin Mary (1739) and finally when he renounces the 
ideal of holy love. 
The centrality of death to the dramatic action and to Adam's developing 
knowledge continues. There are burning heretics in the background in the first Prague 
scene and, interestingly, the very background nature of their demise is reflected in the 
stagnation of the Prague society: death has lost its immediacy and society suffers.2 In Paris 
Eve is killed and Adam is in danger of being beheaded. In Prague II the courtier plots to 
2 Lucifer draws attention to the catalytic effect of death upon the ideal. Commenting on the fire on 
which the heretics are being burnt, he says: 
But I'm afraid it will die down soon, 
Not doused by manly resolution, 
Nor to yield room to new opinions; 
But there's no one in this indifferent age 
To throw fresh logs into the embers, 
And I may freeze. Alas, the collapse of every 
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murder Adam. The London Scene concludes with the death of society in the danse 
macabre, while in the Phalanstery nature itself has begun to die, and in the Space Scene 
Adam is faced with death once again. In the Ice World the moon stares behind the fog like 
"death's lantern" and the world itself is "terrible," a giant grave over which nature has 
flung a shroud (3744, 3758-59). Not only is mankind dying, but the last inhabitants of this 
world have turned to murdering each other. 
While the picture of fallen Adam as pursued by real or imagined harbingers of 
death was an established trope in Renaissance versions of the Fall, the presence of death 
throughout the dream sequence in The Tragedy represents something different. Nor is it 
simply a dramatic realisation of the memento mori theme. Rather, death provides the 
context in which knowledge becomes possible, even imperative; it is the pivot about 
which Adam's constant revision of the ideal turns. This revision of the ideal increasingly 
focuses upon the paradox of human existence as the divine spark in mortal matter. The 
conflict inherent in this paradoxical existence implies, and is realised dramatically in, the 
struggle between soul and matter. In Paradise Lost knowledge of death must be achieved 
before Adam can fully comprehend the redemptive role of the Son and see death as a 
means to new, spiritual life. While the "sum of wisdom" Adam reaches in The Tragedy is 
very different, it is his developing understanding of death that leads him repeatedly to 
revise his understanding of life, until in Scene 13 he arrives at the formulation of the 
relationship between life and death that will be endorsed by God in the final lines of the 
poem: 
I'll fail to reach the end a hundred times, I know. 
What does that matter? And what properly is the end? 
The end, cessation of honourable strife, 
The end is death, life is struggle, 
And man's end is this struggle in itself. 3698-37023 
great idea is similarly pathetic (1184-90). 
3 An accurate translation of this critical passage is difficult. Madach's use of"a eel" suggests a 
variety of meanings that cannot be accurately conveyed in English. The question "A eel voltakepp mi is?" 
[And what is the eel?] would seem to imply that this multiplicity of meaning is consciously invoked and that 
the following lines not only explore the goal of life but the possibilities of the word "eel" itself. I have 
chosen to translate "eel" with the rather archaic "end," which, I hope, retains the opacity of the original. 
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In man's existence as the "small spark kneaded into mud," immortality and mortality are 
united. Life and death define and generate the struggle that takes place between them, 
itself the purpose of existence. Throughout the poem, death plays a positive role by its 
very negativity, compelling an awareness of the gap between the conception of the ideal 
and its realisation, forcing Adam to review and revise his developing understanding of 
himself. It is knowledge of death that accompanies him offstage at the end of The Tragedy 
(Hubay 1777). As he steps into the dawn of history, restored to youth, the spectre of the 
dying world is inexpungibly imprinted on his memory and he cries, "Csak az a veg! -
Csak azt tudnam feledni!" (4116) [But that end! If only I could forget the end!]. While 
death never appears as an allegorical figure in The Tragedy as it does in Paradise Lost, 
nevertheless through its critical role and its constant presence throughout the dream 




"Regaining to Know God Aright" 
"Such an untransmuted lump of futurity," CS Lewis wrote of the final two books 
of Paradise Lost, "coming in a position so momentous for the structural effect of the 
whole work, is inartistic" (125). Since Lewis's dismissal of the visions and narratives 
through which Michael concludes the education of Adam, critical attention has 
rehabilitated the close of Paradise Lost. In part, this criticism has focused on finding 
parallels between the structure of Michael's presentation of history and contemporary 
historical methodology, 1 but such discussions tend to address issues of the reader's 
education rather than exploring the significance of the visions within the scope of the 
poem and how they relate to Adam's ongoing education. That Milton believed that the 
external world and history itself provide a means towards self knowledge is evident in the 
History of Britain, where he asserts that a comparison of former times to the present can 
"raise the knowledg of our selves both great and weighty" (Works V i 130). Fields, who 
finds in Paradise Lost a dual development of self-knowledge through introspective self-
contemplation and the mirroring of the self in the created world, sees in Books XI and XII 
the final stage of Adam's education as he is prompted towards new self-knowledge by the 
means of Aristotelian externals: "By viewing himself on the world's stage, Adam becomes 
1 MacCallum finds in Books XI and XII the six divisions of history identified by Augustine and 
argues for a "basic pattern of fall, judgement, regeneration, and renewal. .. repeated cyclically from age to 
age, each new world being born out of the ruins of the old through the man of faith" ("Sacred History" 150-
53). Waddington outlines a more highly detailed structure based on a correspondence of the six visions of 
Book XI with the six Ages covered in Book XII. Amorose rejects the cyclical pattern inherent in the 
Classical view of history, as well as the Judea-Christian tradition of history as a linear progression from the 
Fall to the Final Judgement (142), and reads these last books as an example of contemporary 1 J1h century 
apocalyptic history, finding a tripartite structure based upon a dialectic. The first age is that of conscience, 
during which "chosen men rely on an inward, and partial, source" for the moral and political directives from 
God that guide the individual. The second age is that of law, when "the chosen people come to rely on an 
external and .. .incomplete set of guidelines." These two ages find synthesis in the third age, in which 
"outward Law and inward conscience are combined, in effect internalising the Law so that the individual 
soul becomes the most reliable source for knowledge of God's directives" (148). 
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aware of the better part of man, his rational powers of discrimination, his aspect of self-
like-God" (398).2 
However, the process is more subtle and complex than Fields's summary would 
seem to suggest. In fact, the visions and narratives of Books XI and XII present Adam 
with an opportunity to begin "regaining to know God aright" by involving him in an 
educational programme designed to facilitate his discovery of the "new spiritual life" that 
is the result of salvation or engrafting into Christ. Specifically, he is prompted to 
reconsider those misunderstandings that precipitated, and were precipitated by, the Fall: 
his misconstruing of the relationship between self, image and God, his failure to appreciate 
inner reality through external form, and his failure properly to evaluate spiritual truth and 
external "seeming." The focus of these last books moves steadily away from the physical 
and temporal to the spiritual and eternal, encouraging Adam towards a "comprehension of 
spiritual things, and love of holiness" (Works XVI 5). They are indeed in a position 
"momentous for the structural effect of the whole work" They are also hugely important 
to Adam. Not only is his postlapsarian education designed to repair the ruins of the Fall by 
enabling him to reformulate his relationship with God, but the shifting of the focus from 
external to internal, the utilisation of immediate, temporal reality in order to illustrate a 
greater, spiritual reality, conforms with the underlying methodology of Of Education, 
where Milton admits that "because our understanding cannot in this body found it selfe but 
on sensible things, nor arrive so cleerly to the knowledge of God and things invisible, as 
by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature, the same method is necessarily to 
be follow'd in all discreet teaching" (Works II 367-69).3 The futuristic visions and 
2 Amorose reaches a similar, if tentative, conclusion: "It is as though Michael is sent to Adam in 
order to expurgate error so that a rebuilding of vision can occur" (149). Maccallum is more emphatic: "The 
organization created by historical periods, types, and promises is only the foundation for the unity he 
achieves by making the whole history serve the education of Adam" ("History" 159). See also Summers: 
"The final books complete the education of Adam and of the reader. The simple acquisition of information, 
the learning of what was to happen ( or had happened) in history, while essential, did not of itself constitute 
that education; it provided the occasion for it and the raw materials" (190). 
3 Coiro traces the parallels between Of Education and Paradise Lost in fascinating detail, noting the 
progression from agriculture to geography, anatomy and medicine, the practical arts, the reflection on 
morality, politics, and finally "the highest matters of theology and church history ancient and modern." 
Despite citing the above passage from Of Education, however, she seems to fail to take into consideration 
the progression from external to internal reality that is the implied focus of all teaching and to discover this 
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narratives of Paradise Lost offer a means of "orderly conning over the visible and 
inferior" so that, beginning with external realities, Adam may be directed towards "things 
invisible" and knowledge of God. 
Before the Fall, knowledge of self and of God were inextricably interrelated. Adam 
was aware in the moments after his creation that it was through God that "I move and live 
I And feel that I am happier than I know" (VIII 281-82). Knowledge before the Fall was 
not simply an intellectual acquisition but an understanding of the relationship between 
God and man. Similarly, Adam's postlapsarian education is designed not merely to impart 
information concerning the future but is a process of regeneration begun by "prevenient 
grace," which, without Adam's conscious knowledge, "remov'd I The stony from their 
hearts, and made new flesh I Regenerate grow instead" (XI 3-5). Prompted to address the 
ways in which he failed in knowledge in the Fall, he is enabled to arrive at a new 
understanding of the relationship between the human and the divine, moving from an 
acknowledgement of sin and a recognition of the justice of the penalty imposed, through 
repentance, to new hope. The process is one of redefinition, of a shifting focus, of 
internalisation. For Adam, as much as for any believer, "the new life brings with it. .. an 
understanding of spiritual affairs .... Spiritual death led to a weakening and virtual 
extinction of these things. But in the new spiritual life the intellect is to a very large extent 
restored to its former state of enlightenment and the will is restored, in Christ, to its former 
freedom" (Works VI 478).4 
Despite the removal of the immediate threat of physical annihilation, death remains 
central to the process of re-education. For Adam "regaining to know God aright" begins 
same movement in Adam's education in Paradise Lost. Noting that the lesson Adam must learn "is not an 
'easy' lesson: expulsion from paradise, limited knowledge, limited ambition, the inevitable linking of birth 
with death" (136), she remains focused on externals and does not identify the greater lessons that make 
Adam's education not "brutal and pessimistic" (137) but a cause for 'joy and wonder," namely the 
internalisation of Paradise, so that, expelled from Eden, he will "possess I A Paradise within [him], happier 
far" (XII 586-87). 
4 Milton emphasises this movement towards internal, spiritual understanding, continuing: 
"UNDERSTANDING .. .IS A HABIT INSTILLED BY GOD, BY WHICH THE FAITHFUL WHO ARE 
INGRAFTED INTO CHRIST, WHEN THE DARKNESS OF THEIR NATIVE IGNORANCE HAS BEEN 
DISPERSED, AND THEIR INTELLECT ENLIGHTENED IN ORDER TO PERCEIVE CELESTIAL 
THINGS, COME TO KNOW, WITH GOD AS THEIR INSTRUCTOR, EVERYTHING NECESSARY 
FOR ETERNAL SALVATION AND FOR A TRULY BLESSED LIFE" (Works VI 478) 
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with a revision of his understanding of death. The Fall involves a serious miscalculation of 
what death entails, for at that stage Adam believes that it is commensurate with severance 
from Eve. "How can I live without thee" (IX 908) he asks as he contemplates separation 
from his "other self." The question is simply rhetorical: he has already reached the 
conclusion that life is not possible without her. Now he formulates the question as 
j~stification for his decision to share her fall. 5 At this stage, unaware of the meaning and 
nature of death, lacking any experiential or even theoretical knowledge of death that 
would enable him properly to discriminate between the two, he confuses life and death and 
claims that "if Death I Consort with thee, Death is to mee as Life" (IX 953-54). Death with 
Eve is not Life, however, and had Adam retained a correct understanding of the 
interrelationship of self, image and God, he should have known this and should have 
addressed the question "how can I live without thee" instead to God. Now, after the Fall, 
experiencing the regenerating effects of the Son's mediation and God's "implanted Grace 
in Man" (XI 23), he begins to revise his understanding of what life and death entail, and to 
recall the importance of a right relationship with God. Once articulated simply in terms of 
life (God is the source "From whom I have that thus I move and live" VIII 281), that 
relationship is now also related to and expressed in terms of his newly-acquired 
understanding of death. As he begins to understand that death is severance from God, not 
Eve, he takes the first critical steps from an understanding of the physical significance of 
death to an understanding of its spiritual consequences. 
In Book XI, after praying to God, Adam expresses a sense of comfort and 
alleviation of distress. He recounts the experience to Eve: 
Methought I saw him placable and mild, 
Bending his ear; persuasion in me grew 
That I was heard with favour; peace retum'd 
Home to my breast, and to my memory 
His promise, that thy Seed shall bruise our Foe; 
Which then not minded in dismay, yet now 
Assures me that the bitterness of death 
Is past, and we shall live (XI 148-58). 
5 Lewis notes, "We are not shown the formation of his decision as we are shown the formation of 
Eve's. Before he speaks to her, half way through his inward monologue (896-916) we find the decision 
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MacCallum claims that Adam shows a tendency to "slight death and to assume too easily 
that its bitterness is past" (Sons 194) but the sense of comfort Adam derives from renewed 
communion with God should not be dismissed as an underestimation on his part of the 
consequences of death. At the end of Book X, having reached the realisation that death is 
to be a gradual process, a "slow-pac't evil, I A long day's dying" (IX 963-64), he suggests 
that in response to prayer God will be moved to pity and teach them how to survive in an 
inclement world. His concern lies exclusively with physical survival: he looks to the 
hostile elements and expresses his fear of rain, ice, hail and snow, the winds, lightning and 
baneful stars, and the effect of these on their physical existence. His hope - and the focus 
of his prayer - is that they might "pass commodiously this life, sustain' d I By [ God] with 
many comforts" (X 1083-4). Now, having prayed, he no longer expresses concern over the 
details of their physical survival. Instead his focus is the internal, spiritual comfort he has 
received. The externalised problems of Book X, the hostile elements in conflict and the 
impact of their hostility on "Our Limbs benum'd," are replaced and resolved by 
internalised solutions. After prayer, he speaks of "persuasion," "favour,'' "peace," and 
"memory," not as these relate to protection from the winds and cold but as they relate to 
an inward state of mind. Prayer has effected not physical comforts but spiritual 
comforting. 
Throughout Book XI Adam further develops his renewed understanding that man 
can only "live and move" in God, qualifying this with the additional realisation that 
dislocation from God constitutes true death. When Michael announces that they are to 
leave Eden, Eve feels the severance from "created things" and calls the loss of Paradise an 
"unexpected stroke, worse than that of Death" (XI 268). Adam, responding to the same 
news, grieves primarily not at the necessity of their "departure from this happy place" (XI 
303) but because he fears that this will entail banishment from the presence of God: 
This most afflicts me, that departing hence, 
As from his face I shall be hid, depriv' d 
His blessed count'nance (XI 315-17). 
Having made the correlation between God's "placable and mild" countenance and 
the assurance in his heart that "we shall live," Adam is "heart-struck with chilling grip of 
sorrow" (264) at the prospect of losing the possibility of communion with God. It is the 
already made - 'with thee certain my resolution is to Die"' (126). 
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agony and chill of immanent death he feels, death precipitated by severance from his 
Maker. 
· In issuing his instructions to Michael, God indicates that the purpose of the visions 
is to alleviate sorrow and instil peace in Adam and Eve: the angel is to "reveal I To Adam 
what shall come in future days" and "So send them forth, though sorrowing, yet in peace" 
(XI 113-14, 117).6 This peace is to be derived from the visions themselves and in 
particular the revelation of the promise concerning the "Woman's seed." It is to this 
promise and to the intent of the visions that Michael refers in his response to Adam's 
despair at the prospect of losing access to God's "blessed count'nance." He is sent, he 
assures Adam, to ensure that Adam is confirmed in the belief that 
in Valley and in Plain 
God is as here, and will be found alike 
Present, and of his presence many a sign 
Still following thee, still compassing thee round 
With goodness and paternal Love, his Face 
Express, and of his steps the track Divine (XI 349-54). 
Expulsion from Eden does not imply expulsion from the presence of God: life, not only 
physically but also spiritually, can continue beyond the bounds of Paradise. 
Despite the fact that Adam's recollection of the promise during prayer yields 
spiritual comfort, as yet he grasps only its physical significance: in order for the promised 
Seed to be born, he realises, he and Eve must live, at least long enough to reproduce. The 
true significance of the promise and the victory of the Woman's Seed over the Serpent is 
spiritual, but, although prayer begins the process of his reorientation towards internal 
reality, Adam has a long way to go before he can understand the spiritual implications of 
that victory. This understanding represents the culmination of the process of re-education, 
of reorientation towards spiritual reality, and is only attained in his final speech in Book 
XII where he acknowledges the Son as "my Redeemer ever blest" (573). In Book VIII, 
under tutelage to God, prompted and challenged by a Maker whose aim was to elicit an 
expression of "the spirit within thee," he perfected his understanding of himself and the 
nature of the divine. There, apprehension of inner reality was "sudden," as, enabled by 
6 Coiro, who calls Adam's education "brutal and pessimistic" (37), perhaps overlooks these lines 
and Adam's mounting joy throughout Book XII as he begins to find the Paradise within. 
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conversation with God, he moved away from verbs of external perception to an 
understanding of the inner nature of things. "Regaining to know God aright," however, 
involves not "sudden apprehension" but a laborious process of response and correction as 
Michael leads him away from a focus on the immediate and physical to a focus on 
spiritual reality. In the context of the Fall, death is the solution provided by God, the "final 
remedy" that releases man from what would otherwise be an endless life of woe in his 
fallen state and allows him passage to a "second Life" (61-63). Thus Death becomes the 
"Gate of Life" (XII 571 ). This world is not the ultimate reality, and throughout Michael's 
visions and the continued narratives of Book XII, Adam is directed away from the 
mundane to an understanding of spiritual life, from "shadowy Types to Truth, from Flesh 
to Spirit" (XII 303).7 Preparing Adam for the visions, Michael not only purges his "visual 
nerve" with Euphrasy and Rue but instils into his eyes three drops of water from the Well 
of Life, which pierce "ev'n to the inmost seat of mental sight" (XI 418), working inwardly 
to enable him to apprehend spiritual reality. 
The educational programme Michael delivers is designed and closely directed by 
God, who instructs the angel to "reveal I To Adam what shall come in future days /As I 
shall thee enlighten" (XI 113-115). 8 In his fallen state, Adam no longer expresses a thirst 
for knowledge but seeks only practical help to survive the onslaught of the now inclement 
elements.9 The fact that he must learn, as well as what he must learn, is decided by God. 
7 "If the new spiritual life is to lead to a paradise within, the husk of the old world must be cast 
away" (MacCallum Sons 192). 
8 Even Allen, who criticises Michael for his "monotonous monologue" and for swamping Adam 
with a sea of words, concludes that "One must not be too hard on Michael, for he maintains faultless order, 
imparts an enormous store of information, and draws Adam toward obedience to God" (117). 
9 Lewalski finds exemplified in Books XI and XII the "three root sins" that were involved in the 
Fall: intemperance, vainglory, and ambition, which, in agreement with Augustine, she identifies with thirst 
for knowledge. She specifically associates this ambition with Adam, saying that his "ambitious seeking after 
knowledge is disciplined by the cessation of the visions, forcing him to rely with humility and faith upon the 
revelation of the angel" (28). Not only does this seem to suggest that Adam has witnessed the visions of the 
previous book with something less than humility and faith, but it fails to take into consideration the fact that 
he does not ambitiously seek after knowledge in either Book XI or Book XII but is receptive to the visions 
as directed by Michael and God. Nor was an ambitious seeking after knowledge evident in his behaviour 
during the Fall. Eve's soliloquy before the Tree of Knowledge centres upon knowledge as ambition, and the 
temptation it represents is clearly established in her repeated use of "know" (758, 765, 753), "knowledge" 
(752), "unknown" (756, 757) and "wise" (759, 778). In contrast, in his soliloquy and subsequent address to 
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Whereas Adam took a leading role in the conversation with Raphael, posing questions that 
elicited an angelic response, now the course of instruction is predetermined, both in scope 
and purpose: 
Know I am sent 
To show thee what shall come in future days 
To thee and to thy Offspring; good with bad 
Expect to hear, supernal Grace contending 
With sinfulness of Men; thereby to learn 
True patience, and to temper joy with fear 
And pious sorrow (XI 356-62). 
There is no longer leisure for "sudden mind" to arise in Adam "not to let th' occasion pass" 
(Y 451-52), but rather he is directed to participate in this educational experience with the 
simple imperative "ascend I This Hill" (XI 367-68). 10 Similarly, while he is allowed to 
respond to the visions, voicing his queries and fears, Michael - and through Michael, God 
- retains control of the direction of his education and each new vision is introduced by an 
angelic imperative to see: "Adam, now ope thine eyes" (XI 423); "now prepare thee for 
another sight" (555); "now prepare thee for another scene" (637); "now direct thine eyes" 
Eve, Adam does not once mention knowledge nor employ the related words, "know" and "wise." This 
absence of words explicitly related to knowledge can only reflect the absence of an ambitious seeking after 
knowledge that informs his decision to fall. 
'
0 Schwartz notes that the Hill of Visions is compared, not to Mount Sinai, as one might expect, nor 
to the Mount of the Sermon on the Mount, nor the Mount of Transfiguration, but rather to that Mount on 
which Christ was tempted by Satan. Thus the allusion establishes the visions and narratives as a temptation 
of Adam, who is tempted "to view the prospect of what lay before him and want to possess it, as the Second 
Adam is offered the kingdoms of the world" (133). But given that Milton specifically identifies this Hill as 
"Not higher ... nor wider looking round, /Whereon/or different cause the Tempter set I our second Adam in 
the Wilderness" (XI 381-83 my italics), it is dangerous to read too great a parallelism into the allusion. If 
Satan's purpose is "different," we must not apply the same purpose to the visions of Book XL An alternate 
reading, and one that I think avoids the trap of associating too closely the purpose of these visions with 
Satan's purpose in the temptation of Christ, is to discover a similarity of result between the two. The 
temptation in the wilderness centres upon identity and self-knowledge. Satan introduces the first two 
temptations with the words "If thou be the Son of God," challenging not only Jesus' identity but that self-
knowledge that is the product of a correct understanding of the self in relation to God. The visions Michael 
shows to Adam are designed similarly to challenge his self-knowledge, restoring him to a right relationship 
with God. 
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(711); "And now what further shall ensue, behold" (839). The only exception to this 
construction is the second vision which Michael introduces with the words "a monstrous 
crew I Before thee shall appear; that thou may'st know I What misery th'inabstinence of 
Eve I Shall bring on men" (474-77). Given latitude in conversation with Raphael to direct 
the discussion within the bounds of knowledge "not surpassing human measure" (VII 
640), Adam is now obliged to follow without deviation the programme arranged for him 
by God, in which the main focus is his reorientation from external "seeming" to internal 
truth in order that he may once again understand the relationship between himself and 
God. 
Initially Adam's awareness of spiritual reality is subordinate to his concern with 
physical, temporal reality. After the first of the visions, it is not the sight of sin (the murder 
of Abel) that wakens his utter horror but the sight of physical death. Michael's revelation 
that Abel will receive the rewards of faith "though here thou see him die, I Rolling in dust 
and gore" ( 459-60) should assure Adam that death does not spell the end of human 
existence, but for now he is unable to process this information. Ignoring the possibility of 
life after death and dismissing sin with a brief "Alas, both for the deed and for the cause!" 
(461), he focuses entirely upon the demise of the physical body: 
But have I now seen death? Is this the way 
I must return to native dust? 0 sight 
Of terror, foul and ugly to behold, 
Horrid to think, how horrible to feel! ( 462-65) 
The sight of further "shapes of death" in the second vision, accompanied by agony and 
"diseases dire" convinces him that the fallen life is utterly miserable and man would 
"Better end here unborn" (502). When informed by Raphael that such ends can be avoided 
by observing the rules of temperance, his focus shifts from obsession with the fact of 
physical death to the continuance of physical life and he asks how he "may be quit I 
Fairest and easiest of this cumbrous charge" (XI 548-49). Michael's reply is again an 
attempt to prompt Adam to look beyond the simply existential to the spiritual: "Nor love 
thy Life, nor hate; but what thou liv'st I Live well" (553-54). For man to desire or pursue 
either death or simple duration of life as the ultimate good involves a distortion of his 
nature (Summers 201) and a misunderstanding of the purpose of existence. 
The third vision reinforces this need to focus beyond the temporal, beyond the 
"fairest and easiest" path through physical life. The vision of tents and herds of cattle, 
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music and metal working, love and delight, seems to confirm Adam's hope at the end of 
Book X that God would help them "to pass commodiously this life." But as prayer offered 
spiritual rather than physical comfort, so now Adam must realise that the "Arts that polish 
Life" and allow one to live "fairest and easiest" are not to be desired as an end in 
themselves. Living "well" must take precedence and in fact, it is a life "Tri'd in sharp 
tribulation" that refines man and prepares him for the second Life. 
In the fourth vision Adam begins to realise this. Enoch, the "Just Man" is saved 
from physical death and transported to heaven. In his response to this vision, Adam 
discriminates between external and internal heroism, physical and spiritual might. No 
longer concerned with living life commodiously, he is able to recognise the disparity 
between "Death's Ministers" and "that Just Man," between "sin" and "Righteousness." 
His condemnation of those who "multiply I Ten-thousand-fold the sin of him who slew I 
His Brother" (677-79) illustrates what MacCallum calls the "dialectic development" 
discernable in the process of his recovery of knowledge. In Tetrachordon Milton notes 
that in his teaching Christ did not "omitt to sow within them the seeds of a sufficient 
determining a gen the time that his promis' d spirit should bring all things to their memory" 
(Works IV 188). Similarly, seeds sown by Michael (the identification of Cain as "unjust" 
and Abel's murder as a "bloody Fact") or by God (the promise concerning the woman's 
seed), while apparently overlooked by Adam at the time, are brought to mind by later 
events (further visions or, in the case of the promise, prayer). Although in his response to 
the first vision Adam seemed obsessed with the fact of physical death and dismissive of 
sin, now, in hindsight, he is able properly to identify Cain's act as one of sin and its 
repercussions in later history as sin multiplied. 11 
It is a critical commonplace that Abel, Enoch and Noah are types of Christ and that 
the visions are "resonant with typological implications" (MacCallum Sons 193, 196).12 
11 MacCallum, citing Christ's method of teaching as identified by Milton, notes that Michael 
employs a similar strategy: "He leads Adam towards this goal by a series of graded steps, each one but the 
last inconclusive, and each consequently capable of misinterpretation .... He employs ambiguity, sometimes 
appearing to mislead Adam deliberately in order to crystallize the false interpretations which must be 
rejected" (Sons 202). 
12 For a different approach, see Schwartz, who finds in Milton's use of typology an inversion: 
"Summary conclusions that continue, and so do not summarize or conclude; moments of enlightenment that 
tum out to be veiled after all: Milton has foiled all of the classic features of typology, and he has used 
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What is more interesting in terms of Adam's continued education and in particular the 
movement from physical to spiritual that is necessary to his proper appreciation of the 
fulfilment of the promise concerning the woman's seed, is the progression from Abel, 
murdered despite his "piety" and "devotion," to Enoch, the "Just Man" rescued by 
Heaven, to Noah, the "one Man found so perfect and so just, I That God vouchsafes to 
raise another World I From him" (876-78). This progression from death despite piety to 
continued life as a result of piety represents a development from a focus on the individual 
per se to the individual as mediator for the entire world. It is Adam, not Michael, who 
clearly articulates Noah's role as saviour of the world, a role that prefigures that of the Son 
who will "save I A World from utter loss" (III 307-8). Death, once dreaded as the demise 
of the individual, is now seen in global terms, a "whole World I Of wicked Sons 
destroy'd" (XI 874-75). Life, too, becomes a gift extended by God to an entire world for 
the sake of Noah. The ability Adam demonstrated in the previous vision to discriminate 
correctly between the "Just Man" and "Death's Ministers," between "sin" and 
"Righteousness" is evident again in the contrast he sets up between the "wicked Sons" and 
the "one Man found so perfect and so just." But his understanding is still incomplete: the 
world restored for the sake of Noah is still a temporal world and it is in response to the 
physical salvation of that world that Adam "erst so sad I Greatly rejoiced" (XI 868-69). 13 
The continuation of physical life is seen as of ultimate significance: he has not yet fully 
comprehended the simple lesson of Abel's death and subsequent reward, that death is the 
gate to "second Life." 
Regina Schwartz argues that Michael's use of typology, his frequent excursions 
into future time and the drawing back of the narrative to the present, ":frustrate, rather than 
fulfill, our expectation of an end" (126). But Michael is merely following instructions to 
reveal "To Adam what shall come in future days" as God "enlightens" him and 
"intermix[ing] I My Cov'nant in the Woman's seed renew'd" (XI 114, 115-16). This 
typology to do it" (133). Amorose approaches Books XI and XII in terms of contemporary millenarian or 
apocalyptic histories. 
13 Looking for parallels to the stages of education outlined in Of Education, Coiro writes 
(specifically of Noah) that "It is finally here, at the end of Book XI, that Adam must face the stunning 
humiliation of seeing men who do not give in to temptation as he has done, men whom he must recognize as 
morally superior to himself' (140). If Adam is suffering from stunning humiliation he does a remarkably 
good job of concealing it beneath his outpouring of joy. 
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intermingling of the narrative revelation of the future with explanation of the prophecy 
concerning the promised seed must therefore be seen as an integral part of God's design 
and not Michael's "manipulation of typology" (Schwartz 126), and the reason behind it 
should be sought in the effects of Michael's teaching upon Adam's growth in knowledge. 
The interweaving of typological signification into the narratives sows in Adam's mind the 
"seeds of a sufficient determining," gradually reorienting him towards truths that are 
necessary to the "sum of wisdom." Michael's role throughout this process is to approve 
Adam's developing understanding and correct his continuing misapprehension that 
physical reality is what is important. Having pointed Adam towards Abel's reward by 
Faith and prompted him to focus on living "well" rather than "fairest and easiest," the 
angel corrects Adam's assessment of the second vision as "Much better," drawing his 
attention to the inadequacy of judging by external appearance: 
Judge not what is best 
By pleasure, though to Nature seeming meet, 
Created, as thou art, to nobler end 
Holy and pure, conformity divine (XI 603-6). 
Again, after the vision of the Flood Michael confirms Adam's hope that the 
rainbow signifies God's "Covenant never to destroy I the earth again by flood" (882-83), 
but qualifies this by shifting the conversation to bring it to the destruction of the earth by 
those fires that will "purge all things new, I Both heavens and earth, wherein the just shall 
dwell" (900-901). The World restored for the sake of Noah is not permanent, and Adam, 
having just expressed relief at seeing the world saved, must look beyond this life, this 
world, this existence to another. Having introduced the idea of the impermanence of the 
physical and the hope of a new world, Michael pauses "Betwixt the world destroy' d and 
world restor' d" (XII 3). 14 This summation of the position to which the archangel has 
brought their dialogue is rich with inference. Adam is able to appreciate the destruction of 
one world by the Flood and its restoration for the sake of Noah, but the allusion to the 
destruction of the temporal world and the creation of new Heavens and Earth still lies 
14 Waddington believes that the litmus test of any analysis of Books XI and XII is how it explains 
the shift from vision to narrative and summarises various analyses in this light (9-10). His own thesis, that 
the ending of Book XI covertly describes Adam's own death, which must have happened shortly before the 
flood, and that the termination of the vision links "mortality and the limits of prophetic vision" is very 
convincing (16-20). 
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beyond his comprehension. Adam, too, is poised between a world destroyed and a world 
restored, between loss of external Eden and discovery of a "Paradise within thee" (XII 
587). 
Although Michael waits for Adam to respond, he remains silent. Again, the angel 
is content to sow the "seeds of a sufficient determining," briefly summarising the critical 
lesson of the previous vision before continuing. 
Thus thou hast seen one World begin and end; 
And Man as from a second stock proceed. 
Much thou hast yet to see, but I perceive 
Thy mortal sight to fail (XII 6-9). 
Another world, too, is to end, and man is not only to descend by natural generation from 
Noah as a "second stock" but to be "transplanted" spiritually into the Son and be restored 
in him "as from a second root" (III 288). But for now the angel does not place 
unreasonable demands on Adam's "mortal sight." Rather, throughout the following 
narrative, he returns periodically to the theme of the dissolution of mundane reality and the 
inauguration of a reality that is spiritual, twice more arriving at the end of the world. On 
each occasion Adam's response indicates his developing appreciation of the primacy of 
spiritual reality and the need to look beyond the boundaries of the physical. Finally his 
education is complete: acknowledging the Son as his Redeemer, he understands that death 
is the Gate of Life and that beyond "this transient World, the Race of time" lies an eternity 
"whose end no eye can reach" (XII 554, 556). 
But at the beginning of Book XII Adam still has much to learn. In order to arrive at 
this "sum of wisdom" and discover the "Paradise within," he must continue to adjust his 
focus from the material to the spiritual, learning to identify the spiritual truths woven 
through Michael's narration of temporal events. As he corrected Adam's response to the 
visions of Book XI, Michael continues to point to the spiritual application of the 
narratives. Adam's displeasure at Nimrod's usurpation of authority is approved by the 
angel: "Justly thou abhorr'st I That Son, who to the quiet state of men I Such trouble 
brought" (XII 79-81). But while approving Adam's dismay at Nimrod's attempt to subject 
"Rational Liberty," Michael also prompts him to consider man's loss of "true Liberty" in 
the Fall and the truth shadowed forth by temporal reality: 
Sometimes Nations will decline so low 
From virtue, which is reason, that no wrong, 
But Justice, and some fatal curse annext 
Deprives them of their outward liberty 
Their inward lost (XII 97-101). 
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The wandering of the Israelites and their eventual arrival in the "Land I Promis 'd 
to Abraham and his Seed" (259-260) ameliorate Adam's concerns about the survival of 
mankind, easing his heart "Erewhile perplext with thoughts what would become I Of mee 
and all Mankind (273-76). Although he feels his "eyes true op'ning" (274), his focus is 
still the physical continuance of the human race and he needs Michael's prompting to look 
to realities beyond this. The history of the nation of Israel, and indeed Israel itself, is 
designed to draw his attention to truths that lie beyond the scope of temporal reality. 
Abraham's seed as the chosen race is to be superseded by a spiritual race, the "Sons I Of 
Abraham's Faith wherever through the world" (448-49). The Law, by bringing sin to light 
and man's inability to make expiation, makes it clear that "some blood more precious must 
be paid for Man" (293). Joshua's role prefigures the role of the Redeemer, who will "bring 
back I Through the world's wilderness long-wander'd man I Safe to eternal Paradise of 
rest" (312-14). The Israelites' wandering in the wilderness thus becomes an allegorical 
picture of the transitory and troubled passage of the believer through this world "suffering 
for Truth's sake," the "few I His faithful, left among th'unfaithful herd" (480-81). 
In this sense, the entire thrust of the visions and narratives parallels the function of 
the Law among the Israelites, resigning Adam "in full time I Up to a better Cov'nant, 
disciplin'd I From shadowy Types to Truth, from Flesh to Spirit" (XI 301-3), continuing 
the theme of mirroring that is found throughout Paradise Lost. Rather than representing 
partial vision, with the movement from shadowy type to truth implying the arrival "at a 
definitive understanding, a complete vision instead of a partial one" (Schwartz 124), 
Milton's "shadowy Types," like Plato's, are the images projected by a spiritual truth upon 
the fabric of material existence. The existence of a shadow implies the existence of an 
object casting the shadow, and the movement from shadowy types to truth need not 
necessarily imply progression from an unclear to a definitive understanding, but rather is 
suggestive of a turning away from an unreal to a real object of vision. The focus of 
observation shifts as the observer is "disciplin'd" 
From shadowy Types to Truth, from Flesh to Spirit, 
From imposition of strict Laws, to free 
Acceptance of large Grace, from servile fear 
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To filial, works of Law to works of Faith (303-6) 
Although this progression in itself suggests an increased understanding to the extent that 
the viewer is enabled to identify and appreciate the difference between Types and Truth, 
Flesh and Spirit, the passage promises no "definitive understanding," only the 
reorientation from external to internal, the substitution of material objects by spiritual. 
Perfection lies not in the eye (or understanding) of the beholder but in the object he 
beholds, and the movement from shadowy type to truth is a turning about, a reorientation 
of one's focus from the shadow to the source that casts the shadow. 15 In their morning 
prayer Adam and Eve were able to identify God "dimly seen" in the created world. Now 
Michael's visions and narratives tum Adam back towards truths of which the material is 
only a shadow, constantly drawing him towards the spiritual paradigm and, as Adam 
begins to assimilate this orientation towards spiritual reality, he begins to discover the 
"Paradise within." 
Essential to this process of regaining a proper knowledge of God is the intercessory 
role of the Son. The effects of his mediation on behalf of fallen man are evident already in 
Book XI, where Adam's "short sigh of human breath, up-borne I Ev'n to the Seat of God" 
(XI 147-8) does indeed win God's audience but only through the intercession of the Son, 
who, as Priest, brings Adam's prayers before God and "interprets" them on his behalf. At 
this stage Adam is unaware of the Son's intercessory role, but in order to attain the "sum 
of wisdom," acknowledging his "Redeemer ever blest," he must be brought to a conscious 
understanding of that role. The entire movement of Adam's education from a focus on 
external reality to a focus on internal reality, from physical to spiritual, prepares him to 
understand Michael's explanation of the promised Seed. Again, Michael does not overtax 
Adam's developing understanding, but introduces the promise and its fulfilment by stages, 
initially mentioning "thy great deliverer" almost parenthetically: 
By that Seed 
Is meant thy great deliverer, who shall bruise 
The Serpent's head; whereof to thee anon 
Plainlier shall be reveal'd (XII 148-51). 
15 Lewalski discusses the focus upon sight as metaphor for the assimilation of knowledge 
throughout Books XI and XII. 
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That the "great Messiah" is to mediate between God and man as Moses mediates 
between God and the Israelites becomes clear a little later during the same narrative 
passage (239-44). But until Adam demonstrates his realisation that the Law gives proof of 
sin while being unable to remove it, the angel does not proceed to narrate the birth of the 
Messiah. That it is the Messiah who, with his "blood more precious," will provide 
expiation for those sins that the blood of bulls and goats could not remove is only hinted 
at; at this stage Michael makes no direct correlation between the Messiah and the 
necessary sacrifice. Instead, he allows Adam to mistake the fulfilment of the prophecy as 
purely physical: "Needs must the Serpent now his capital bruise I Expect with mortal pain: 
say where and when I Their fight, what stroke shall bruise the Victor's heel." Adam still 
seeks a literal interpretation of the promise, although the shifting focus from physical to 
spiritual reality and Michael's frequent corrections should have alerted him to the 
possibility that the kingdom to be established is not of this world (MacCallum 198). 
At this point his realisation that in person of the Messiah "God with man unites" 
extends only to the physical unity of divine and mortal: "from my Loins I Thou shalt 
proceed, and from thy Womb the Son I of God most High; So God with man unites" (380-
82). Despite the huge strides he has taken in regaining to know God aright, he still does 
not "clear ... understand" (376), but clarity of understanding is not far away. He has 
experienced for himself the dislocation from God that is the result of sin and the narratives 
of the first part of Book XII draw to his attention the fact that sin must always divide man 
from God. 16 After the Flood, God "oft descends to visit men I Unseen" ( 48-49) but as the 
world begins to "tend from bad to worse," he withdraws, "wearied of their iniquities" 
(106, 107). Delighting in the Israelites who are "obedient to his will" he dwells among 
them in the tabernacle (245-248) until their "foul Idolatries, and other faults" cause him to 
withdraw once more (337-39). What Adam must now understand is that in the Son God 
not only unites with man in a physical sense, but the Son's self-sacrifice, fulfilling the Law 
and releasing man from the consequences of sin, enables God, as Spirit~ to dwell in man as 
in "living Temples" in a perfected realisation of the unity prefigured by his inhabiting the 
tabernacle. In keeping with the reorientation of Adam's understanding from the physical 
to the spiritual reality throughout the visions and narratives, Michael corrects Adam's 
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expectations of a physical victory. The bruising of the Serpent's head is not to involve 
"mortal pain," and Adam is not to conceive of the fight between the Woman's Seed and 
the Serpent as a duel resulting in physical wounds. The Son's victory is spiritual: "to the 
Cross he nails thy Enemies, I The Law that is against thee, and the sins I Of all mankind" 
( 415-17). 
Three times during the last two books of Paradise Lost Michael's narrative arrives 
at the end of the world, giving a tripartite structure to Adam's instruction that corresponds 
not only to the three drops of the Water of Life instilled into Adam's eyes, but also to a 
progression from salvation by Types, the Law, and finally by Faith. Abel, Enoch and Noah 
are presented as Types of the Redeemer and the visions of Book XI conclude with a 
typological representation of the final dissolution of the world in the destruction of the 
world by the Flood. It has already been noted that the first time Michael mentions the end 
of the world, Adam is unable to respond. The Mosaic Law, rather than offering salvation, 
confirms man's sinfulness and his inability to atone for his own sin. The Son's sacrifice 
offers complete expiation, fulfilling and dismissing the Law, and when Michael draws the 
narrative a second time to the end of the world and the Second Coming, "When this 
world's dissolution shall be ripe" (XII 459), Adam having seen the Messiah's sacrifice and 
the redemption of mankind from the strictures of the Law, does not lament for a world lost 
but responds with joy and wonder at the triumph of good over evil (XII 470-71) and grace 
over wrath (478). But Michael continues; Adam's instruction is not yet complete. For this 
he requires the work of the Spirit and the Law of Faith (XII 488-90). In this third, brief 
section of the narrative, Michael emphasises the importance of inward Faith as opposed to 
outward Rites and the satisfaction of formal religion. Adam must be directed one last time 
away from the external to the internal. His question "who then shall guide I His people, 
who defend?" ( 482-83) recalls God's guidance of the Israelites in the Pillar of Fire and .the 
Pillar of Cloud, but now he must look for spiritual rather than physical guidance, inward 
rather than outward aid (MacCallum Sons 199). The believer's guide is internal and his 
armour is spiritual: 
Hee to his own a Comforter will send, 
The promise of the Father, who shall dwell 
16 As it if were some technical glitch in an otherwise commendable effort on Michael's part, Allen 
remarks that the archangel is "forever reminding Adam of his sin" (117). That Adam should be repeatedly 
His Spirit within them, and the Law of Faith 
Working through love, upon their hearts shall write, 
To guide them in all truth, and also arm 
With spiritual Armour, able to resist 
Satan's assaults (XII 486-92). 
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Adam's hope to "pass commodiously this life," his initial horror at the sight of 
death, and his concern for the physical continuance of mankind that saw him collapse with 
grief at the sight of the Flood and the "end of all [his] Offspring" (XI 7 5), are superseded 
by an understanding that "suffering for Truth's sake I Is fortitude to highest victory, I And 
to the faithful Death and Gate of Life" (569-71). This "transient World" has been 
measured and Adam understands at last its dimensions and the spiritual reality that 
exceeds it, "Eternity, whose end no eye can reach" (556). Salvation or "ingrafting in 
Christ" "brings a comprehension of spiritual things, and a love of holiness, for the 
understanding is restored in large part to its original clearness and the will to its original 
liberty" (MacCallum Sons 200). Adam's opening words in Book IV revealed his 
awareness of God's power and goodness and his dependence on that power and goodness, 
as well as his responsibility to observe the prohibition against the Tree of Knowledge. For 
unfallen Adam, obedience seems an "easy charge"(421). But in the event, his 
responsibility to God is neglected. Desiring to maintain that "link of Nature" that binds 
him to his other self, he inverts the relationship between himself and Eve and places 
responsibility to her above responsibility to God. Now his final words in Paradise Lost 
demonstrate that he has regained a right knowledge of God. He reformulates his awareness 
of God's goodness, his dependence on that goodness, and his responsibility: 
Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best, 
And love with fear the only God, to walk 
As in his presence, ever to observe 
His providence, and on him sole depend (XII 561-64). 
He re-evaluates life and death in the light of his newly acquired understanding, 
recognising that Death is not "some dreadful thing" but the "Gate of Life," a realisation he 
has arrived at through the example of the Son "whom I now I Acknowledge my Redeemer 
ever blest" (573). 
reminded of sin and its consequences is a necessary part of the process of reorientation. 
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Chapter 6 
Knowledge without God 
Futuristic visions occupy two books of Paradise Lost, but in The Tragedy of Man 
the future is presented by Lucifer as a series of dream visions that occupy eleven of the 
fifteen scenes and take Adam in one night through some of the greatest epochs of human 
civilisation. The fact that events after the Fall comprise the greater part of The Tragedy 
means that Adam's postlapsarian pursuit of knowledge becomes the significant focus of 
the work. The knowledge he gains at a conscious level appears to relate largely to the 
construction of society and the inability of mankind to generate a social structure that can 
withstand the distorting effects of the Fall. But at a subconscious and symbolic level a 
similar movement towards internalisation can be found in The Tragedy as is evident in the 
final books of Paradise Lost. Adam ages physically during the course of the poem, a 
process that is traced in the stage directions as he is transformed from the youthful 
Pharaoh of Scene 4 to the decrepit old man who meets the Eskimo and his wife, but it is 
his gradual emotional and intellectual maturation to which Hubay refers when he writes, 
"Varazslat ez az alom. Egyetlen ejszaka ferfit csinal a serdiilobol" [This dream is magic. 
In a single night it makes a man of an adolescent] (1784). Lotze finds Adam's developing 
maturity less noticeable than the physical aging, although he, too, admits that "in rough 
outline we can witness in Adam the maturing process from impetuous youth to a 
thoughtful and introspective Kepler" (61). The process is more than a rough outline, 
however, and involves the internalisation and assimilation within the person of Adam of 
those interdependent yet often conflicting facets of human nature that are initially 
represented by other characters. Adam is not merely the protagonist of a dramatic poem, 
but by virtue of his role as the first man is representative of the human race in its entirety, 
as well as symbolising the individual. Thus his development gains a symbolic and 
universal significance, and his interaction with the other main characters has implications 
at this symbolic level. Soter suggests such a symbolic reading when he writes, "A 
Tragedia alapeszmejeben eleve bennfoglaltatik a figyelmeztetes, hogy a Teremtes 
osszhangjaban Adam abrandos eszmeisege, Lucifer tagadasa, valamint ez Eva kepviselte 
termeszetiseg egymasra szorulnak, kiegeszitik egymast" [From the outset the suggestion is 
evident in the basic theme of The Tragedy that in the Creator's harmony, Adam's 
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visionary idealism, Lucifer's negativity, and the natural sphere represented by Eve are 
dependent upon each other, complete each other] (180). 1 Lengyel, too, finds that Eve, 
representative of feeling or life energy, stands in antithesis to either Lucifer or Adam 
(188). The dialectic thus generated between idealism, negativity and the natural sphere 
finds synthesis in the final scene, where the Lord explicates the role of both Eve and 
Lucifer in Adam's development (Lengyel 161, Soter 181). 
The synthesis that Lengyel and Soter find in the final scene is already occurring 
during the dream sequence, however, and a more precise division can be identified than 
that between idealism, negativity, and the natural sphere. Remembering that Lucifer 
characterises himself in the human sphere not as "negativity" per se but as the processes of 
the intellect (which he frequently deploys to negative effect), we can define the tripartite 
division of ertelem [intellect], erzelem [sensibility], and eszme [the ideal]. As Adam is the 
representative of the individual in the poem, so it is in him that these three facets of the 
human nature - intellect, sensibility, and idealism - fmd synthesis. 
Adam's tendency towards idealism is established in Scene 2. As was noted in 
Chapter 2, his response to Lucifer's reasoning stands in sharp contrast to Eve's emotional 
response. While she is easily induced to change her mind and see the Lord's prohibition as 
"cruel," Adam, recalling God's warnings about eating the forbidden fruit, is reluctant to 
discard the ideal of divine righteousness. Similarly, their responses after the Fall are 
antithetical: Eve, responding to the apparent and immediate, despairs, but Adam has 
already replaced the ideal he has rejected with the new ideal of self-as-god. His subsequent 
exposure to realities that had previously been beyond the limitations of his experience 
elicits not a logical, reasoned response, nor an emotional one but a response based solely 
on idealism.2 He frets against the thread that ties his "proud spirit" to physical existence 
(388) and bewails the instability of matter that thwarts his "great designs and great 
desires" (435). He rejects Lucifer's reasoning as the backward-looking glance of old age 
and contrasts this with his own youthful idealism (540-41). In Scene 4, his reaction to 
1 Mark also notes that during the historical scenes Adam loses his three-dimensionality and 
becomes an essentially allegorical figure ("Salvation or Tragedy" 299). 
2 Adam's response is to a degree emotional but the emotion he experiences is driven by idealism. 
His brieflament for the abandoned instinctive life of Eden hinges upon the sudden discovery that the ideal of 
self-as-god is not sustainable and provides a sharp contrast to Eve's distress, which is caused directly by 
observation of and response to their physical situation. 
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Lucifer's hypothesis that glory may be fleeting is again the response of the idealist: should 
he discover glory to be worthless, he would die and curse the world (597-98). His freeing 
of the Egyptian slaves is a grandiose and idealistic gesture that contrasts with Lucifer's 
cynical reasoning. But as the dream sequence progresses, Adam's responses lose their 
naivety. The protagonist of the later scenes is articulate, can discriminate between rhetoric 
and substance, and has developed his own opinions on the nature of the human condition. 
Similarly, the sensitive response initially represented by Eve is no longer foreign to his 
world-view. These developments do not occur at the expense of his idealism but rather 
support and foster his ongoing redefinition of what constitutes the ideal. 
In Scene 2, the tension between intellect and idealism is strongly externalised, with 
Lucifer and Adam representing two conflicting modes of knowing. Adam feels trapped by 
Lucifer's logic and, although not necessarily compelled by it, is unable to respond in a 
way that effectively nullifies the impact of Lucifer's cynicism: "Mi vegtelen konit 
okoskodasod, I Melyb61 menekves nincsen is" (729-30) [Your argument runs in endless 
circles, I From which there is no escape]. He responds in frustration to Lucifer's mockery 
in Rome but his objections are umeasoned, and the hurling of a cup at Lucifer's head 
hardly constitutes a sound logical reply. Throughout these early scenes Adam relies on an 
external catalyst, whether that be situational or Lucifer's biting critique, to trigger his 
disillusionment with the ideal and stimulate the subsequent definition of a new goal. He is 
as yet incapable of bringing any critical faculty of his own to bear upon the ideal and at the 
end of the Constantinople scene requires Lucifer's critique of disillusionment to 
understand why the ideal has failed. The process towards assimilation or internalisation of 
Lucifer's critical faculty, however, becomes evident in the following scene. Adam's 
dissatisfaction with the indifference that characterises society in Prague, which he 
represents with a degree of eloquence in conversation with Eve, is not stimulated by 
Lucifer's cynicism, and it would seem that he has begun to adopt and utilise Lucifer's 
ability to dissect and analyse. In fact, at lines 2028-30 he echoes Lucifer's argument from 
the previous scene against the idealisation of women and explores it further, applying it to 
his current situation. This ability to rationalise, to identify flaws, continues to develop. In 
Scene 10, his scepticism about the possibility of knowledge echoes and expands upon 
Lucifer's mocking words from Scene 2, "nagyon sok van meg, mit te nem tudsz I S nem is 
fogsz tudni" (225-26) [There is still so much you do not know I and never will]. In London 
he not only recognises Lucifer's sophistry and cynicism (2582, 2599) but argues against it 
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using the same techniques of ironic rebuttal as does Lucifer himself. His opening speech in 
Scene 12 demonstrates an impressive analytical ability; he does not require anyone's 
assistance in order to identify and ·condemn what is wrong in the methodology and goals 
of the Phalanstery. Not only has he developed new perception into what is important to 
human life but he has gained insight into Lucifer's character and intent, identifying in him 
"the cold indifference I of a spirit, who shares in neither my struggles I nor my death" 
(3781-83). Lucifer, he realises, wishes to drag every sacred ideal down to the dust (3837-
39). Finally he claps his hand to Lucifer's mouth, stopping his tirade: "No more! Your 
every argument seems I So artless, so sound, I But so is all the more malign" ( 3875-77). 
This recognition in itself underlines Adam's assimilation of characteristics that properly 
belong to ertelem, for it entails both conscious reflection and a process of logical thought 
that reveals the nature and interconnection of events - in this instance the nature and 
interconnection of Lucifer's arguments and motives. 
A parallel internalisation of erzelem also occurs during the course of the dream 
sequence. In the chapter on Eve, the way in which she embodies erzelem was explored and 
how her mode of understanding is arrived at through experience of the world. For Eve, 
understanding is a sensitive response to a system of stimuli rather than the result of an 
abstracted logical process and hence represents a way of knowing very different to 
Lucifer's. For this reason the two are often in conflict. While ertelem is aware of the gaps, 
erzelem is aware of the underlying unity of creation: "Mino csodas osszhang ez, 
kedvesem, IE sokszerii sz6 es egy ertelem" (205-6) [How splendid this harmony is, my 
dear; I These many tongues express a single sense]. Lucifer's natural antipathy to 
responsive sensitivity expresses itself in doubt, in ridicule, and in Scene 7 a parody of 
love. He sees erzelem as a defence against his destructive intellect: on seeing Adam and 
Eve in Eden, he doubts whether knowledge will be an effective weapon against those 
between whom erzelem "mint menhely all, I Mely lankadast61 6vja szfvoket, I Emelve a 
buk6t" (212-14) [stands as a refuge I That guards their hearts from fainting, I Lifting up 
the one that falls]. 
In Scene 4, through Eve, Adam begins to feel and understand his own emotions 
through Eve's mediation. Her presence allows him an awareness of the external, 
experiential world, not only by opening him to love but also by directing him to the world 
beyond the self. In Rome Eve expresses dissatisfaction with the shallowness of hedonistic 
pleasure and recalls a distant past "Where under sun-drenched palms I I was innocent, 
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playful, childlike, I And my soul's calling was great and noble" (1238-40), words repeated 
almost exactly by Adam twenty lines later (1259-62). This influence of her discourse on 
his is even more profound in the following scene, where his idealism and her sensibility 
come close to achieving harmonious unity. At the end of Scene 6 Adam embraces the 
ideal of Holy Love, finding chivalry to be the flower of the new world and the exalted 
ideal of womanhood to be its poetry. The perversion of the ideal in the debate between the 
heretics and the friars destroys the first tenet of .his faith in that Love and he begins to 
avoid the word "Holy" as a marker of idealism. The resultant gap in his vocabulary is 
filled when he meets Eve; while he struggles with the awareness that the very ideal he had 
espoused prevents his love, his pursuit of the ideal is affected by her sensibility and he 
adopts a vocabulary that is biased towards emotion, using words he has not used in this 
scene until now: "hearts" (1755, 1803-4, 1860) and "dreams" (1664, 1695, 1830). 
Although Lucifer and Helen provide a satirical counterpoint to this fusing of idealism and 
emotion, first in dramatic parody and then in an intellectual analysis of the problems 
involved in the idealisation of love, and although it is the negative realisation of failure 
that wins out at the end of the scene, erzelem momentarily acts as a countering, stabilising 
force, confirming Adam's faith in the possibility, if not the realisation, of ideals. 
Although sensibility and idealism in the persons of Isaura and Tancred are not 
permitted to unite, assimilation begins to occur within the character of Adam. In the 
following scene as Kepler his appeal to Barbara evinces an emotional sensibility that is 
characteristic of erzelem rather than idealism. He uses words that are are expressive of 
sentsitive response - "heart" (2027, 2035), "pain" (2003, 2028, 2036) and "love" (2025, 
2026). That he is formulating such expressions without the explicit assistance of Eve's 
sensitive guidance suggests that he has begun to assimilate erzelem in the same way as he 
is assimilating Lucifer's rational and analytical abilities. In Paris, in the dream-within-a-
dream, Adam's awareness of the necessity of human relationships is for the first time 
incommensurate with Eve's. In her first incarnation in Paris, Eve represents what is good 
in the society that Danton (and in Danton, Adam) wishes to destroy and the emotional 
response he experiences stands in striking contrast to her assumption of the idealistic role, 
a contrast she herself points out: "Mas Isten vezet, I Mint akit en szivemben hordozok" 
((2277-78) [The god that leads you I Is not the one I hold in my heart]. Her diffidence 
becomes more pronounced through the London scene and is translated into physical 
distance in the Phalanstery. Eve has fulfilled her dramatic function of prompting the 
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idealistic Adam towards sensitive awareness and now adopts a role in which she provides 
an emotionally-tuned Adam with a means of assessing the values of the age. In the 
Phalanstery and the Ice ·World, it is the sight of Eve that completes his disillusionment, 
and his emotional maturity is signalled in his ability to recognise in the "madness" of love 
a "lingering sunbeam from Eden" (3574). 
This process of maturation, which occurs by means of Adam's assimilation of 
those facets of the human nature initially represented by Eve and Lucifer, works at a 
subconscious level. He seems genuinely unaware of the huge progress he has made during 
the course of the dream-sequence, and this inability to recognise his own maturity 
contributes to his tragedy. The precise location of the tragic element in The Tragedy has 
proved a critical stumbling block. Lotze asks, "Is Adam truly a tragic character .. .if the 
poem's exposition already assures Lucifer's defeat and the salvation of man?" (56). The 
answer must be affirmative: Adam is a tragic figure and his tragedy lies precisely in his 
need for "salvation" as the imposition of a solution by an external, benevolent force. At 
the end of Scene 2, God dismisses Adam with the words, "lasd, mit ersz magadban" (335) 
[ see what you can achieve on your own]. This imperative provides the motivation for the 
continuing structure of the dream-sequence: on his own Adam attempts to discover an 
ideal that can replace the ideal of divine righteousness that he abandons in the Fall. As 
Mada.ch explained to Erdely, 
Egesz muvem alapeszmeje az akar lenni, hogy amint az ember Istentol 
elszakad, s onerejere tamaszkodva cselekedni kezd: az emberiseg 
legnagyobb s legszentebb eszmein vegig egymas utan cselekszi ezt. Igaz, 
hogy mindeni.itt megbukik, s megbuktat6ja mindeni.itt egy gyonge, mi az 
emberi termeszet legbensobb lenyeben rejlik. . . (Valogatott mitvei 393-394). 
[The fundamental idea of my whole work is intended to be this: when man 
breaks away from God and begins to act relying on his own strength, he 
pursues this course of action successively through mankind's greatest and 
most sacred ideals. True, he fails everywhere, and the cause of his 
ubiquitous failure is a weakness that is hidden in the innermost fabric of 
human nature ... ] 
The postlapsarian action of The Tragedy, comprising the eleven scenes of the 
dream sequence in which Adam explores the possibilities of self-knowledge outside any 
relationship with God, is often analysed from the point of view of a dialectic that 
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emphasises the externalised, objectified ideal. Lotze finds that Hegel's four steps in the 
development of world civilisations from despotism (the Orient) to democracy (Greece), 
aristocracy (Rome), and monarchy (the Christian world) are closely followed in the first 
four scenes of Madach's dream sequence, and locates a dialectic in these scenes, with the 
original thesis (All for One) established in Egypt and the first antithesis (One for All) in 
Greece. This antithesis is modified in the following scene to become Everybody for 
Himself, while the synthesis (Everybody for Everybody) is finally reached in Christianity 
(84). He points to further correspondence in the parallelism between Hegel's three stages 
of Christianity and the scenes set respectively in Constantinople, Prague and Paris (79). 
The dialectic identified by Lengyel, however, addresses more satisfactorily the issue of 
Adam's struggle to formulate an ideal and understand the basic problems of existence. 
Lengyel holds that as an underlying structural device in The Tragedy the Hegelian 
dialectic cannot be applied beyond the end of Scene 6. He cites St Peter's words, "Az 
egyen szabad I Ervenyre hozni mind, mi benne van" (1371-72) [the individual is free I To 
bring to realisation all that is within him], as evidence of a bifurcation in the eszme and 
finds that the true development of the ideal from this point on occurs within the individual 
(156-57). The ideal as a goal of society is stunted and leads ultimately to the Phalanstery 
and Ice World scenes where the socio-political eszme is to scrape a living at whatever cost. 
For Lengyel, the dialectic is an ongoing revision of the ideal. Soter also identifies a 
dialectic; for him, dialectic tension is generated by the interaction of Adam's visionary 
idealism, Lucifer's negativity, and the natural sphere represented by Eve, while the 
synthesis is provided in the harmony imposed by the Lord in the final scene (180). 
What Lengyel and Soter both identify is the centrality to any reading of The 
Tragedy of an internally conceived ideal and the ongoing revision of that ideal throughout 
the dream sequence. In this sense, there is an element of common ground between the 
dialectic structures they propose and that discerned by Amorose in Adam's education in 
the final books of Paradise Lost. Amorose finds there a dialectic in which history is 
presented in a broadly tripartite structure that establishes the thesis-antithesis conflict 
between the internal rule of conscience and the external rule of law, with the synthesis 
being reached in the third age in which "outward Law and inward conscience are 
combined, in effect internalising the Law so that the individual soul becomes the most 
reliable source for knowledge of God's directives" (148). The focus upon the 
internalisation of the solution or synthesis, and the transcendence of the individual over 
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the socio-political demesne, are themes that are central to Adam's postlapsarian learning 
in The Tragedy of Man. 
Falling, Adam voluntarily leaves Eden and, having abandoned God, he begins to 
discover himself. As has been noted, this self-discovery initially takes the form of a self-
awareness grounded in physical reality, in the ability of the self to project itself and its 
desires upon the external world. Adam's patterns of speech change as he explores the 
possibilities of the first person possessive suffix and first person verbal forms, and his 
dominance over the physical world provides his chief source of satisfaction: Onmagam 
levek I Enistenemme, es amit kivivok, I Meltan enyem. Brom ez, s biiszkesegem (362-64) 
[I am become I my very own god, and what I conquer I is worthily mine. This is my 
strength and my pride]. His sense of godhood is shattered by the glimpse Lucifer gives 
him into the workings of nature. The instability of all matter, including his own physical 
self, undermines his claims to godhood and acts as a catalyst to his thirst for knowledge of 
what lies beyond the limits of his individual existence. It is in this scene, too, that Adam 
first identifies what is to become critical to the ongoing revision of the ideal: 
I feel it, although I do not know its name, 
A single thread perhaps - the greater shame -
That bridles my proud soul. 
Look - if I leap up my body falls back down, 
My eyes and ears refuse to serve 
When I spy out the secrets of the far-away; 
And if imagination lifts me to the heights, 
Hunger compels me, humbled, to descend 
Again to trampled matter (386-94). 
This conflict between matter and spirit, external and internal, the inherent paradox of 
human existence as the "small spark kneaded into mud" underlies Adam's developing 
understanding of what constitutes the eszme. 
As in Paradise Lost, historicity is not in itself the focus of The Tragedy. Rather, 
history provides a framework for the pursuit of knowledge that cannot be achieved within 
the limits of the individual's existence. Milton's Adam, proscribed by mortality that must 
see him die before the Advent, cannot understand the spiritual significance of the promise 
concerning the woman's seed without the assistance of Michael's visions and narratives. 
Similarly, for Madach' s Adam, the dream sequence allows him opportunity to explore 
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issues of self-knowledge that would not otherwise be possible.3 For this reason, historical 
accuracy and anachronism are not of primary concern to Madach. Arany is correct when 
he asserts that the dream visions do not correspond to the facts of world history, for 
Madach's interest lies not in fact but in the symbolic progress of ideals.4 The appearance 
of Luther, Michelangelo, Cassius and Plato in a far distant future society would seem 
extraordinary were one to approach The Tragedy with the preconception that its overriding 
intent is the systematic portrayal of the history of mankind. The significance of these 
figures lies in their symbolic possibility. Luther represents fervour for new knowledge, 
Cassius the noble heart, Plato the visionary, and Michelangelo the creative soul. The ideal 
of individual creativity that they represent is presented as antithetical to the sterility of a 
society that has adopted the possibility of megelhetes [ survival] as its ideal and where 
man's natural creativity has been distorted, removed from the sphere of art and focused 
instead upon the recreation of matter. Luther, Cassius, Plato and Michelangelo become 
symbolic types in a scene where it is not historicity that is crucial but the "clash of great 
ideals" promised in the prologue. The same holds true of the entire dream sequence: 
3 Hubay quotes Pannenberg (no reference given): "A tortenelem az az egyetemes keret, amelyben 
az emberi elet es gondolkodas kibontakozik. Ebben a keretben az ember alland6an megtapasztalja, hogy az 
egyetemes tortenes ertelme rejtve marad elotte. Egyetlenjelen esemenyt se tudunk egyertelmiien 
meghatarozni, mertbenne eliink, sodr6dunk az egyetemes folyamatban: csak a veg, ajovo tarhatja fol a 
teljes jelentest. A tortenelem egeszet nem foghatjuk at, marpedig teljesen csak az egesz ertheto. Addig, amig 
a tortenelem veget nem ert, az emberi let es cselekves csak remenykedve varja a jelentes beteljesedeset. A 
tortenelem rejtelye csak a vegso betelejesedesben tarul fol. .. " (1785) [History is that universal framework in 
which human life and thought unfold. In this framework man is constantly experiencing that the meaning of 
the universal plot remains hidden before him. We cannot unequivocally determine a single event in the 
present because we are living in it, we are being carried along in the universal stream: only the end, the 
future, can expose the full meaning. We cannot embrace the entirety of history, although it is only in its 
entirety that it is completely understandable. So long as history has not anived at its conclusion, human 
existence and the human story only waits, hoping, for the fulfilment of meaning. History's secret is only 
uncovered in the final fulfilment.] History offers Adam a context for self-knowledge, and in seeing history to 
its bitter end he reaches an appreciation of the meaning of life he could not gain in any other way. 
4 Cited by Lotze: "Can we expect Lucifer to show Adam the future of mankind in other than 
pessimistic colours ... .it is said that the gloomy dream visions conespond to the facts of world history. This I 
deny" (55). In his summary of 19th century response to Madach's work (53-55), Lotze also mentions Agost 
Greguss's opinion that the historical scenes show things not as they really are but as Lucifer wants Adam to 
see them. Thomas Mark summaries modern criticism in "' The Tragedy of Man': Salvation or Tragedy?". 
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Madach casts Adam as Miltiades, Tancred and Danton because of the symbolic currency 
these characters bring with them. The dream sequence thus becomes a kaleidoscopic 
progression of historical moments or possibilities in which we can clearly recognise an 
ideal and its distortion. Lucifer directs the visions only to the extent to which as critical 
intelligence his aim is to point out the failing of the ideal in its historical realisation: he is a 
structural tool who fulfils not only God's but Madach's intentions.5 Thus he invariably 
leads Adam to a moment in history where the ideal espoused in the previous scene has 
already become an anachronism, in an attempt to demonstrate the failure of the ideal rather 
than allowing its potential for positive realisation. 
Questions of historicity, however, play a part in understanding the structure of the 
dream sequence and, hence, the nature of the eszme [the ideal]. Soter identifies a personal, 
autobiographical quality in the two Prague scenes and sees the Parisian scene they flank as 
central to the play' s ideology, arguing that the preceding scenes prepare the way for this 
scene, while the speculative scenes which follow serve as an epilogue: "Az egesz muvet 
tehat a szemelyes, eletrajzi es korelmeny kore felepitett szerkezetnek tekinthetji.ik; Az 
ember tragediajanak magya [sic] az else pragai, a parizsi, a masodik pragai- es a londoni 
szin" [Thus we may consider the whole work as a construct built around the personal and 
autobiographical, and around the ideals of the age; the kernel of The Tragedy of Man is the 
first Prague scene, the Paris scene, the second Prague scene - and the London scene.] 
(182). Mark follows the same division, finding four historical scenes followed by a central 
triptych and then another set of four perhaps slightly less historical scenes. But this 
division inevitably leads to problems in Scene 13. Mark's thesis that the battle cry of the 
5 Ultimately, God is the architect of Adam's developing self-knowledge. It is God who gives 
Lucifer a foothold in Eden, God who directs Adam to "see what you can achieve on your own" and instructs 
Lucifer to continue his work as cosmic "leaven." Adam's words to the scientist in the Phalanstery could well 
be taken as an analogy for the underlying direction of the dramatic action: 
I'm well aware that the man 
Who carries sand or carves stone is essential: 
Without him the hall will never rise. 
But such a man gropes in the dark, 
And has no inkling what work it is he helps in. 
Only the architect sees the whole, 
And although he cannot carve a singe stone 
It's he who, like a god, creates the work (3206-13). 
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French Revolution provides the structure for the following scenes (London, the 
Phalanstery, and the Ice World), while fundamentally sound, fails to take into account the 
function of the Space Scene, which is clearly an examination of neither liberty, equality 
nor fraternity, and in fact exists outside society, indeed, beyond the world itself. However, 
if we take into consideration the fact that historicity is not in itself the overriding 
motivation of the dream sequence, we can identify other factors in the central triptych that 
provide new insight into the redefinition of the eszme in these last four scenes. 
In the first four scenes Adam represents the ideal as a historical character. 
Discovering that the ideal is corrupted in its social realisation, he formulates a new ideal 
that will provide a new basis for society. Scene 7 comes to a conclusion with Adam 
renouncing all socially-oriented ideals: "mozogjon a vilag, amint akar I kerekeit tobbe nem 
igazitom" (1866-67) [let the world move as it may, I I shall no longer set its wheels 
straight]. He determines to disengage himself from ideals and stand on the outskirts of 
society as an observer; during the first Prague scene this is what he does both literally and 
metaphorically. 
When the first set of four scenes are compared with the last four one notices 
immediately that Adam no longer espouses the ideal in himself, he is no longer cast in the 
role of a historical figure and is no longer a central participant in the society around which 
the scene is based. More importantly - in fact, of fundamental importance - is that during 
the central triptych Adam's concept of what constitutes the ideal has changed. In that first 
set of four scenes he was searching for the realisation of an ideal within a social setting -
the realisation of an ideal by society. The ideals he espouses in these scenes are all socially 
oriented and his disillusionment is based in the socio-political failure of the ideal. In Egypt 
he comes to regret the "waste and woe of millions" and to formulate a new ideal of civic 
virtue. In Greece his disillusionment is again specifically focused upon the failure of the 
political ideal: "vagy miert is eljek I Midon latom, mi dare a szabadsag, I Melyert egy 
elten kiiszkiidem keresztiil" (1257-59) [ or why should I live I since I see how foolish is 
that liberty I for which I strove my entire life?]. It is this liberty that had comprised his 
"nagy eszme" [great ideal] (1071-72) and its failure, together with his disillusionment with 
the socially oriented ideal of civic virtue, leads him to formulate hedonism as the new 
expression of the ideal in the social context. The end of Scene 6 sees him adopt Holy 
Love, an ideal that has both socio-political and individual possibilities, bringing both 
brotherhood and the liberation of the individual (1363-65). Although the Apostle Peter, 
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like Milton's Michael "sowing seeds of a sufficient determining," emphasises the 
discovery of the ideal within the individual, Adam espouses rather the social goal of 
brotherhood, seeing in Holy Love, too, a means for the betterment of society: 
Oh, if God exists, 
If he cares for us and has power over us, 
Let him bring forth a new people and a new ideal for the world, 
The former to infuse good blood into a bastard race, 
And the latter to give scope to nobler folk to reach 
New heights (1339-44). 
At the end of Scene 7, having been brought to the point where he is obliged to 
admit that it is not possible to realise an ideal in society, Adam steps back from idealism 
altogether. He will no longer attempt to right the wheels of the world (1866-68). But his 
Parisian dream reawakens his enthusiasm for the eszme [the ideal] - not as the espousal of 
socially oriented impulses, although this definition continues to be explored throughout 
the following scenes, but for the first time as the expression of the Isten szikraja, the 
"spark of God" or "divine spark" in man: "How splendid was the scene revealed to me! I 
He's blind, who cannot see the spark of God, I Smeared though it was with blood and 
filth" (2372-74). This bifurcation of the ideal and its formulation as the individual 
expression of an internal state of being is pivotal: it marks a turning point in Adam's self-
knowledge and introduces the dichotomy of matter and spirit that provides the impetus for 
the final scenes of the dream sequence: "Az eszmek erosbek I A rossz anyagnal. Ezt 
ledontheti I Eroszak, az orokre elni fog" (2411-13) [Ideals are stronger I Than sorry 
matter. Might can destroy matter, the ideal will live forever]. Man is "a small spark 
kneaded into mud" and if we take Saint Peter's words, "the individual is free I To bring to 
realisation all that is within him," literally, that which is inside the individual is the Isten 
szi/a'aja, the divine spark. As Lengyel writes, "Az eszme tehat mint orok feladat Isten 
szava benniink: az eszme a benniink rejlo Isten" [The eszme is the eternal task inside us; it 
is the word of God. Eszme is the God within us] (156). 
Whereas in the first four scenes Adam hoped to prove the possibility of the social 
realisation of the ideal, in the four scenes following this pivotal internalisation of eszme 
the action centres around his assertion that the ideal is stronger than matter. The structural 
impetus of these scenes is the dichotomy between internalised eszme and material 
existence. In London materialism proves stronger than idealism: man degenerates to a 
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state of animal existence ("silanyul allatta az ember" 2726) because the divine spark, the 
creative impulse, is made subservient to matter. Music, identified by Adam as a product of 
the creative ideal in Scene 10, is simply a way of scraping a living, and value is vested in 
objects rather than in beauty or truth. The distortion of the ideal is most clearly seen in 
Eve, in whom Adam hopes to find "holy poetry, the music of the past" (2798). She is 
possessed of a degree of innate piety that leads her to place her bouquet before the statue 
of the saint, and at the bizarre conclusion of the scene, when the citizens of London leap 
one by one into the open grave, she is transformed by the spirit of Love, Poetry and Youth, 
transcending matter and scorning the grave that only has power over "dust. .. the 
earthborn" (3135). 6 Yet even Eve can be bought by the prospect of material wealth and 
effectively names her price: "you might buy me a fairing .. .I saw some trinket vendors 
over there" (2991, 2999, cf 2815). 
Even the internalised ideal can be corrupted by the exigencies of material existence 
and, in the following scene, Adam looks to science to provide a stable social order that 
will nurture and give free scope to individual expression, enabling the L<,ten szilmija to 
find more perfect fulfilment. He identifies eszme as that which "directs ardour, that sacred, 
eternal flame in human hearts ... to loftier goals" (3166-71). But in the conflict between 
matter and ideal material existence proves stronger: megelhetes, the possibility of the 
simple continuance of physical life, is upheld as the eszme governing this society and 
anything that does not contribute to mere survival is forbidden (3369). Poetry is dismissed 
as a "useless flower" and Adam finds the utilitarian productions of the Phalanstery 
"devoid of art and soul" (3340). The focus upon material existence is reflected in the 
Scientist's attempts to recreate life in a test-tube by manipulating the "eternal laws of 
matter" (3414), experiments that are doomed to failure because matter alone does not 
constitute life. The necessary spark ("szikra" - significantly, the same word Adam uses to 
describe the divine spark in man) is missing and cannot be fabricated by science. As we 
6 Eve's apotheosis is one of the most Faustian moments of The Tragedy. As Hubay remarks (1787), 
Madach might have chosen to finish the poem here but did not. The fact that he continued beyond this 
apotheosis and the ascendance of the eternal feminine is another argument to look beyond the Faustian 
influences in The Tragedy. Had Madach concluded here, the philosophy expressed in The Tragedy would be 
fundamentally different. Adam's self-knowledge is not yet complete. He has not yet discovered the ultimate 
interdependence of spirit and matter, nor formulated his final definition of the goal of life, nor made the final 
choice to relate his own being to that of the divine. 
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have seen, Luther, Michelangelo, Cassius, and Plato represent the attempt of the individual 
to "bring to realisation all that is within him," attempts that are repressed and punished by 
the fraternity. Again, matter proves stronger than the ideal, and at the end of the scene 
Adam rejects the physical and seeks an otherworldly existence, his lines echoing Eve's 
apotheosis at the end of Scene 11: "Megvetjiik e foldnek hitvany porat, I Keresve utat a 
magasb korokbe" (3584-85) [Let us scorn the dust of this miserable earth, I Seeking the 
way to higher spheres]. 
In the Space Scene Adam's hypothesis that ideals are stronger than sorry matter is 
put to the ultimate proof. Leaving the earth behind, he attempts to dislocate the 
internalised ideal from the material body. The antipathy of spirit and flesh first 
experienced in Scene 3 is reflected in his conflicting emotions: 
Two emotions are warring in my breast: 
I feel how miserable the earth is, how it binds 
My lofty soul, and long to break free of its sphere; 
And yet I weep for it and ache that I am tom away (3595-98) 
Nevertheless, he is determined to continue until every bond that ties him to the earth is 
broken (3626-27), confident that the soul, that composite of "thought and truth" (3641 ), is 
eternal and therefore will outlive the demise of matter. Identifying this "thought and truth" 
as that which existed before the world of matter, he implicitly associates it with the divine, 
for it is God who enjoyed existence before the creation of the material world (117-18). 
Again, Adam is referring to the Isten szikraja in man, the divine that informs the physical 
being, but now the focus is not the creative energy of that divine spark but its immortality. 
His attempts to render it disincamate fail. Ideals cannot outlive "sorry matter"; the two are 
inextricably bound together within the human nature. This realisation, bought at the cost of 
his near-death, leads him to accept the condition of mortality which is essential to the 
pursuit of any ideal. Ultimately, the ideal is inspiration, direction rather than goal, and is 
valued for the effect it has upon the individual: 
However wretched 
My ideal, still it inspired me, 
Raised me up, and so proved great and holy (3715-16). 
If the ideal has not proved stronger than matter and the two must coexist in the human 
condition, Adam can still hope that eszme will prove to be eternal. Returning with Lucifer 
to the earth, he anticipates the final triumph of idealism: 
Lead me to where palm trees flourish, 
The lovely home of sunshine, sweet scents, 
Where man's soul has grown 
To full consciousness of its strength (3745-47). 
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The Ice World that concludes the dream sequence is the grimmest of all the scenes, 
for here not only the hope that Adam expresses in these lines but also his assertion in 
Scene 10 that although might can destroy matter, the ideal will live forever, meets its 
reversal. He finds no new ideal sprung up again, to breathe life into the earth (3732-33) 
but rather, this final scene is infused with death. The moon stares from behind the fog like 
"death's lantern" and nature has flung a shroud over the world as over a grave. The world 
and mankind are dying, but the terrible truth is that the ideal, the eszme is already dead. 
Matter has outlived the ideal. Or, as Lucifer argues, the ideal has always been subservient 
to matter, shaped by the exigencies of material existence and blind coincidence. 
Milton's Adam is conducted through the visions and narratives of Books XI and 
XII by the archangel Michael with the specific intent of assisting him to remedy those 
failures in knowledge that were precipitated by the Fall and to regain to "know God 
aright." Madach's Adam is guided by Lucifer, who in Scene 1 announced to God his 
intention to "subvert your world" (151). Becsy suggests that Lucifer's goal is to drive 
Adam to suicide because this will prove that God's creation "is not good" (259). But 
Adam's physical demise is not Lucifer's aim. He saves Adam from death on more than 
one occasion and greets his potential suicide in Scene 15 not with congratulation but with 
cynicism. 7 In Scene 2 he gives his reasons for leaving Heaven and explains his ultimate 
motivation in a passage that contains startling parallels to St Peter's description of his new 
world: 
I long for strife, for disharmony 
Which gives birth to new strength and a new world, 
Where the soul, by itself, can be great (300-303). 
Given St Peter's emphasis on the freedom of the individual to "bring to realisation all that 
is within him" and the subsequent development of Adam's understanding of what eszme 
comprises, Lucifer's identification of the fulfilment of internalised potential as his goal 
7 Lucifer rescues Adam from beheading at the end of Scene 5 and suggests that they enter the 
Phalanstery in disguise, thus avoiding the threat of violence (3182). 
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seems astonishing. It is as if Lucifer is pre-empting St Peter, directing Adam towards the 
critical spiritual facet of existence. In fact, his words serve to define, before the Fall, 
before the dream sequence, the arena of combat: his aim is not to destroy Adam physically 
but to effect a spiritual subversion, relying on strife and disharmony to bring to realisation 
in Adam a self other than that intended by God. 8 Renouncing providential control, God 
leaves Adam in Lucifer's world, where the self, by itself, can be great. The world of 
instinctual existence and stasis is replaced by Lucifer's world of self-awareness and an 
evolution driven by the realisation of absence. Lucifer invariably leads Adam to a moment 
in history where the ideal espoused in the previous scene is already an anachronism. His 
intention is to demonstrate the failure of the ideal and by doing so, to destroy Adam's 
instinctive idealism, destroy, as it were, the divine in man. His opposition to the eszme is 
based on cold fact - the cold fact of his own selection of history - and is argued with 
merciless mockery to bring Adam to disillusionment and despair: 
In good time you'll reach the goal 
Sooner perhaps than you might hope, 
And then you'll weep, seeing its imbecility, 
While I laugh in your face (813-16). 
Despair is reached in the penultimate scene, when Adam is faced with choice 
whether to accept or defy the destiny allotted him by God (3937-38). This is Lucifer's 
moment of triumph, the moment at which Adam's idealism apparently lies vanquished. 
Having identified the Isten szikraja in man and its creative expression as one thread of the 
bifurcated ideal, having asserted the superiority of ideal over matter and the 
indestructibility of the ideal, Adam is faced not only with the utter failure of the divine 
spark to overcome the material world but also the interdependence of that spark on man's 
physical existence. Lucifer's triumph and Adam's tragedy is that, alone, he can -
apparently - achieve nothing. 
Abandoning Adam after the Fall, God bids him "see what you can achieve alone." 
Again, the necessity of individual endeavour parallels the necessity of self-realisation in 
Lucifer's world - or St Peter's. Self-knowledge must be achieved by the individual. 
Maturity is achieved through internalisation: the internalisation of the ideal and the 
8 In line with this argument is the fact that the Heavenly Chorus sees the world as "lost" at the 
moment of the Fall, that is, at the moment of Adam's spiritual crisis, not thirteen scenes later when he 
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internalisation of those facets of human nature that were originally identifiable only in Eve 
and Lucifer. But the redefinition of the ideal and Adam's identification of the internal self 
as the God-in-man, the Is ten szikraja, also represents a significant development of his self-
identification vis-a-vis God. The internalisation of the divine as the spark that animates 
human life leads to a recognition of an interrelationship between God and man that 
represents a fundamentally different position from the vaunted self-divinity of Scene 2. It 
is a reversal of man's desire to compete with God evident in Scene 4 where Adam as 
Pharaoh believes that in the pyramids he has achieved an endless glory that outdoes God's 
and boasts that "Man has become stronger than God" (587). This realisation that the divine 
is not divorced from the human despite God's and Adam's abandonment of each other 
after the Fall is critical in terms of the resolution of The Tragedy. Adam's discovery that 
striving itself is the meaning of life, "life is struggle, I and man's end is this struggle in 
itself' (3701-2), so often identified as the crux of Madach's philosophy, must be read in 
conjunction with the lines that contain his capitulation and return to God, "Uram, 
legyoztel. fm, porban vagyok I Nelki.iled, ellened hiaba vfvok" (4002-3) [Lord, you have 
conquered; I lie in the dust I Without you, against you, I strive in vain]. His return to God 
underlines his failure to prove his own greatness and as such is inimical to the ideal of 
self-godhood, but it is only through his redefinition of the ideal, through his realisation 
that the self, the inner soul of man, is of divine origin, that he is ultimately able to relate 
that self to God. If thought and truth are infinite and existed before the world of matter 
(3641-42), then thought and truth are commensurate with the God Adam had attempted to 
deny. 
This relation of the self to God entails both salvation and tragedy.9 Although it 
marks the end of Adam's struggle on his own and brings a degree of tranquillity, his return 
considers suicide. 
9 Belehorsky asks: "Mi a Tragedia vegso konkluzi6ja? Az ember elet fonnmaradasanak biztos 
tudasa, bizonyossag az emberi elet ertelmessegeben .... Az individuum mindennel ertekesebb kincset fedez 
fol onmagaban: szabadsagat. Szabadsagat, mely azonos ember letevel, szabadsagat, mely bunhoz, erenyhez 
egyforman kotheti. Kiildetese az alland6 valasztas, mely onformalas, onmegval6sftas is. A szabadsag 
jelentese egyenlo az en-eve 1. ... " (892) [What is the final conclusion of The Tragedy? The certain knowledge 
of the survival of human life, certainty in the intelligence of human life .... The individual discovers in 
himself treasure more valuable than everything: freedom. Freedom, which is identical with human existence, 
freedom, which may bind one equally to sin and virtue. Its destiny is eternal choice, which is also self-
formulation, self-realisation. The meaning of freedom is equal to the meaning of the "I"] 
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to God does not provide him with access to knowledge beyond that which he has.already 
acquired through his own efforts. The solution imposed by God is merely a recapitulation 
' 
of what Adam has already learnt at a subconscious level and what has been demonstrated 
by the action of the drama - that within the limits of human experience uncertainty is the 
only certainty, and that meaningfulness in life can only be found in the active cooperation 
of responsive sensitivity, idealism, and the potentially destructive rationalism of the 
intellect. The synthesis outlined by God is only the synthesis already achieved within the 
character of Adam. Not even the immortality of the soul is confirmed by Madach's God; 
rather, he affirms the impossibility of accessing knowledge that lies beyond the ability of 
the individual: "Ne kerdd I Tovabb a titkot, mit j6tekonyan I Takart el istenkez vagy6 
szemedt61" ( 4042-44) [Inquire no further I Into the secret that the hand of God I Has 
kindly veiled from your longing sight]. And yet the return to God is necessary. It is the 
delayed response to God's challenge in Scene 2. It marks the end of Adam's struggle on 




On an initial reading of Paradise Lost and The Tragedy of Man many differences 
are apparent. The overriding programme of Milton's poem is to 'justify the ways of God 
to men," and his version of the Fall story explores the relationship between God and man 
and the necessity of that relationship to any true self-understanding. Madach, on the other 
hand, wished to demonstrate the effects of man's severance from God and his subsequent 
progression through a series of ideals while reliant on his own strength. Consequently, the 
details of the Fall story- conversation with God in Eden, the injunction against the Tree of 
Knowledge, the role of Satan or Lucifer, the consequences of the Fall, expulsion from the 
garden, and Adam's postlapsarian [ re ]discovery of knowledge - are deployed differently 
and to different ends by the two authors. And there is the overriding difference between 
epic and tragedy, between affirmation and despair. But such differences should not blind 
us to an underlying similarity of intent. Belohorszky' s comment on the philosophical basis 
of The Tragedy might also be applied to Paradise Lost: both are works "melynek 
val6sagtiikrozese komplex valasz a let kerdeseire es igy immanensen filoz6fiai 
allasfoglalas is" [ whose mirroring of reality is a complex reply to the questions of 
existence and thus ... also a philosophical stance] (887). 
At one level, philosophy has always attempted to catalogue and explicate not only 
our knowledge of the external world but also the phenomenon of human self-awareness. 
The desire to know comprises a critical goal of human endeavour; in the words of 
Aristotle, "all men by nature desire to know" (Works VIII 980a). This desire reaches 
towards answers to the question, who (or what) am fl The Biblical story of the Fall, while 
formulated as religious mythology rather than a systematic philosophical statement, 
approaches the same question. At its most fundamental level, it is an attempt to explain 
our awareness of conflicting potentialities within the self by rationalising our ability to 
conceive of an ideal of internalised perfection and our simultaneous inability to realise that 
ideal. In our fallen state, we lack perfection, and yet the impetus to perfection persists, 
implying a faculty of discrimination: we are able to recognise whatever it is we identify as 
"good" as well as its opposite, whether that opposition is simply a failure to arrive at the 
ideal or the active negation of good. This ability to discriminate, to "know good and evil," 
is identified by God in the Biblical account as what characterises the divine (Gen. 3.22) 
and yet, paradoxically, it also defines the human condition. The Fall marks the end of an 
110 
instinctual existence in a state of perfection and the beginning of the struggle for moral 
and spiritual equilibrium, that ability to err which makes imperfect fallen existence 
recognisably human. 
For Classical philosophers and poets, knowledge of the gods was not necessarily 
an integral part of knowledge of one's self. The relationship between divine and mortal as 
described by the poet Pindar argues that god and man are similar, if ultimately 
incommensurate, beings: 
Single is the race, single 
Of men and of gods; 
From a single mother we both draw breath, 
But a difference of power in everything 
Keeps us apart (Greek Literature 104). 
For Pindar, man does not find his source in god. Xenophanes goes further, postulating that 
the idea of divinity may have its source in man: "Man made his gods, and furnished them I 
with his own body, voice and garments" (Greek Literature 90). For Aristotle, knowledge 
of the self leads to God rather than having its foundation in the divine. Observation of 
external reality develops self-knowledge; the soul best discovers itself in the mirror of the 
intimate friend (Works IX 1213a, 1245a). When Milton's Adam awakes, he responds 
immediately to details of the external, to "Hill, Dale, and shady Woods, and sunny Plains, 
I And liquid Lapse of murmuring Streams; by these, I Creatures that liv'd, and mov'd, and 
walk' d, or flew" (VIII 262-64). Observing the creatures, his attention is turned to himself 
and the fact that he, too, "sometimes went, and sometimes ran" (268). But for Adam the 
self reflected in the external is not enough to bring him to self-knowledge. Despite the fact 
that, like the creatures around him, he is possessed of "supple joints" and "lively vigour," 
this is not sufficient to answer his questions about the source of his existence. His 
discovery of his physical being, of those "supple joints" and "lively vigour," is qualified 
immediately by a significant "but": 
Myself I then perus'd, and Limb by Limb 
Survey' d, and sometimes went, and sometimes ran 
With supple joints, as lively vigour led: 
But who I was, or where, or from what cause 
Knew not (VIII 267-71). 
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Milton's Adam seeks understanding of the source of his own being as an essential 
prerequisite to knowledge of himself. At this stage he lacks the intimate friend in whom, 
according to the Aristotelian paradigm, he might be able to discover himself. But his 
urgency to understand the source of being as evinced by his address to the created world 
reflects a development in the philosophical treatment of the question of self-knowledge in 
which Christian values assimilate and supersede the Aristotelian categorisation of the 
means to self-knowledge. The role of the intimate friend is assumed by a God who is the 
source of all being and with whose existence the existence of the individual is inextricably 
involved, and the Classical impetus towards self-knowledge is complicated by this 
relationship. In his History of Britain Milton refers to the development of self-knowledge 
through a study of external reality, claiming that a study of former times may "raise a 
knowledg of our selves both great and weighty ... for if it be a high point of wisdom in 
every private man, much more is it in a Nation, to know it selfe" (Works V i 130). Yet in 
Paradise Lost Raphael warns Adam against superfluous study of external reality. The 
pursuit of all learning is to be directed towards one goal. Knowledge exists "within 
bounds" and enquiry into the physical world should "serve I To glorify the Maker" (VII 
120, 115-16). Thus observation of the external world provides a point of departure for 
knowledge of God, who "sitt'st above these Heavens I To us invisible or dimly seen I In 
these thy lowest works" (V 156-58). In these lines Milton reflects a conviction held widely 
by his contemporaries that "Since the perfection of blessedness consists in the knowledge 
of God, he has been pleased ... to manifest his perfections in the whole structure of the 
universe, and daily place himself in our view, that we cannot open our eyes without being 
compelled to behold him" (Calvin Institutes I 51 ). 1 
It is Adam's observation of the created world and specifically of himself that leads 
him to the conclusion that there is a "Great Maker" through whom "I move and live" (VIII 
281 ). Self-knowledge and knowledge of God are inextricable and the Aristotelian concept 
of discovery of the self through study of an intimate friend is superseded by discovery of 
I In this issue Milton is very close to Calvin. Compare Christian Doctrine: "That there is a God, 
many deny .... But he has left so many signs of himself in the human mind, so many traces of his presence 
through the whole of nature, that no sane person can fail to realise that he exists" (Works VI 130) with 
Calvin: "For though in old times there were some, and in the present day not a few are found who deny the 
being of a God, yet, whether they will or not, they occasionally feel the truth which they are desirous not to 
know" (Institutes Vol 1 44). 
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the self through contemplation of the divine. To quote Calvin again, "Our 
wisdom ... consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. 
But as these are connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the 
two precedes, and gives birth to the other. For ... no man can survey himself without 
forthwith turning his thoughts towards the God in whom he lives and moves" (Institutes I 
37). Although Calvin maintains that "some idea of God always exists in every human 
mind" (Institutes I 44) and cites Cicero as evidence that this idea of God was also 
prevalent in the Classical world, the Renaissance theologian John Frith identifies the Bible 
as the authority for the interrelationship of knowledge of self and knowledge of God: 
The philosophers to whom God had inspired certain sparkles of truth, 
acknowledged that the chiefest point of wisdom and direction of a man's 
life was to know himself, which sentence the Scripture establisheth so 
clearely, that no man may dissent from the truth of the same. For Solomon 
saith, that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Now who can 
fear the Lord, but only he that knoweth himself, as the Scripture teacheth 
him?" (265). 
Following this conviction that knowledge of self and God are intricately related, 
Milton's Adam discovers himself in conversation with God. His first instinctive 
apprehension of the existence of a "Great Maker" is confirmed and through interaction 
with God he arrives at an expression of "the spirit within thee ... My Image" that wins the 
approval of his Maker. For Milton's Adam, the prelapsarian state offers opportunities to 
develop through conversation with God, conversation with Eve and conversation with 
Raphael, and the self-knowledge that he constructs is sufficient - or should be sufficient -
to enable him to make correct choices when faced with temptation. But he fails to "know 
[him]self aright" and falls, confusing the relationship between source, self, and image. He 
loses his ability to perceive the dependence of the self upon its source, to understand 
himself as God's image, and posits dependence upon his own image, Eve. For Milton, the 
Fall represents the "ruins" of knowledge, and all postlapsarian learning - including 
Adam's in the final two books of Paradise Lost - is to be directed towards reparation of 
those ruins by regaining a proper knowledge of God and, consequently, a proper 
understanding of the self. 
For Madach's Adam, by contrast, discovery of the self is located not in the 
prelapsarian state within the context of a relationship with God but in the moment of the 
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Fall and through God's and man's abandoning of each other. Madach's revision of the Fall 
story largely rejects the assumption of Christianity that knowledge of self and God are 
interdependent and presents a self that is the centre of its own universe, a god unto itself, 
and is able to realise itself - and, indeed, only can begin to realise itself - in the absence of 
an external divinity. Adam's fall out of a relationship with God and into self-knowledge 
and the rejection of The Tragedy of Man of the necessity of a relationship with God to the 
acquisition of initial self-knowledge, offers an analogy to the contemporary philosophical 
shift away from a theocentric universe to one whose centre of gravity and cause of being is 
the individual. Adam's identification of struggle as the goal of life, his emphasis on 
action, his redefinition of the ideal through disillusionment and choice, in many ways 
anticipate the existentialist approach to life in which "the self is an ideal, a chosen course 
of action and values" (Solomon 243). His discovery of his self, reflected in the sudden 
shift in his discourse towards first person singular verbal forms and suffixes and in his 
boast of self-godhood, is commensurate with the existentialist attitude that begins with the 
individual experiencing itself as "the hero, the megalomaniac ... the realization that 'I am 
the world."' (Solomon 242). The world that Adam enters as he falls, the world of Lucifer 
where the soul by itself can be great, finds parallel in the existentialist illusion of self-
creation. Milton's Adam recognises that life cannot be self-generated; for his Madachian 
counterpart, as well as for the existentialist, the source of man is man or, to quote Sartre, 
"man makes himself' ( qtd. in Solomon 177). In The Tragedy of Man it is through his own 
efforts and through his assimilation of the qualities of intellect and sensibility that Adam 
grows. Like Kierkegaard's "existing individual" (Copleston 348), Adam is in a constant 
process of becoming. 
But the correlation between the existentialist attitude as developed during the early 
20th century and the philosophical position conveyed in The Tragedy extends only so far. 
The most valuable comparison is rather between Mada.ch and his contemporary, 
Kierkegaard.2 In many ways both anticipate the more fully developed existentialim of the 
20th century and the similarities between the two philosophical positions is worth 
exploring. In the much-quoted lines from Scene 13, Madach's Adam realises that life is a 
2 Belohorszky finds that "Kierkegaard es Madach kozott latunk belso kapcsolatot, filoz6fiai 
rokonsagot" (886) [between Kierkegaard and Madach we can see an internal connection, a philosophical 
kinship], and proceeds to examine in some detail the correspondence of Kierkegaard's three phases of self-
realisation with Adam's development in The Tragedy. 
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struggle and man's goal is that struggle in itself (3701-2), a sentiment that fmds correlation 
in Kierkegaard's belief that "existence itself, the act of existing, is a striving ... (and) the 
striving is infinite" (Copleston 348). Adam understands that it is the paradox of human 
existence as the "divine spark kneaded into mud" that generates that struggle. Kierkegaard 
defines existence as "that child that is born of the inf mite and the finite, the eternal and the 
temporal, and is therefore a constant striving" (Copleston 348). But the critical congruency 
between the two, and that which differentiates them from later existentialist thought, is the 
ultimate necessity for the self to return to the divine. 
The third and fmal stage of self-realisation in the Kierkegaardian dialectic 
comprises the decision, through faith, to relate the self to a being who lies beyond the 
reach of speculative philosophy (Copleston 345). Similarly, Madach's Adam only begins 
to discover himself outside the context of a relationship with God. In the final scene of The 
Tragedy, he chooses to return to the idea of God that he had rejected in the Fall and accept 
a reality beyond the horizons of the self. It is a mistake to read his identification of 
struggle as the goal of human life without reference- to this later decision, for his choice to 
return to God qualifies his philosophy of life. Realising that all struggle is meaningless 
outside a relationship with God, he relocates the boundaries of that struggle: "Uram, 
legy6ztel. fm a porban vagyok I Nelkuled, ellened hiaba vfvok" (4002-3) [Lord, you win. 
Here I am in the dust I Without you, against you I strive in vain]. The admission 
comprises his delayed response to God's challenge in Scene 2, "see what you can achieve 
on your own" (335), and from this perspective the entire action of the dream sequence 
becomes parenthetical, an extended hiatus between two lines of the dialogue between God 
and man. The self-godhood that Adam proclaimed in Scene 3 has proved impotent and all 
his attempts to arrive at an ideal that is not corrupted through being realised historically 
have failed. Only by returning to a relationship with the divine can he hope to discover the 
meaning of his endless existential striving. 
Curiously, Madach's God denies Adam the possibility of deriving a sense of 
direction and purpose from this relating of himself to the divine, despite Adam's clearly 
articulated desire for further knowledge. Adam shares this desire, too, with Kierkegaard: 
"The important thing is to understand what I am destined for, to perceive what the Deity 
wants me to do; the point is to find the truth which is truth for me, to find that idea for 
which I am ready to live and die" (Journals § 22, qtd. in Kaufmann 189). Adam had hoped 
to find such an ideal without reference to the Deity, and ultimately God does nothing more 
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than confirm the role of the ideal that Adam himself formulated in Scene 13, when he 
recognised that "However wretched I My ideal, still it inspired me, I Raised me up, and so 
proved great and holy" (3715-16). God even reinforces the existentialist ethic of striving: 
"Your arms are strong, your heart is noble: I Endless the field that summons you to work" 
( 4072-73). And yet this final stage was necessary: Adam must strive with God rather than 
without him. 
This ultimate understanding is not the "paradise within" that Milton's Adam 
experiences. For the Adam of Paradise Lost, attaining the "sum of wisdom" is not 
unrealistic. He reaches this point before the end of the epic and it is precisely because he 
has that he must strive: man must "add I Deeds" because he has come to know (XII 581-
82). The Adam of The Tragedy arrives only at the possibility of understanding, the 
possibility of knowledge amid a world of uncertainty. But this knowledge is limited. In the 
resolution imposed by God, knowing what lies beyond transient human experience is 
impossible and man's inability to access the "secret that the hand of God has kindly 
veiled" is what elevates and ennobles his struggles towards an ideal. In an inversion of the 
resolution of Paradise Lost, man must strive because he does not know. 
The positive outcome of epic is not merely a literary convention. When Milton 
asserted that the end of all learning is "to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining 
to know God aright" (Works II 366-67), he was not imposing an impossible imperative 
upon educational endeavour but one which, if idealistic, was yet attainable. For Milton, 
God was essentially knowable. He was visible in the created world and specifically in man 
himself, and the self-seeking soul would inevitably be directed by its own efforts to 
discover God. For Milton's Adam, too, learning to "know God aright" is an achievable 
goal. The opportunities afforded in the prelapsarian state enable him to construct a sound 
understanding of the relationship between himself and God and although he falls out of 
self-knowledge into misunderstanding, failing to know himself aright, he is prompted to 
relearn, repairing the ruins of his former knowledge and arriving at a reformulation of his 
relationship with the divine. Nor is the outcome of The Tragedy merely formulaic. In his 
poem "Hit es tudas," considering the loss of the original harmony in which God and man 
lived together, Madach writes, "a nagy iirt tan at sem tudja szallni, I Isten gondja es 
emberremenyek" [perhaps not even God's care and human hopes I Can reach and touch 
across the vast chasm]. In The Tragedy, he allows the hope- or at least the hope of hope -
that the relationship can be renewed, although Adam's final words reflect perhaps a 
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greater measure of despair. Traditionally, the Fall involves division: man is separated from 
God, the creature from the creator, and good is separated by definition and experience 
from evil. In both The Tragedy of Man and Paradise Lost resolution is reached only in the 
healing of that dislocation. But where for Milton "regaining to know God aright" is the 
impulse that underlies all learning, for Madach even the possibility of restoration is 
doubtful and certain knowledge is an impossibility; man is not to inquire further into "the 
secret that the hand of God I Has kindly veiled from your longing sight" ( 4043-44). 
In Genesis, Eve sees that the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge is "to be desired to 
make one wise" (Gen 3:6). The Biblical story of the Fall cannot be separated from a 
human fascination with knowledge and a desire to understand that fascination by 
objectifying it. Implicit to both Milton's and Madach's utilisation of the story is a re-
exploration of the relationship between knowledge and falling. This attempt to discover 
answers to the fundamental questions of human existence and human capacity for 
knowledge creates common ground that underlies the apparent and at times distracting 
differences between their work. The desire to know remains a constant through the 
vagaries of human .development, but the approach to knowledge taken by different 
generations shifts, drawing the story of the Fall away from its original context of religious 
mythology into the realms of anthropocentric philosophy. Paradise Lost and The Tragedy 
of Man exist in a continuum that reflects the ongoing effect of changing philosophical 
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